# PAUL TILLICH'S UTILIZATION OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN SITUATION

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# PREFACE

The thought of Paul Tillich has intrigued and inspired me to search for the depth dimension in man's life that reveals to him the meaning of his existence. Tillich's thought has provided a structure for analyzing the ultimate concerns that the history of mankind has recorded in literary and artistic forms. He has also provided the means for grasping and shaping the meanings that are indigenous in the symbols that man expresses in his life styles. My purpose has been to derive the dynamics and form in Tillich's utilization of depth psychological insights in order to achieve the depth dimension of his thought about the human situation.

An intense search for the meaning of life in the depth dimension of man was initially motivated by Stanley Hopper through hours of personal dialogue. His courses sketched out a panoramic view of life that offered innumerable vistas of thought about man and his existence. The creative and disciplined thought of Carl Michalson illustrated so well the truth that is often encapsuled by the paradox. His personal friendship encouraged me to risk juxtaposing contradictive ideas in search for the meaning and significance of life. I am greatly indebted to Ira Progoff who has illuminated the depths of man's being and revealed the creative-destructive movements of the unconscious that determine many of our crucial decisions in life. The most significant influence upon the dynamics and form of this study was Will Herberg. His most unusual conceptual analysis of the human predicament, from many facets of knowledge including depth psychology and theology, has been a critical influence upon the grasping and shaping of my ideas. Most of all, he gave me sustaining encouragement from problem to problem and answer to answer. I am indebted to all of these men who have made my life more meaningful by showing me the meaning they have found in their own lives and the direction they have given to my academic pursuits.

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# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

The influence of depth psychology is evident in the thought of Paul Tillich. It is explicitly evident by his own admission of its significant contribution to his thought and to theology generally. It is implicitly evident in his utilization of depth psychological insights and materials in his analysis of the human situation. He has understood depth psychology as a science concerned with the dynamic activity of the unconscious psyche and as an integrating center for all the disciplinary resources that deal with an analysis of the human predicament. The phenomenological concerns of depth psychology are an ancillāris to the ontological principles that undergird Tillich's thought about the existential situation of man. He has permitted his work to come under the influence of depth psychological thought more than any other theologian because of the correlative methodology that is the framework of his life work as well as his Systematic Theology, the magnum opus of his thought.

Tillich has subjected his thought to the two formal criteria of every theological enterprise: to form and content that serve as the methodological guardians of every approach to systematic theology. The task of the theologian is guided by these two basic requirements: to present a responsible statement of the truth of the Christian faith as it has been affirmed by the history of the church and its faithful adherents, and to formulate a methodology by which a relevant interpretation of this truth can be made by each succeeding generation. Rather than to follow the pattern of emphasizing one or the other of these two demands, Tillich has accepted the challenge to evolve from both poles a systematic theology that does not sacrifice the Christian message to the human situation nor obscure the questions of man's ultimate concerns that arise out of the awareness of his finitude in the answers that have been given by the traditional interpretations of the revelatory events of the Christian faith. He has adopted a methodology for correlating the message and the situation, the answer and the question, the divine and the human relationship by an analogy of being. This approach respects the authenticity of philosophy's analysis of the structure of being and theology's analysis of the meaning of being and their interdependent relationship that mutually informs each other of the significant truths each has derived ~~ir~~ its particular way. In this way the theologian is coerced to formulate the existential questions that have been provoked by man's religious experience and to formulate the theological answers that have been shaped by man's ultimate concerns in the form of an "answering theology."

The thesis of this dissertation asserts that depth psychology is decisive and indispensable to the theological task of Tillich because it is the primary source for analyzing the human situation. He has both implicitly and explicitly furnished the basis for this claim throughout his corpus and it is acknowledged by any reader familiar with his thought. Depth psychology is a decisive factor in determining qualitatively the essential-existential polarity of his ontological methodology and for theoretically undergirding the correlative principle of *analogia entis*. Depth psychology is an indispensable factor for cognitively grasping a holistic conception of the ultimate concerns of man that arise out of the ambiguities of life. Depth psychology, structured upon an existential philosophical matrix, is an *ancillāris* to the ontological analysis of human existence. The insights and materials of depth psychology have provided Tillich with a *depth dimension* for his existential analysis of the human situation.

The problem of this dissertation is to establish how Tillich utilizes his denotative and connotative conceptualization of depth psychology in his analysis of the ultimate concerns of man under existential conditions. It is important to determine precisely how his understanding of the dynamic unconscious depths of man and his intimate acquaintance with a wealth of sacred and profane literary and artistic materials describing the nature of finite man have functioned qualitatively in the determination of his correlative methodology, the formulation of the existential questions and theological answers in his systematic theology, and in his existential analysis of the human situation. It is equally important to examine the depth dimension in his ontology that has been derived from the principles of depth psychological theory and practice, from a personal friendship with professional analysts, and from an active involvement and participation academically and theoretically in the depth psychological movements.

The methodology of this dissertation follows a definitive, descriptive, and explicative analysis of Tillich's utilization of depth psychology in his theology. A definitive analysis of his correlative methodology exposes the structure of his approach to the theological task. A descriptive analysis of the depth psychology in his theology reveals their interdependent relationships in the search for the structure and meaning of being. An explicative analysis of his use of depth psychology in his existential analysis of the human situation illuminates the depth dimension of his philosophical-theological approach to the task of systematic theology. This first chapter will state the thesis, the problem, the methodology, the limitations, and the significance of this dissertation. The second chapter will define Tillich's method of correlation and present a Protestant and a Roman Catholic criticism of his methodological procedures. The third chapter will describe the influence of depth psychology on Tillich's theology and the reciprocal influence he has had on depth psychology and practical theology theoretically. The fourth chapter will explicate Tillich's utilization of depth psychological insights and materials in his analysis of the human situation. The fifth chapter will provide a summary of the dissertation indicating the depth dimension in Tillich's thought which he has derived from depth psychology.

The limitations of this dissertation are determined by Tillich's existential analysis of the human situation. It is further limited to his utilization of depth psychology for grasping and shaping the existential questions of man that arise out of his ultimate concerns under the condition of finitude. The interpretation of the theological answers of divine self-manifestation in the revelatory events of the Christian faith is less the concern of this dissertation and will be of necessity dealt with only in those circumstances where it impinges critically upon the understanding of the analysis of the human predicament.

The central concern of this dissertation is with Tillich's utilization of depth psychological insights and materials in his major theological writings, the systematic and the non-systematic works, and in his specific depth psychological treatises in professional journals. It will indicate the similarity of Tillich's understanding and utilization of depth psychology to several significant depth psychological movements but will not attempt to demonstrate the influence of any particular depth psychological movement upon his thought. One must also recognize the inexhaustible task of determining the effect of the European and American ethos upon Tillich and resist any temptation to "psychoanalyze" the unconscious influences upon his life. Biographical data is not available for such a purpose even if it were to be considered feasible from a psychological point of view.

_The significance of this dissertation_ resides in its contribution to the understanding of Tillich's utilization of depth psychology in his existential analysis of the human situation. In this respect it emphasizes the significant contributions depth psychology has made to theology in its analysis of the vital creative-destructive forces of the unconscious and its influence upon the conscious decisions of man. Depth psychology has rediscovered the wealth of depth psychological materials in secular and religious literature and the arts that describe man's anxiety and inner self-destructiveness that he has experienced in his estrangement from his essential being. Depth psychology has rediscovered the meaning of sin that removes it from the realm of moral judgments about human acts and points out the depth dimension of the universal and tragic separation of the existential from the essential state of being that man has perpetrated in his decision for self-actualization. Depth psychology has rediscovered the holistic nature of the psyche stressing the demonic structures of the unconscious that are decisive and determinative in the totality of man's personality and that give new meaning to the freedom-destiny polarity of man's ontological nature. Depth psychology has rediscovered the meaning of the central doctrine of the Christian faith, grace, that overcomes moralism and recognizes the meaning of forgiveness as acceptance of all men who are estranged in finite freedom regardless of the conventionality of man's life style. The major significance of this study points out these factors in Tillich's understanding and utilization of depth psychological insights that have guided him to a relevant interpretation of man's predicament, to the recognition of the ultimate concerns that form man's questions about his ambiguous life, and to a translation of the Christian message into theological answers that have been shaped by the existential questions. The recognition and analysis of Tillich's use of depth psychology's ancillary role with his ontological analysis of the being of man is the central significance of this utilization study.

There are also several secondary contributions that this dissertation may make to the dialogue between psychology and theology. This critical analysis of Tillich's methodological procedures may provide significant guidelines for others to follow in translating the message of the Christian faith into the psychological idiom of contemporary culture making it more relevant to the ultimate concerns of man's life. It may also contribute to the depth dimensional concerns of both depth psychology and theology for the individuation and salvation of man through the analysis of the interdependent essential-existential states of being that comprise the nature of man. For all too long both of these disciplines of thought have considered man only from the existential point of view and have failed to correlate their understanding of man with his essential nature in terms of his "dreaming innocence" or "created goodness." Tillich's thought may enhance the openness of dialogue between psychology and theology in providing the structure for a common search for an awareness of the Urgrund of man's sense of estrangement, ambiguity, anxiety, anomie, and provide for a more effective means of evolving an authentic meaning in man's life in the crisis of his existence. The depth dimension of Tillich's thought is illustrative of the direction and depth that man can achieve in his analysis of the nature of man. The theory that Tillich has espoused about the significant influence of the unconscious psyche upon man's total personality may guide both psychology and theology to a deeper respect for its dynamics in their formulation of the psychological and the theological nature of man.

The purpose of this dissertation will be accomplished if it will have pointed out the most unusual way that Tillich has incorporated the immense depth psychological insights and materials into his theological methodology and will have shown how he has contributed to a more relevant translation of the ultimate concerns of man and the theological answers of the Christian faith by the utilization of the resources of depth psychology.

# CHAPTER II

# THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

The theological system of Paul Tillich is dependent upon a correlative methodology for juxtaposing his interdependent philosophical and theological categories of thought about the human situation and Christian message. A method of correlation is imperative because "there is no common basis between theology and philosophy"[1] since "philosophy deals with the structure of being itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us."[2] On the one hand, Tillich contends that philosophy and theology are divergent in terms of the cognitive attitude of the thinkers as well as the differences in their sources, and in the cosmological and soteriological contents of each discipline. On the other hand, they are convergent in that the psychological, sociological, and historical situation limit the ultimate concern of every man whether he be philosopher or theologian. But Tillich would equally contend "neither is a conflict between theology and philosophy necessary, nor is a synthesis between them possible."[3] There is simply no common basis. Therefore, a method of correlation is imperative for the apologetic theologian as a means for correlating an existential analysis of the human predicament with an interpretation of the revelational answers of the Christian message.

It is the purpose of this chapter to define Tillich's method of correlation in order to indicate the rationale for his theological system. A descriptive analysis of the categories of existence and of essence will point out the existential questions derived from an analysis of the human situation and the theological answers to these questions interpreted from the content of the Christian message. A descriptive analysis of the principle of analogia entis will indicate how the philosophical questions are correlated with the theological answer. A brief critique of Tillich's method of correlation will focus upon Protestant and Roman Catholic criticisms of his methodology.

## A. DEFINITION OF THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

The method of correlation is not unique with Tillich. It has been historically the standard methodology for "apologetic theology" as a means of making the Christian message relevant to man.[4] But Tillich has utilized it in a unique way to explain the "the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence."[5] Correlation is the "interdependence of two independent factors . . . not understood in the logical sense of quantitative or qualitative co-ordination of elements without causal relation, but it is understood as a unity of the dependence and independence of two factors,"[6] namely the philosophical question and the theological answer. This is a unique emphasis with Tillich because he recognizes the authenticity of both human existence and divine manifestation in his systematic theology. Whereas most theologians in the apologetic approach recognize the content of the Christian faith as superior to human knowledge and proceed to make the Christian faith relevant to human knowledge, Tillich holds them together in a "theological circle" causing each one to meet the demands of the other in the search for the most relevant understanding of the Christian faith under the conditions of human existence. In this use of the method of correlation, "it makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions."[7]

The method of correlation is a "theological assertion" that is "made with passion and risk" to correlate human existence as it is, with life as it ought to be, as revealed in the divine manifestation; to correlate the existence of man with the essence of man, respectively. This assertion is based upon two formal criteria of all theologizing: one, "the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately,"[8] and two, "our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not-being."[9] Theology must risk a passionate concern to perceive authentically the reality of man's existence and to grasp the questions that arise from the very depths of his being. It must move beyond the transient crisis of human existence, claims Herberg, "to discern the permanent crisis of life, the existential crisis which no time or history can cure."[10] Theology must be concerned with being: "the whole of human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence,"[11] which is always threatened because man can be lost or saved. Therefore, Tillich believes that:

> Man is ultimately concerned about his being and meaning. "To be or not to be" in this sense is a matter of ultimate, unconditioned, total, and infinite concern. Man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he belongs, from which he is separated, and for which he is longing. Man is totally concerned about the totality which is his true being and which is disrupted in time and space. Man is unconditionally concerned about that which conditions his being beyond all the conditions in him and around him. Man is ultimately concerned about that which determines his ultimate destiny beyond all preliminary necessities and accidents.[12]

Man, then, is ultimately concerned about the existence that has been given him as well as that which has created and sustains his existence. Theology must also risk, in hope and faith, the reception of that which transcends man and reveals the meaning of his very existence. "The second formal criterion of theology does not point to any special content, symbol, or doctrine," notes Tillich, but only to "that which determines our being or non-being."[13] It is "the ground of our being, that which determines our being and not-being, the ultimate and unconditioned power of being"[14] which encounters man with a word of meaning for his existence.

The term correlation may be used in three different ways. First, "it can designate the correspondence of different series of data," i.e., the correspondence between religious symbols and what they symbolize. Second, "it can designate the logical interdependence of concepts," i.e., the concepts denoting what is human and divine. Third, "it can designate the real interdependence of things as events in structural wholes," i.e., man's ultimate concern and that which he is ultimately concerned about.[15] In each case it is assumed that the philosophical questions and theological answers are respectively independent, dependent, and interdependent. They are independent of each other, on the one hand, in that the existential question "is not the source for the revelatory answer formulated by theology"[16] because the divine revelation cannot be found in an analysis of the human predicament. On the other hand, "it is equally wrong to derive the question implied in human existence from the revelatory answer . . . because the revelatory answer is meaningless if there is no question to which there is an answer."[17] They are dependent upon each other because "in respect to content the Christian answers are dependent on the revelatory events in which they appear; in respect to form they are dependent on the structure of the questions which they answer."[18] They are interdependent because both occur within man's religious experience. "Theology formulates the questions implied in human existence, and theology formulates the answers implied in divine self-manifestation under the guidance of the questions implied in human existence. This is a circle which drives man to a point where question and answer are not separated."[19] The latter utilization is central in Tillich's thought because the concept of interdependence assumes independent and dependent aspects and enables him to establish an _Anknüpfungspunkt_ in the divine-human relationship.

This "point of contact" is the "theological circle", or an ellipse, in which the two foci of religious experience--the existential question and the theological answer--encounter each other. This contact point is not a moment or place in time and space but rather "belongs to man's essential being, to the unity of his finitude with the infinity in which he was created and from which he is separated."[20] The theological circle demands that the theologian participate fully in both foci protecting him from any arrogant proclamation from either one. The source of the existential question is the human predicament, but "the form of the question is determined by the total system and by the answer given in it."[21] Likewise, the substance of the theological answer is experienced in the divine self-manifestation but "the form of the theological answer is not independent of the form of the existential question."[22] The correlative methodology makes clear that "the question does not create the answer."[23] Tillich obviates any order of precedence of question and answer in the method of correlation because there is a dynamic movement taking place in the theological circle between the two foci of existence and essence. He contends "the answer, 'the Christ', cannot be created by man, but man can receive it and express it according to the way that he has asked for it."[24] The dialogue between the two foci of the theological circle is initiated when the theological answers have some correlation or meaning with the existential question. It is often the case, since "man is the question he asks about himself, before any question has been formulated,"[25] that the content of the dialogue evolves first out of the very depths of man's being. The theologian, using the method of correlation, proceeds to make "an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise" and then "demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions."[26]

This correlative methodology offers the possibility of overcoming the inadequacies of traditional theologizing. It attempts, first, to correct supranaturalistic thought that "takes the Christian message to be the sum of revealed truths which have fallen into the human situation like strange bodies from a strange world."[27] This view is inadequate for Tillich because it requires that "man must become something else than human in order to receive divinity"[28] and denies the accepted fact that "man cannot receive answers to questions that he has never asked."[29] Learning theory has made it clear that conscious reception of a stimulus requires a perception of it first. Second, the correlative approach attempts to correct naturalistic or humanistic thought that "derives the Christian message from man's natural state."[30] Such a position fails in Tillich's view because "unaware that human existence itself *is* the question . . . it identified man's existential with his essential state"[31] thereby putting both question and answer on the same existential level. It denies the fact that revelation is "spoken" to man. Third, Tillich's methodology also rejects the validity of the dualistic approach that attempts to build "a supernatural structure on a natural substructure . . . by positing a body of theological truth which man can reach through his own efforts or . . . through 'natural revelation'."[32] Tillich prefers to correlate these inadequate views "by resolving natural theology into the analysis of existence and by resolving supranatural theology into the answers given to the questions implied in existence."[33] The correlation provides a "self-transcending" or "ecstatic" naturalism.[34]

The structure of the system is formed by the method of correlation. Each of the five parts of Tillich's system is unique. The first part "must give an analysis of man's essential nature" and to the question of finitude "must give the answer which is God." The second part "must give an analysis of man's existential self-estrangement" and to the question of his existence "must give the answer which is Christ." The third part "must give an analysis of man as living" and to the question of the ambiguities of life "must give an answer which is the Spirit." The fourth part "must give an analysis of man's rationality, especially his cognitive rationality" and to the question of the ambiguities of reason "must give the answer which is revelation." The fifth part "must give an analysis of man's historical existence" and to the question of the ambiguities of history "must give an answer which is the Kingdom of God."[35] Respectively, these five parts form the structure of Tillich's systematic theology--being and God, existence and Christ, life and Spirit, reason and Revelation, and history and Kingdom of

God. Each is held in correlation with the other, independently analyzing their respective existential or essential categories, dependently demanding the understanding the other can provide in their independent analysis, and interdependently correlating the existential questions with the theological answers for a meaningful religious faith.

Such a proposition rests upon the rational character of systematic theology. Theologizing is a "constructive task" giving "an interpretation of the Christian message which is relevant to the present situation,"[36] and employs a special kind of reason. Tillich suggests:

> There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively different from the cognition involved in the technical, scholarly work of the theologian. It has a completely existential, self-determining, and self-surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually most primitive believers. Whoever participates in the New Being participates also in its truth. The theologian, in addition, is supposed not only to participate in the New Being, but also to express its truth in a methodical way. We shall call the organ with which we receive the contents of faith "self-transcending," or ecstatic, reason, and we shall call the organ of the theological scholar "technical," or formal, reason. In both cases reason is not a source of theology. Ecstatic reason is reason grasped by an ultimate concern. Reason is overpowered, invaded, shaken by ultimate concern.[37]

It is this ecstatic reason by which the Christian message can be interpreted meaningfully in the midst of the contradictory existential situation of man. The basis for this ecstatic reason is the concept of transcendent meaning rather than a transcendent realm. The method of correlation allows man's reason in his existential questions to be overcome by the ultimate concern present in the theological answers of divine self-manifestation. Three basic principles govern the rational character of theology for Tillich. One is semantic. He contends "the semantic situation makes it evident that the language of the theologian cannot be a sacred or revealed language . . . therefore, he should use philosophical and scientific terms whenever he deems them helpful for his task of explaining the contents of the Christian faith."[38] The theologian's task is communication and he is obliged to use the language that achieves clarity of thought and that represents the reality of the existential situation. Another is logical. "Theology is as dependent on formal logic as any other science"[39] believes Tillich, and both dialectics and paradox, common to theological thought, have their logical place. Logic is especially the obligation of an "answering theology" in demonstrating the symbols used in the content of the Christian faith are the answers to the questions posed by an analysis of the human predicament. A third principle is methodological. This principle implies that "theology follows a method, that is, a definite way of deriving and stating its propositions" and particularly that "it must be carried through rationally and consistently."[40] Tillich would insist emphatically that "it is the function of the systematic form to guarantee the consistency of cognitive assertions in all realms of methodological knowledge."[41]

The method of correlation is the keystone of Tillich's systematic theology holding the over-arching philosophical and theological concerns in their respective places of importance. The methodology allows a system of theology to include the summa of the Christian tradition and the essay on the contemporary problems of existence together so that some solution might be given to the special situation of life to today. Only as the contents of the Christian faith are explained in mutual interdependence of existential questions and theological answers are they meaningful. It is this correlative methodology, a theological assertion at best, that recognizes the authenticity of human existence and divine manifestation as the "whole of human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence."[42] It is, indeed, an Anknüpfungspunkt between the existential question and the theological answer, a means of overcoming the inadequacies of traditional theologizing, with a rational character built upon a "self-transcending" or "ecstatic" reason. The method of correlation is vulnerable to distortion as is any theological method, but it is an explicit way of joining together knowledge and vital piety which

John Wesley claimed has too long been separated.

The correlative methodology of Tillich will be defined further in a descriptive analysis of the categories of existence and essence which it correlates and of the principle of _analogia entis_ by which the categories are related.

## B. A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

The method of correlation has been defined above as a philosophical tool for establishing the mutual or reciprocal interdependence between the philosophical analysis of the human situation and the theological interpretation of the Christian faith. These philosophical and theological categories of thought may well be termed the _category of existence_ and the _category of essence_, respectively. The category of existence is primarily concerned with the ultimate questions that arise from the conditions of human finitude in terms of reason, being, existence, life, and history. The category of essence is primarily concerned with the revelatory contents of the Christian faith as ultimate answers to the ultimate questions of human finitude in terms of Revelation, God, Christ, Spirit, and the Kingdom of God. The correlation of these five polaric concepts—reason and Revelation, being and God, existence and Christ, life and Spirit, history and Kingdom of God—emphasizes the existence-essence relationship. As defined above, however, an existence-essence relationship exists within each philosophical and theological category. Being, for example, can be adequately analyzed in terms of both existence and essence--simul justus et peccator. The same is true for the polaric concept of God who can only be understood in terms of existence and essence--God the incarnate and God the creator. The existence-essence correlation that exists between, as well as within, the philosophical and theological categories of Tillich's thought allow each one to relevantly inform the other of their authentic nature and to cognitively understand both the question and the answer.

The existence-essence correlation is made possible by the scholastic principle of anologia entis, the analogy of being. It is an ontological principle that contends the split between subject-object, human-divine, is united on the common basis in being. It assumes that everything that is participates in being and the ground of being, in a rational structure of the universe which can be termed logos. Therefore, the subject can know the object, the human conceive the divine, because the finite possesses within itself a concept of the infinite. Man, conceived of as a microcosmos, can by analogy know about God from knowing about his own being. Thus, analogia entis provides the common basis by which the question and the message, existence and essence, can be correlated in terms of man's ultimate concern.

The task now is to provide a descriptive analysis of these categories of existence and essence, and of the principle of analogia entis. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to develop each category in detail. The central concern is to grasp the basic existential and essential analyses that form the question and the answer and to indicate how they are correlated by analogia entis in each section of this chapter. The descriptive analysis will be based solely upon the Systematic Theology because it has rationally encompassed the fundamental conceptualizations of the whole of Tillich's thought.

## 1. THE CATEGORY OF EXISTENCE

The category of existence is concerned with an analysis of the human situation. It is not an analysis of the psychological or sociological state of man but rather of the scientific and artistic, the economical, political, and ethical forms in which man exists. It is concerned with "the totality of man's creative self-interpretation"[43] of his particular human situation. Correlation is an existential process, as old as man's self-consciousness, in which he "becomes aware of the fact that he himself is the door to the deeper levels of reality, that in his own existence he has the only possible approach to existence itself."[44] As man penetrates his own finitude he finds he has also penetrated universal finitude and is able to form some ultimate questions about his own existence. He is able to acknowledge the self-contradiction and estrangement that exists in himself as well as in existence universally. Man comes to realize the ultimate question of being he is asking, is himself. "He cannot avoid asking it, because his very being is the question of his existence. In asking it, he is alone with himself. He asks 'out of the depths,' and this depth is he himself."[45]

The category of existence can be demonstrated in terms of the philosophical concepts--reason, being, existence, life, and history--and especially in the questions raised from the analysis of the existence-essence polarity of the human predicament.

## a. THE CONCEPT OF REASON

Reason, as "the structure of the mind which enables the mind to grasp and transform reality,"[46] enables man essentially to transcend the depths of his own existence. Ontological reason relates "the logos structure of the grasping-and-shaping-self and the logos structure of the grasped-and-shaped-world."[47] It enables man to grasp the form, value, and meaning of reality. The subjective-objective character of essential reason indicates a "depth of reason" that penetrates the relative truth of existence. Metaphorically it is

> the "substance" which appears in the rational structure, or "being-itself" which is manifest in the logos of being, or the "ground" which is creative in every rational creator, or the "abyss" which cannot be exhausted by any creation or by the totality of them, or the "infinite potentiality of being and meaning" which pours into the rational structures of mind and reality, actualizing and transforming them.[48]

The depth of reason, in its essential state, is a dimension of reason potentially capable of grasping the ultimate meaning of human existence.

But in its existential state, essential reason is estranged from its ground and "can express itself only in the symbolic form of myth and cult. Because it is finite, self-contradictory, and ambiguous in its existential state, "it contradicts itself and is threatened with disruption and self-destruction."[49] The very structural elements that provided a depth dimension to reason in the essential state become conflicted in an existential state and, therefore, raise the quest for revelation.

> The polarity of structure and depth within reason produces a conflict between autonomous and heteronomous reason under the conditions of existence. Out of this conflict arises the quest for theonomy. The polarity of the static and dynamic elements of reason produces a conflict between absolutism and relativism under the conditions of existence. This conflict leads to the quest for the concrete-absolute. The polarity of the formal and the

> emotional elements of reason produces the conflict between formalism and irrationalism of reason under the conditions of existence. Out of this conflict arises the quest for the union of form and mystery. In all three cases reason is driven to the quest for revelation.[50]

Reason, even in its existential state, "asks for revelation, for revelation means the integration of reason," because it is able to transform the radical conflicts of human existence. Reason can enable man to hold a "controlling knowledge" and a "receiving knowledge" manifest in the ground of being and ask for and accept the revelation that transcends the risk and uncertainty that is indigenous in existential reason.

## b. THE CONCEPT OF BEING

The basic ontological structure of being assumes an interdependence of ego-self and the world--an a priori self that has a world to which it belongs. As an ego-self man is separated from his environment and able to transcend it by his power of reason. Yet, he is in the world which enables him to encounter himself, and to develop a self-consciousness. This self-world polarity is also the basis of the subject-object polarity described in the concept of reason.

The polaric ontological elements that constitute man's being are individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. In the individualization-participation polarity man reaches his perfect form in personality and community. "There is no person without an encounter with other persons."[51] In the dynamics-form polarity man achieves his power of being. "Man's dynamics, his creative vitality . . . is directed, formed; it transcends itself towards meaningful contents."[52] In the freedom-destiny polarity man is capable of "deliberation, decision, and responsibility". Tillich says, "My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny."[53] The ontological elements, in finitude, are threatened with tension and conflict because of the lack of balance between the essential and existential being.

Because man is able to transcend his essential being, he is able to conceive of non-being as a part of his being, as that which determines his finitude. "Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude. Nonbeing appears as the 'not-yet' of being and as the 'no more' of being."[54] But, non-being is a part of essential being and becomes a threat only to existential being through the various categories or forms by which man grasps and shapes reality. The categories of time, space, causality, and substance threaten being with non-being producing an anxiety of "transitoriness," "insecurity," "contingency," and "nothingness." The possibility of courage to accept these finite conditions is the question of God. "The question of God must be asked because the threat of nonbeing, which man experiences as anxiety, drives him to the question of being conquering nonbeing and of courage conquering anxiety."[55] The possibility of his existential being overcoming his essential being and with that meaninglessness and despair "drives man toward the question of an infinite, unthreatened ground of meaning; it drives him to the question of God."[56]

## c. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE

"Existence means standing out of non-being,"[57] out of absolute non-being (ouk on) in contrast to potential being (me on). This state of existence is "the predicament of man and his world in the state of estrangement;"[58] an estrangement from that to which one belongs, his essential being and God. Man is estranged from his state of dreaming innocence, "a state of pure potentiality," because, in his finite freedom, he has decided for self actualization, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence.

> At the moment when man becomes conscious of his freedom, the awareness of his dangerous situation gets hold of him. He experiences a double threat, which is rooted in his finite freedom and expressed in anxiety. Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualizing himself and his potentialities.[59]

This "transition from essence to existence is a universal quality of finite being"[60] that ontologically precedes existence in the "transcendent Fall." Man exists in estrangement because he has contradicted what he essentially is and ought to be. In "unbelief" man has turned away from God. In "*hubris*" man elevates himself to the realm of the infinite. In "concupiscence" man desires to make himself the center of reality. Tillich observes that "man finds himself . . . in existential estrangement, unbelief, *hubris*, and concupiscence. Each expression of the estranged state contradicts man's essential being, his potency for goodness. It contradicts the created structure of himself and his world and their interdependence. And self-contradiction drives man to self-destruction."[61]

Existential man is estranged from his essential being and "no act within the context of existential estrangement can overcome existential estrangement."[62] Any attempt at self-salvation is futile and leads to the depths of despair. There is no other possibility for man than to ask for the "New Being" who can reunite his estranged relationship with God and his essential self. Man is aware of this question of the Christ because "the question of salvation can be asked only if salvation is already at work no matter how fragmentarily. . . . The quest for the New Being presupposes the presence of the New Being."[63] The New Being comes to man not as a third reality between God and man, but rather as a representative of God transcendent in the very center of man's essential nature under the conditions of human finitude creating meaning for man's existence. He is the answer to the ambiguities of existence.

### d. THE CONCEPT OF LIFE

Life is a multidimensional unity of essential and existential being. Essential life refers to the original "created" nature of man in unity with the ground of his being. Existential life refers to the "fallen" nature of man in estrangement from God. "In all life processes an essential and an existential element . . . are merged in such a way that neither one nor the other is exclusively effective."[64] The essential-existential unity actualizes itself in the dimension of the human spirit that includes the cognitive and moral functions of life and is, therefore, the "unity of power and meaning."[65] It is in the realm of the spirit that the potential being is actualized and, in turn, encounters the ambiguities of life in moral acts.

The actualization process of life under the dimension of the spirit is inclusive of three basic functions--self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence--that are dependent upon the basic polarities of being. Self-integration is a moral act in which "the centered self constitutes itself as a person"[66] in an ego-thou relationship.

In this process "personal life emerges in the encounter of person with person and in no other way."[67] But existentially, self-integration is threatened by the possible loss of individualization in participation with a neighbor. Self-creation is a cultured act in which man, in his dynamic encounter with the resistance of reality, procedes to a new form of centeredness under the principle of growth. Therefore, "every cultured act is the act of a centered self and is based on the moral self-integration of the person within a community . . . a person who participates in a culture's movement, growth, and possible destruction is culturally creative."[68] But existentially, self-creation is frustrated because the interdependence of dynamics and form isolates man from the object of his experience. Self-transcendence is a religious act in which man finds the unity of freedom and destiny and, in turn, the potential liberation from finitude. Self-transcendence does not manifest itself in empirical terms as does self-integration and self-creation for "one can speak about it only in terms which describe the reflection of the inner self-transcendence of things in man's consciousness."[69] It is in the mirror of man's consciousness that the ambiguity of the sacred and the profane is experienced; and existentially man resists self-transcendence in the anxiety of self-annihilation. Thus, in self-integration, there is a circular line of centeredness in which man achieves a self-identity in the process of self-alteration and in returning to the center of his actual life., In self-creativity, there is a horizontal line of growth in which man achieves a new form that extends the original reality of his existence. And, in self-transcendence, there is a vertical line in which man achieves a freedom from the bondage of his finitude. In each function there is a potential unity of self-identity and self-alteration.

And equally so there is an estrangement in the basic ontological elements of being that disrupt the unity of the essential and the existential, making life ambiguous. In every case "self-integration is countered by disintegration, self-creation is countered by destruction, self-transcendence is countered by profanization."[70] Man experiences these ambiguities of life in all dimensions and reaches out in quest for the life of the Spirit that enters into his spirit, grasps it, and delivers it, making life unambiguous. This experience of the Spirit is possible because "life has the character of self- transcendence. Under all dimensions life moves beyond itself in the vertical direction."[71] Even though man seeks unsuccessfully the unambiguous, the quest for the ultimate still remains. The Spirit grasps the spirit and draws it up beyond the ambiguities of life.

### e. THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY

The nature of history correlates the subjective "historical consciousness" of man with the objective "vocational consciousness" of a history-bearing group. Subjectively, "there is no history without factual occurrences, and there is no history without the reception and interpretation of factual occurrences by historical consciousness."[72] Objectively, in that "man actualizes himself only in the encounter with other persons in a community,"[73] history reflects the tradition of a group that is "determined by an aim toward which they strive and a destiny they try to fulfill."[74] The interdependence of the subjective-objective nature of history is seen in the fact that history-bearing groups are comprised of individuals. Tillich claims "it is not 'the community' that wills and acts; it is individuals in their social quality and through their representatives who make communal actions possible by making centeredness possible."[75] The dynamics of human history are formed by four characteristics--"to be connected with purpose, to be influenced by freedom, to create the new in terms of meaning, to be significant in a universal, particular, and teleological sense"[76]--that represent essential human potentialities in distinction from the natural processes.

Ontologically, in terms of the life processes, history is driven to its ultimate aims.

> History, in terms of the self-integration of life, drives toward a centeredness of all history-bearing groups and their individual members in an unambiguous harmony of power and justice. History, in terms of the self-creativity of life drives toward the creation of a new, unambiguous state of things. And history, in terms of self-transcendence of life, drives toward the universal fulfillment of the potentiality of being.[77]

But history, subject to the ambiguities of existence, tends to actualize only limited aims. Historical self-integration is caught between two contradictory tendencies of "the external imperial trends and of internal centralization."[78] Historical self-creativity is confronted by newness and trapped by the desire to achieve it by revolution or reaction, for "everything new in history keeps within itself elements of the old out of which it grows."[79] Historical self-transcendence is faced with the problem of ultimacy as given or as expected. "The claim to ultimacy takes the form of the claim to have or to bring the ultimate toward which history runs."[80] Existentially, history encounters inescapable conflicts that evoke both its great and tragic attempts to analyze the meaning of existence.

The nature and the problem of an interpretation of history raises the quest for the Kingdom of God. Tillich believes "the answer to the meaning of history implies an answer to the universal meaning of being."[81] But neither the non-historical forms--the tragic, the mystical, the mechanistic--or the historical forms--progressivism, utopianism, transcendental--offer a viable interpretation. The bias of the theological circle presupposes that "historical activity is the key to understanding history . . . (and) it is the vocational consciousness . . . that decides upon the key and what it opens in the understanding of history . . . the symbol of the Kingdom of God."[82] The answer to the question of the meaning of history lies in the universal meaning of being. This universal meaning of being is offered by the Kingdom of God as it is manifest in the Spiritual Presence and Eternal Life, the immanent and transcendent qualities of the Kingdom of God.

The existential questions of the category of existence as Tillich understands them have been posed; the task now is to indicate the theological answers of the category of essence.

## 2. THE CATEGORY OF ESSENCE

The category of essence is concerned with the Christian message. The concern is not for the formulation of the content of the Christian message, but for the formulation of the answers of the Christian message in correlation with the questions raised by an existential analysis of the human situation. Tillich maintains "these answers are contained in the revelatory events on which Christianity is based and are taken by systematic theology from the sources, through the medium, under the norm."[83] The content of the theological answer is independent of the analysis of the existential question, but "the form of the theological answer is not independent of the form of the existential question."[84] They are interdependent because they lie within the "theological circle."

The task of the apologetic theologian is to demonstrate that the symbols of the revelatory events of the Christian message are answers to the ultimate concern of man. To form the answer in correlation with the question, the theologian must struggle for it.

> He must participate in the human predicament, not only actually--as he always does--but also in conscious identification. He must participate in man's finitude, which is also his own, and in its anxiety as though he had never received the revelatory answer of "eternity." He must participate in man's estrangement, which is also his own, and show the anxiety of guilt as though he had never received the revelatory answer of "forgiveness." The theologian does not rest on the theological answer which he announces. He can give it in a convincing way only if he participates with his whole being in the situation of the question, namely, the human predicament.[85]

The formulation of the answer also assumes that the ultimate concern of man indicates he has already received the answer in part; otherwise he could not ask about the answer that provides meaning for his life.

The category of essence contains the theological answers to the existential questions in terms of the concepts of the Christian doctrines of Revelation, God, Christ, Spirit, and Kingdom of God.

### a. THE CONCEPT OF REVELATION

The existential question of reason for the theological answer of revelation is not a quest for an answer that is beyond cognition. It is a rational quest that will unite essential and existential reason in ecstatic reason which overcomes the subject-object structure of finite reason.

> "Ecstasy" ("standing outside one's self") points to a state of mind which is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situation. Ecstasy is not negation of reason; it is the state of mind in which reason is beyond itself, that is, beyond its subject-object structure. In being beyond itself reason does not deny itself. "Ecstatic reason" remains reason; it does not receive anything irrational or antirational--which it could not do without self-destruction--but it transcends the basic condition of finite rationality, the subject-object structure.[86]

"Ecstatic reason" enables man to receive revelation rationally in the depth dimension of his reason where he is aware of the ultimate, because "revelation is the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately . . . the ground of our being."[87] Tillich contends:

> Knowledge of revelation is knowledge about the revelation of the mystery of being to us, not information about the nature of beings and their relation to one another. Therefore, the knowledge of revelation can be received only in the situation of revelation, and it can be communicated--in contrast to ordinary knowledge--only to those who participate in this situation.[88]

Revelation is the answer to the existential conflicts that occur between the structural elements of autonomous and heteronomous, absolute and relative~~, and~~ formal and emotional reason. It is revelation that overcomes the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy by restablishing their essential unity in that God (theos) is the law (nomos) for both the structure and depth of reason. It gives to both "the complete transparency of the ground of being in him who is the bearer of the final revelation, and the complete self-sacrifice of the medium to the content of revelation."[89] Revelation provides a dimension of depth and substance to reason in the ground of being as manifest in Jesus as the Christ and a witness to the ground of being that liberates autonomy from the authority of heteronomy. A new center is established in the autonomous-heteronomous polarity in "the depth of reason ecstatically experienced and symbolically expressed"[90] in myth and cult. Theonomy "is a matter of historical destiny and grace. It is an effect of the final revelation which no autonomy can produce and which no heteronomy can prevent."[91]

Revelation "liberates reason from the conflict between absolutism and relativism by appearing in the form of a concrete absolute,"[92] the New Being. In the revelation of the New Being, "the most concrete of all possible forms of concreteness, a personal life,"[93] the conflicting poles of existential reason are united because the New Being is the bearer of the absolute that is without condition or restriction. Revelation presents a concrete absolute in the person of Jesus as the Christ but does not claim absolutism. Jesus as the Christ manifests a love that unites existentially conflicted absolutism and relativism; a love that "is absolute because it contains everything concrete," and as a love that "is always dependent on that which is loved."[94] Love enables action because it overcomes the anxiety between "the absolutistic character and the relativistic fate of every decision and action"[95] by claiming there are no "right" decisions or actions possible, but only decisions and actions that are rooted in love. In this way love unites absolutism and relativism and leads to new decisions. The revelation of the New Being as agapē enables man to make decisions with courage to participate freely in reason.

Revelation also overcomes the existential conflicts that exist between formalism and emotionalism. The conflict is absolved in the revelation of the New Being because "the whole of a person's life participates"[96] in its reception. The independent claims of the "heart" and the "mind" are unable to grasp the truth in their existential condition. Both tend to destroy the other's claim to knowledge. Detached knowledge lacks the subjective element of knowledge gained by emotion. Knowledge gained by union lacks the objective element of the detached knowledge of form. Formalism and emotionalism are united in revelation's claim that "that which can be grasped only with 'infinite passion' (Kierkegaard) is identical with that which appears as the criterion in every act of rational knowledge."[97] It is in this "infinite passion" that "ultimate concern about the final revelation is as radically rational as it is radically emotional, and neither side can be eliminated without destructive consequences."[98]

The source of this revelation which overcomes the conflicts of autonomy-heteronomy, absolutism-relativism, and formalism-emotionalism is the ground of being manifest in the logos element of existence. This ground of revelation is characterized in mystical, philosophical, and theological language as the "Abyss", the "Logos", and the "Spirit", respectively. Tillich maintains that all three terms are necessary for the theologian's description of the divine life because:

> It is the abysmal character of the divine life which makes revelation mysterious; it is the logical character of the divine life which makes the revelation of the mystery possible; and it is the spiritual character of the divine life which creates the correlation of miracle and ecstasy in which revelation can be received.[99]

If they are not, then "a rationalistic deism transforms revelation into information," "an irrationalistic theism transforms revelation into heteronomous subjection," and "a history of revelation is impossible," respectively.[100]

## b. THE CONCEPT OF GOD

Existential man, threatened with non-being, is asking a question about his finitude. He is asking for the ground and power of all being and for the basis of his courage to be in his finite situation. The answer to these questions is the doctrine of God.

Ontologically, for Tillich, "God is being-itself, not a being."[101] As being-itself, he is both the ground and the power of being. As the ground and power of being, he is the ground of the very structure of being. He is not subject to the structure of being because the structure is grounded in him. Being-itself _is_ this structure of being. As the power of being, "God transcends every being and also the totality of beings--the world. Being-itself is beyond finitude and infinity; . . ."[102] And as being-itself, "God is beyond the contrast of essential and existential being,"[103] for he is neither essence nor existence. As the ground of being, God is the source--"causality and substance"--of being.

God is the basis for man's courage to be in his finitude. The doctrine of creation, asserting God's originating, sustaining, and directing creativity, is the answer to man's anxiety of non-being. The doctrine holds that "God is creative because he is God,"[104] that is, creatio ex nihilo. God is prior to essential and existential creation in that he is the creator. God has created essential man "present as a whole in his essential being and inner telos,"[105] but man has left the ground of his essential being "to actualize what he essentially is, in order to be finite freedom."[106] And in choosing to actualize himself he has fallen from essence into existence and is therefore now threatened with non-being. Man's "fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness."[107] But in the depth of reason, where man's logos is in relation to the divine logos, man is aware that he is dependent upon God's sustaining creativity and that "only in the power of being-itself is the creature able to resist nonbeing."[108] God's directing creativity provides "the telos of creativity--the inner aim of fulfilling in actuality what is beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life."[109] This telos is providence, "a quality of inner directedness present in every situation."[110] God's creativity is the source of man's "ontological courage" in the threat of nonbeing.

The basic source for man's courage to be rests in the doctrine of God as love. As man witnesses this attribute of love that desires to reunite him with the ground and power of his being, he takes courage to affirm his creatureliness. Tillich maintains that "the divine love is the final answer to the questions implied in human existence, including finitude, the threat of disruption, and estrangement."[111]

### c. THE CONCEPT OF CHRIST

The question of existential man is formed by his separation and estrangement from his essential being and from God as being-itself. The theological answer is the New Being who can overcome this existential situation of estrangement and restore man to his essential unity with the ground of his being.

Jesus as the Christ is the answer to man's quest for salvation. He is the one, as the New Being, who reunites man with his essential being. As mediator between God and man, he is the one who represents God to man. As the New Being, "he represents to those who live under the condition of existence what man essentially is and therefore ought to be under those conditions."[112] Jesus as the Christ is the New Being who "is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence."[113] The term "New Being" refers specifically to the estrangement of essential from existential being and is central in Tillich's theological system.

> The New Being is new in so far as it is the undistorted manifestation of essential being

> within and under the conditions of existence. It is new in two respects: it is new in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged character of existential being. It is actual, conquering the estrangement of actual existence.114

The New Being, in his essential being, represents the imago dei indigenous in man even in his estranged situation from God. The New Being "has appeared in a personal life, and for humanity it could not have appeared in any other way; for the potentialities of being are completely actual in personal life alone."[115] It is in his appearing as the New Being that Jesus as the Christ creates the meaning of human history by uniting man with his essential being.

### d. THE CONCEPT OF SPIRIT

Life, as a mixture of essence and existence, is ambiguous in all of its dimensions and cannot attain fulfillment of its essential possibilities. It asks the existential question of a transcendent reunion of this ambiguity of life. The theological answer is the divine spirit, or more specific for Tillich, the "Spiritual Presence," which is the presence of the divine Spirit "in" the human spirit.

The Spiritual Presence is an ecstatic state in which the "divine Spirit breaks into the human spirit . . . (and) drives the human spirit out of itself. The 'in' of the divine Spirit is an 'out' for the human spirit. The spirit, a dimension of human life, is driven into successful self-transcendence: it is grasped by something ultimate and unconditioned."[116] The human spirit, in its transcendence, is grasped and reunited with the divine Spirit. In this reunion of the essential and the existential being in transcendence, "the ambiguous life is raised above itself to a transcendence that it could not achieve by its own power."[117]

The "transcendent union" of the ambiguous life of man "appears within the human spirit as the ecstatic movement which from one point of view is called 'faith,' from another, 'love.'"[118] Faith and love are the contents of the Spiritual Presence. Faith is "the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence and opened to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life."[119] Love is "the state of being taken by the Spiritual Presence into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life."[120] They are mutual components of the Spiritual Presence in that "faith without love is a continuation of estrangement and an ambiguous act of religious self-transcendence. Love without faith is an ambiguous reunion of the separated without the criterion and the power of the transcendent union."[121] But the transcendent union brought about by the Spiritual Presence is fragmentary in historical mankind, for the very acts of faith and love are "acts of affirmation and commitment in which the ambiguity of life reappears."[122] This fragmentary nature is only overcome in the meaning of being manifest in the Kingdom of God. The faith in this meaning of being "occurs within the structure, function, and dynamics of man's spirit."[123] It is within man as he is conscious of the work of the Spiritual Presence. Tillich contends "the Spiritual Presence, elevating man through faith and love to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, creates the New Being above the gap between essence and existence and, consequently, above the ambiguities of life."[124] This presence does not occur in the individual, but rather in social groups because "all the functions of the human spirit--moral self-integration, cultural self-creation, and religious self-transcendence--are conditioned by the social context of the ego-thou encounter."[125] The Spiritual Presence occurs only in community.

### e. THE CONCEPT OF KINGDOM OF GOD

Existential man is questing for a telos and meaning to his historical existence that will overcome the ambiguities between his finite situation and the ultimate end of history. The theological answer is the Kingdom of God.

The Kingdom of God has "an inner-historical and a trans-historical side" and "participates in the dynamics of history" as well as "answers the questions implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of history," respectively.[126] As such it is both immanent in and transcendent to the world. It has a double quality of historical salvation expressed through the Spiritual Presence and of trans-historical salvation manifest through Eternal Life. The Kingdom of God represents the *kairos* in which "saving power breaks into history, works through history," and as such, is both revelation and salvation.[127]

The central manifestation of the Kingdom of God is Jesus as the Christ. He is the "center of history" representing "a moment in history for everything before and after is both preparation and reception. As such it is both criterion and source of the saving power in history."[128] But this moment in history is not a static once-and-for-all-event. Jesus as the Christ becomes the *kairos* of all *chronos* as he is anticipated and received by the "latent church" and is the answer to the ambiguities of history. The Kingdom of God as manifest in history can provide only partial and fragmentary answers to the ambiguities of life. The final answer does not occur in history but rather at the end, in eternity. History is saved by God. The ambiguities of history are essentialized; they are raised to unambiguous unity with the ground and power of being and to fulfillment. History finds its final answer in the resurrection in which essential and existential are reunited, not in the sense of oughtness, but rather in their perfect isness of their creation. The Kingdom of God is able to provide the answer to the question of meaning of history as it turns man from an analysis of his human situation to the theocentric vision of the One who is eternal, the One who is in but not of the world, the One who by his nature of transcendence essentializes history in the New Being.

Tillich is able to correlate the questions arising from the analysis of the human situation with the answers interpreted from the revelatory events by the principle of _analogia entis_. The task now is to descriptively analyze this correlative process.

## 3. THE PRINCIPLE OF _ANALOGIA ENTIS_

In the method of correlation the existential analysis of the human situation is correlated with the theological answer of the Christian message on the principle of _analogia entis_. The philosophy-theology polarity of the correlative methodology has no common basis between them. But they can be correlated on philosophical grounds--the ontological analysis of the structure of being[129]--since both philosophy and theology necessarily inquire after the nature of reality as a whole, the very question of the structure of being.

Tillich's use of _analogia entis_ is based upon the assumption that "in existence, man is what he is in essence--the microcosmos in whom the powers of the universe are united."[130] He also assumes that "what happens to man happens implicitly to all realms of life, for in man all levels of being are present."[131] Man then is a universe in himself qualitatively. This ontological unity is the *logos*, the rational structure of existence. The philosopher, as well as the theologian, assumes, as does science, "that there is an identity, or at least an analogy . . . between the *logos* of reality as a whole and the *logos* working in him. Therefore, this *logos* is common."[132] On this assumption the correlation between the philosophical question and the theological answer in the method of correlation have a common ontological relationship in a unity of being. The principle of *analogia entis* allows the theologian, on philosophical grounds, to assume that what he knows about man he may also know about God. Such an analogy of being enables the theologian to interpret the contents of the Christian message in terms of the ultimate concerns raised by man derived from an analysis of the human situation.

Tillich's use of the principle of *analogia entis* can be clearly demonstrated by describing the analogous base on which he correlates the concepts of the categories of existence and essence.

An analogy between reason and revelation is based on the fact that "subjective reason is the rational structure of the mind, while objective reason is the rational structure of reality which the mind can grasp and according to which it can shape reality."[133] Man is able to "know" himself and the world of his existence in the receiving and acting function of the mind. Tillich so describes this cognitive process:

> In every act of reasonable reception an act of shaping is involved, and in every act of reasonable reaction an act of grasping is involved. We transform reality according to the way we see it, and we shape reality according to the way we transform it. Grasping and shaping reality are interdependent.[134]

And it is in this very grasping and shaping cognitive process that "the knowledge of revelation, directly or indirectly, is knowledge of God, and therefore it is analogous or symbolic."[135] Analogia entis enables man to speak of God because his cognitive structure and content is the very basis in which revelation is expressed and "points to the necessity of using material taken from finite reality in order to give content to the cognitive function in revelation."[136]

The ontological argument is the basis for the analogy between being and God. It holds that an awareness of God is present in man's awareness of his finitude. Man is aware of his finitude, that he is in some way estranged from the infinity which belongs to him. He is cognizant of his potential infinity because of his finitude. He knows that his potentiality is not identical with his actuality and the question of God arises. Though the ontological argument is limited, it does claim the truth of "the acknowledgement of the unconditional element in the structure of reason and reality."[137] Tillich says man may speak of God

> since God is the ground of being, he is the ground of the structure of being. He is not subject to this structure; the structure is grounded in him. He _is_ this structure, and it is impossible to speak about him except in terms of this structure. God must be approached cognitively through the structural elements of being-itself. These elements make him a living God, a God who can be man's concrete concern.[138]

It is because everything that is participates in being and in being-itself, says Tillich, that "the _analogia entis_ gives us our only justification of speaking at all about God."[139]

Jesus as the Christ is known by man in the presence of the New Being. The "New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence"[140] and appears in a person because "the potentialities of being are completely actual in personal life alone."[141] Tillich contends that "Jesus, like every man, is finite freedom. Without that, he would not be equal with mankind and could not be the Christ."[142] The New Being is essential man who is the representative of the _imago dei_ embodied in man even under the existential conditions of estrangement between God and man. Jesus as the Christ is known to man because any quest for him to overcome the problem of human existence presupposes the presence of the New Being. He is known to man because of his total participation in man's existential estrangement in the Cross and because of the victory over this finite event in the resurrection.

The ambiguities of life created by the essential-existential elements are overcome by the analogous knowledge of the Spirit in the spirit of life itself. The Spirit is a dimension of life that "unites the power of being with the meaning of being" and is "the actualization of power and meaning in unity."[143] This actualization occurs only within the limits of man's experience, his total experience in all of the dimensions of his existence. It is the occasion, observes Tillich, when "man in experiencing himself as man, is conscious of being determined in his nature by spirit as a dimension of his life."[144] When this happens it is then possible "to speak symbolically of God as Spirit and of divine Spirit."[145] The human spirit, a dimension of finite existence, is grasped by the divine Spirit, a dimension of infinity, in the human situation through the creative powers of the Spiritual Presence. Man overcomes the ambiguities of life because the essential element in finite life is joined with the essential element in divine life through the transcendence of his finite freedom in the ground of being in which all dimensions of life are united.

The meaning of history is imparted by the Kingdom of God analogously by both its immanent and transcendent qualities. The Kingdom of God has appeared in history as the "center of history" in the person of Jesus as the Christ, as the "great *kairos*" who has been experienced time and again through the relative "kairoi" by which the Kingdom of God manifests itself in revelatory events.[146] The Kingdom of God in its transcendent powers has and does appear in the political system, in the church, and in individuals. The Kingdom of God is immanent and transcendent as well as present and future at the same time.[147] Because history is an all-embracing dimension of life, any answer to the meaning of history implies an answer to the universal meaning of being. Indeed, everything that is, in all realms of life, participates in the striving toward the inner aim or *telos* of history.[148] It seeks fulfillment or ultimate sublimation and meaning in the *telos* present in the manifest Kingdom of God. Tillich holds that "historical activity is the key to understanding history . . . it is the vocational consciousness . . . that decides upon the key and what it opens in the understanding of history."[149] In the context of the theological circle "the key and what the key opens are experienced in the same act," namely, the *kairos*; and "the affirmation of the vocational consciousness in a definite historical group and the vision of history implied in this consciousness go together."[150] The trans-historical side of the Kingdom of God is known in its inner-historical side that is indigenous in human history. The inner-historical side is manifest in the Spiritual Presence and the trans-historical side is identified with the answer to the ambiguities of life universal, the Eternal Life.

Having defined the method of correlation in Tillich's thought and descriptively analyzed the categories of existence and essence as well as the principle of *analogia entis* by which they are correlated, it is now necessary to summarize this correlative process as a whole and draw upon the fundamental criticisms of Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians to evaluate his methodology. It is beyond the scope of the topic of this dissertation to provide a comprehensive survey of all Tillich's critics, as well as upon the whole of the content of his system. Therefore, only representatives of each position will be chosen who best clarify the major criticisms of Tillich's method of correlation.

## C. TWO FUNDAMENTAL CRITICISMS OF TILLICH'S METHOD OF CORRELATION

The preceding definition and descriptive analysis of Tillich's method of correlation has outlined the basic structure and system of his systematic theology. Tillich's approach is from an apologetic or "answering theology"[151] attempting to solve the perennial problem of relating the Christian message to the human situation without destroying the essential and unique character and content of divine revelation. It is a semantically, logically, methodologically rational procedure for correlating the philosophical questions derived from an analysis of "the totality of man's creative self-interpretation" with the theological answers implied in the revelatory events "_from_ the source, _through_ the medium, _under_ the norm" of the Christian faith. The correlation of "questions and answers, situation and message, human existence and divine manifestation" is ontologically possible through an analogy of being since "philosophy deals with the structure of being in itself: theology deals with the meaning of being for us." The theologian, within the "theological circle" or ellipse, is both philosopher, who cognitively penetrates into the structure of the common _logos_ of reality and the logos within himself, and theologian, who, in terms of his two ultimate concerns, risks a passionate interpretation of the revelatory contents of the Christian faith.

The method of correlation, on the basis of the ontological relationship of situation and message in the rational structure of reality, the _logos_, conceptualizes man as a microcosmos. Because of the unity of being in microcosmic man, it is possible to assume that man's knowledge about himself is by analogy his knowledge about God. Alexander McKelway, in his analysis of the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian ontology and German classicism upon Tillich, observes an "ontological vision" by which Tillich correlates subject and object, self and world, God and man.

> For Tillich, the universe is a whole, within it everything, inorganic matter and man alike, is related and united in being, and the whole is related and united with being-itself, the ground of being . . . because man is bound to, united with, and participating in, God as the ground of being, and because the structure of this unity is rational and common to man and the universe, man may see in the structure of his own life a reflection of the structure of the universe and by analogy abstract, from his own being, being-itself.[152]

This is the basis for Tillich's apologetic emphasis upon the philosophical analysis of the human situation which controls the form, but not the content, of the theological answers.

Despite the fact that Tillich claims no order of precedence in his question and answer correlative methodology--"Theology formulates the questions implied in human existence, and theology formulates the answers implied in divine self-manifestation under the guidance of the questions implied in human existence"[153]--he does begin with the philosophical questions formed by the analysis of the human situation and then, apologetically, with "ontological vision," demonstrates the theological answers from the symbols given in the Christian faith. He contends, on the basis of contemporary learning theory, that the revelatory answers are only "meaningful" when they are correlated with the existential questions in mutual interdependence. Though man is the question he is asking about himself prior to anything else, he does so because he is already partially aware of the answers that he has received in his participation in the universal logos. He does so because he is aware that he is "the door to the deeper levels of reality" and as such the only means to understanding his existence at all. Man's creative self-interpretation of his existence forms the questions as well as the answers of the Christian message that enable him to receive and perceive the content of the Christian faith.

There are two fundamental criticisms of Tillich's use of the principle of correlation.[154] One is from the kerygmatic position represented largely by Protestants. There are very few Protestant critics, however, observes Heywood Thomas, due to the nature of Protestant theology. He notes that Karl Barth, outside of his introductory comments to Alexander McKelway's book, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, "only spares him a reference in a footnote or an occasional sentence."[155]

This is perhaps in part due to the "Yes" and the "No" dialectical nature of Tillich's thought which limits not only the possibility of any general criticism of Tillich's thought as a whole, but also of any specific point within in his thought which might manifest qualifications of one or more scholars. Walter Horton's analysis of "Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology"[156] indicates clearly how difficult it is to find a serious point of contention with Tillich's thought. Horton observes, in Tillich's response to Barth's criticism of his rational understanding of nature, "he sides with Schleiermacher and Hegel against Barth in their attempt to overcome the 'profane autonomy' of secular culture and find God's traces everywhere, though he joins with Barth in denouncing the pantheistic idolatry of their direct unparadoxical way of seeing God's presence in the finite."[157]

The other criticism is from the Roman Catholics who are fundamentally critical of Tillich's understanding and use of "human philosophy" and "natural theology". They tend to disagree with Tillich's more liberal use of the philosophical concepts of analogy and ontology. With equal fervor the Roman Catholics are critical of Tillich's "existentialist" posture and his reluctance to hold to the absolutes revered by the natural theologians, and in particular, his rejection of their understanding of the "supernatural."

The task now is to develop these two fundamental criticisms of Tillich's thought as they pertain especially to his correlative methodology.

### 1. PROTESTANT CRITICISM OF TILLICH'S METHODOLOGY

The most prominent qualitative critic of Tillich's use of correlative methodology is perhaps the kerygmatic theologian Karl Barth. Their concepts of the divine-human relationship are extreme polarities. Tillich has noted their antithetical approaches concerning the means of procuring religious knowledge:

> Karl Barth starts from above, from the trinity, from the revelation which is given, and then proceeds to man, . . . whereas on the other hand, I start with man, not deriving the divine answers from man, but starting with the question which is present in man and to whom the divine revelation comes as an answer.[158]

Bernard Martin has made an excellent comparison of Barth's and Tillich's theological postures concerning their theological and philosophical approaches to the problem of the knowledge of God and his word.

> While Barth rejects autonomous philosophy and denies reason and experience in theology, Tillich affirms them as having a proper place in the theological enterprise. While Barth emphasizes the "Word of God" which stands over against man and which is to be "thrown" at him, Tillich speaks . . . of the New Being in which man participates with his entire being and in all functions, including his

> reason. While Barth declares that revelation is in no way dependent upon man, Tillich, though agreeing that the content of revelation is "given" to man as an objective reality and is not produced by philosophical or theological reflection, is nevertheless dependent upon its reception by man and that no "pure" doctrine of revelation, apart from its human reception, is possible.[159]

Tillich has stressed that even though God "is in no way dependent on man, God in his self-manifestation to man is dependent on the way man receives his manifestation . . . there is a mutual interdependence between "God for us" and "we for God."[160] Tillich has followed a "principle of immanent dynamism" in his systematic theology. He has been concerned with evolving meaning from the Christian message for existential man and, therefore, emphasizes the "reception" of the Word. He contends perception of the Word is dependent upon man's first asking a question in order that he receive the answer cognitively and consciously meaningfully. But this is the very crucial issue which Barth claims to be problematical because he views Tillich's methodology as essentially philosophical, not theological. In what appears to be Barth's most detailed criticism of Tillich he questions:

> Since Tillich's theological answers are not only taken from the Bible, but with equal emphasis from church history, the history of culture generally, and the history of religion--and above all, since their meaning and placement is dependent upon their relation to philosophical questions--could not these answers be taken as philosophy just as well as (or better than?) they could be

> taken as theology? Will these theological answers allow themselves to be expressed into this scheme without suffering harm to which in any case is their biblical content? Is man with his philosophical questions, for Tillich, not more than simply the beginning point of the development of his whole method of correlation? Is he not, in that he himself knows which question to ask, anticipating their correctness, and therefore already in possession of the answer and their consequences? *Should not the theological answer be considered as more fundamental than the philosophical questions and as essentially superior to them?* If they were so considered, then the question and answer could proceed, not from a philosophically understood subject to a "divine" object, but rather from a theologically understood object (as the true subject) to the human subject, and thus from Spirit to life, and from the Kingdom of God to history. Such a procedure would not actually destroy the concept of correlation, but would probably apply to it the biblical sense of "covenant". (Italics mine.)[161]

The question of which is more fundamental, question or answer, emphasizes a man-God versus a God-man direction in the quest for revelation through reason and faith, respectively. But it does not adequately describe Tillich's concern for a meaningful reception of the Christian message. Tillich cannot be dealt with so categorically. Tillich is equally concerned with both in correlation, with perhaps the emphasis, if there is *really* one, on the theological answer by his concept of the "theological circle." His emphasis on the theological is evident in his cognitive side of the correlation of the divine-human relationship in which he holds, "God answers man's questions, and under the impact of God's answers man asks them."[162] He contends the question-answer correlation "is a circle which drives man to a point where question and answer are not separated."[163] Tillich cannot really be antithetical to Barth in their concepts of revelation because Tillich's task is to correlate the kerygmatic and apologetic postures in the form of an "answering theology."

This last point is ably made by John Cobb who says about the structure of Tillich's systematic theology: "Tillich correctly differentiates his theology from the apologetic and kerygmatic theologies as an 'answering' theology employing the method of correlation."[164] And as an "answering" theology, Tillich's task is quite different from the traditional approaches. Cobb understands Tillich's task to be "not the defending of the tradition nor the exegesis of scripture," as it is with the kerygmatic or apologetic theologian, "but rather the answering of man's basic contemporary questions in terms of all that can be known historically, phenomenologically, and ontologically, guided by the conviction that ultimate reality is decisively manifest to us in Jesus as the Christ."[165] The main criticism of Cobb is at that point. He believes Tillich's philosophical position, which is apparently unique to Tillich despite his claim that the ontological judgments and religious implications of his philosophy are central in most major philosophies, does not adequately reflect the traditional theological content of the Christian faith. If this is true that Tillich has developed unique ontological and phenomenological aspects in his philosophy, Cobb asks, does not such "an independent philosophic decision of this sort . . . create obstacles to faith that are not ingredient in the demands of faith itself."[166]

Alexander McKelway raises a similar criticism of Tillich's use of the ontological "common denominator" of being. In assuming that God's transcendence has overcome the subject-object, self-world chasm in analogia entis, Tillich "denies the very foundation upon which Christian theology is built, that is, that man is separated from God and can only be reunited in the subjective act of God's revelation of himself in Jesus Christ."[167] Tillich would agree that man is "saved" by God through Jesus as the Christ manifest in the New Being. He asks, however, how can man know about this act of God except that God reveals himself in such an ontological commonality or Anknüpfungspunkt of the divine-human correlation. McKelway contends man can.

> The particular way of knowledge dictated by revelation and presented in the Christian faith is that which holds its object, God as the subject of the knowledge of God and its conditions. It recognizes that the only objectivity which is available to theology is that in which God gives himself as the object of our knowledge in such a way as to require the submission of our traditions and culture to his disclosure

> of himself in Jesus Christ. Any other so called objective approach is only and can be only the subjective transference of ourselves as objects into his place.[168]

And he rather dogmatically maintains this is the only way in which the revelation of God can be meaningfully received without an apparent ontological distortion of the divine-human relationship.[169]

A Canadian Calvinist, Kenneth Hamilton, is rather severe in his criticism of Tillich, observing, "to see Tillich's system as a whole is to see that it is incompatible with the Christian gospel" and, therefore, "to accept it would be to put aside the kerygma in favor of a logos philosophy functioning as a self-contained and authoritative theology."[170] Coming from a Calvinist, is this "projection?" He is of the opinion that Tillich, as a legitimate heir of nineteenth century liberalism, has fallen into the "synthesis" trap like Schleiermacher and Hegel, and "dissolved Jesus Christ into the Christ-idea."[171] Tillich is inclined to abstract the historical in support of an idealistic dogma, says Hamilton, who believes Tillich's ontological concerns have subjugated the final results of his correlative methodology (system-built) to his a priori principles (system-known). He goes on to note "his speculative picture of the Universe stands logically before and above his interpretation of the Christian faith as the latter is set forth in his Systematic Theology."[172] Therefore, he concludes Tillich's "Christian philosophical theology" is no longer attached to the authoritative kerygma of the Christian faith because of his "theology-as-methodological-knowledge" assumptions. In Hamilton's opinion, this is the primary cause of the ambiguity of Tillich's thought. He cites George Tavard and Hendrik Kraemer who have said of Tillich: "he lives in the incompatible situation of wanting to be wholeheartedly an ontological philosopher and as wholeheartedly a Christian thinker or theologian. This is impossible."[173] Hamilton points out that "Tillich makes faith the servant of knowledge because he has started out from the assumption that truth comes nowhere else but in the whole that a system gives."[174] This is possible "provided faith and knowledge go together" and that Tillich's view of the universe is correct as well as his view of the contents of the Christian message.[175] This further assumes that philosophy and theology are equally authoritative; but this assumption is false if ontological theology is subordinate to philosophy. It further assumes question and answer congruity and that "Tillich is expecting us to accept a theory about the human situation . . . and demands that the message of Christianity shall conform to the mental horizons obtaining in this theory."[176] Hamilton's criticisms do not recognize Tillich's "theological circle" as significant nor does he grasp the implications of the interdependent relationship of the question and answer. Tillich's system can not be criticized from one or two perspectives, but must be viewed as a whole composed of many dialectical parts.

The possible anthropocentric criticism of many kerygmatic theologians is voiced also by George Thomas, especially with the ultimate concerns which Tillich postulates as a guiding element of his theologizing.[177] The main criticism of Tillich's method of correlation and the structure of the system for Thomas is that

> he seems to allow to philosophy in its analysis of the human situation an "autonomy" which is not rooted in "theonomy." Only the "theonomous," the "saved" reason, according to his own view, can be expected to see the truth of the situation clearly and profoundly. Only such a reason can properly formulate the "questions" to which the Christian message gives the "answers." This would not be very important if the possibility of a "Christian philosophy" were the only issue at stake. But another issue is involved: Can a philosophical reason which has not been fully "converted" by the Christian faith correctly formulate the "structure" and "categories" of Being and raise the deepest "questions" implied in existence? If not, will not the Christian "answers" whose form is determined by the nature of the "questions" be distorted or obscured?[178]

Tillich replies to this criticism acknowledging his dependence upon scientific elements and suggests science and religion can join in "a union in which the religious dimension, the dimension of 'depth,' shines through the dimension of methodological cognition. It is also a union in which the symbols of transparent depth open the eyes for cognitive problems and their treatment."[179] Tillich goes on to stress the fact of the essential interdependence between theology and science noting that "I have taken . . . historical research, sociological analysis, and therapeutic psychology more seriously than traditional theology usually does."[180]

The Protestant criticism of Tillich is basically from a kerygmatic posture claiming he has subjugated the authority of the theological answers to existential questions, and in so doing distorts the validity of the Christian faith. There is no significant Protestant criticism of Tillich's methodology; his critics are concerned only about his basic assumptions. But neither Tillich nor his critics can claim any final answer to their questions of the knowledge of God and his message for man.

## 2. ROMAN CATHOLIC CRITICISM OF TILLICH'S METHODOLOGY

The best Roman Catholic criticism of Paul Tillich has been collected by Thomas O'Meara and Celestin Weisser in their volume Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought.[181] The editors, in their introduction, point out two important questions that his theology raises for the Roman Catholic. "First, it often appears to Catholics that Protestant theology is too much the thought of a single man and too little the respectful examination of the deposit of faith. . . . Secondly, the reader from a traditional theological background will be respectful of Tillich's struggle to make Christ meaningful to our culture, but will wonder at the changes made in Christianity."[182] The two questions illustrate a basic difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism with regards to subjectivity against objectivity, autonomy against authority, and symbol against analogy. This is evident in the editors' comments that "the answer to both of these questions lies in the problem of the evolution of dogma, the transmission of a special Word of God through history and time."[183] Basically, the critiques in this excellent anthology question Tillich's understanding of the content of the Christian message and his interpretation of this content as he demonstrates its theological answers to the existential questions derived from the analysis of the human situation. In essence, they question his theology and his methodology. The principle concern of this criticism of Roman Catholicism of Tillich is with his methodology, and basically with his use of the philosophical tool of analogy.

Gustave Weigel's central criticism of Tillich's methodology is the role symbolism plays as a self-styled epistemological basis for his principle of correlation. "Tillich's ontology is neither Platonic nor Scholastic;" contends Weigel, "it is existentialist, but it is a formal ontology and it is chosen deliberately and consciously."[184] The phenomenological influence on Tillich's ontology causes him to be more concerned with symbolism than concretism and so affects his concept of analogy, especially of Thomistic use of analogy. Tillich's symbolism does not explain the Thomistic doctrine of analogy and he gives six reasons why it does not.

> First of all, he has identified being with existence, _sensu negante_. Secondly, he supposes that class-concepts have meaningful content only for extrapersonal reality or achieved in ordinary human experience. . . . Thirdly, he recognizes a form of knowledge which gives dimension but not content . . . symbolism. Fourthly, the knowledge which gives dimension is an awareness achieved in the autoperception of existence at the point of its ultimate ground. . . . Fifthly, existential awareness is specifically different from the conceptual achievement of empirical objects. . . . Lastly, though reason is inevitable in all thinking, yet true reasoning, or what Aristotle would call syllogism, can only use univocal terms. An analogous term cannot enter into a syllogism; and when it does we have a fallacy and not a true reasoning.[185]

Weigel's criticism points to both Tillich's ontology that separates the essential from the existential, the subject from the object, as if they were two independent entities rather than as two perspectives of one entity, and also his use of _analogia entis_ by which theological answers can be correlated with existential questions on a philosophical principle.

In the original publication of this article, per request of Weigel, Tillich responded to Weigel's criticism of his thought.[186] He chose to respond to the questions of ontology and symbolic knowledge. To the first Tillich said, "I certainly do not identify . . . being with existence. My whole system is based on the distinction of essential and existential being."[187] He goes on to illustrate by indicating his doctrine of God, "in good Scholastic tradition," invalidates an essence-existence polarity in that "God is being-itself," and as such, cannot be a "thing" whether it be subject or object. "God is the creative ground of all events, of every "thing." Neither is his thinking naturalistic, for he emphasizes "naturalism and supernaturalism provoke each other and should be removed together."[188] He summarizes his response to the ontological criticism saying, "I want to state that it is much less influenced by existentialism than by Aristotle and Schelling. It is my doctrine concerning man in which the influence of existentialism is important."[189] In response to symbolic knowledge Tillich distinguishes between "signs" and "symbols" stating:

> Signs point to something different in which they do not participate at all. Symbols participate in the power of what they symbolize. This is--if I understand Thomas and your interpretation of his thought rightly--the positive or proportional element in the analogia entis on which you insist. Such an

> insistence lies clearly in the line of my doctrine concerning God and of my use of metaphors like "ground of being" and "power of being" for God. If God is the creative ground of everything that has being, everything insofar as it is must express something knowable about God. In this I fully agree with Aquinas. Every symbol . . . says something positively true about God.[190]

Tillich does concede to Weigel that "I believe you are right when you say that my understanding of analogia is more negative-protesting than positive-affirming. I am more worried about the idolic character of traditional theology and popular beliefs about God than you are."[191]

This same argument is pursued further in part by George McLean in "Symbol and Analogy: Tillich and Thomas" dealing with the knowledge of revelation. He claims that reality itself is analogous in Thomistic thought and provides not only the basis for a rational and objective knowledge of God, but also a very definite set of statements about God. For Tillich, however, reality is neither analogous nor symbolic and, therefore, allows him to evolve a knowledge of God solely from the existential relation of man to God producing only ideas about the divine-human encounter rather than an objective content. The basic claim of McLean is that analogy provides objective knowledge about God proportionally whereas symbol describes the divine-human relationship, not God, but man, by the analogy of attribution.[192] Tillich chooses the symbol because of the "blasphemous" tendencies in proportional analogy.

Edward O'Connor likewise agrees with Weigel about the false equivocation between symbolic knowledge and analogy. He cites Tillich's response to Weigel as the source for this equivocation of symbolic knowledge and analogy and the fact that Thomistic _analogia_ is not the basis for a natural theology. O'Connor observes "it is patent from Tillich's writings that he does not mean by _symbol_ what St. Thomas means by _analogy_, and this is precisely the reason why it is no basis for a natural theology."[193] In an "impressionistic" way O'Connor, on the basis of Tillich's "protest" against the Roman Church in 1933 and "a crisis of conscience," raises up Tillich's "anti-authoritarianism" as the source for his preference of symbol, attributive analogy, rather than the proportionate analogy of natural theology and its authoritative position.[194] He believes Tillich simply does not wish to relinquish the autonomy he experiences with symbol for the authority he must be subject to in analogy. "Autonomy does not mean the freedom of the individual to be a law to himself,"[195] Tillich points out, but rather "autonomy means the obedience of the individual to the law of reason, which he finds in himself as a rational being. . . . It is the law of subjective-objective reason; it is the law implied in the _logos_ structure of mind and reality."[196] Tillich refuses to surrender his position to a heteronomous one of Roman Catholicism and, therefore, an intellectual subjugation to an authority not experienced, but posited by a rational analogy. He simply says, "as a Protestant theologian I cannot accept the 'objectivation' of authority."[197] The synthesis of this conflict lies in a theonomy which directs the autonomy of man by the divine Spirit rather than heteronomously by law authoritatively established autonomously by man.

George Tavard's criticism of Tillich's methodology points out "the whole of his theological system turns out to be completely abstract theologico-philosophical construction. It is centered on the postulate that the eternal divine-human essence is manifested in Jesus the Christ"[198] via the Protestant principle of immanent transcendence. For Tavard this means that there exists only an existential pole in which the ground of being resides in the center of man's being in Jesus the Christ. There is no essential polarity for Tillich because he denounces "supernaturalism." Tavard cites Jacob Taubes' criticism that Tillich's "theology of mediation involves the divine in the human dialectic to the point that the divine pole of the correlation loses all supernatural point of reference."[199] Basically, Tavard appraises Tillich's apologetic methodology as a "loaded argument" because his existential analysis is directed by the theological answer he will give.[200]

Somewhat similar criticisms are made by McLean in his article on "Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy." He believes that Tillich's ontological elements and categories, and their indigenous limitations, seriously restrict his conceptualization of the divine. God should not be limited by any finite being. McLean claims: "to deny any pure perfection of God is to deny the divine itself, the simple, infinite, and all-perfect being. God is the most perfect and the most determined being, not the common and indetermined notion of being."[201] But Tillich would surely answer, is not all knowledge of God humanly contrived in the last analysis. McLean is also critical of the bases for his categories and ontological elements noting that "Tillich is content to assert that all things have in themselves a structure either identical or at least analogous to the finite categories of the mind;"[202] that is, a general subject-object correspondence in the universal logos. He would contend that "true knowledge will be had only when the knower and the known are bound together in a union which is itself objective."[203] Tillich, however, claims that the universal logos may well be the most "objective" common point between God and man. McLean observes that, in general, Tillich's ontological problems are caused by his epistemological difficulties with their existential limitations and must be more dependent upon natural law if ontologically man is to know God.

The focus of Roman Catholic criticism of Tillich's methodology can be grasped in Tillich's replies to the critics of his thought in Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought. In general there are three main points: objectivity against subjectivity, authority against autonomy, and analogy against symbol. Tillich defends his subjective approach in terms of his understanding of religion as "an existential relation between God and man. This implies that God can be experienced only in terms of 'ultimate concern' and never as an object which could be approached cognitively like other objects. Every knowledge of God . . . is the work of the divine Spirit, i.e., God himself, present to our spirit."[204] The topic of common concern between Protestants and Roman Catholics ought to focus upon the nature of experience rather than the mutual criticisms of subjectivism and objectivism. Tillich lays claim to his Protestant heritage in the criticism between authority and autonomy. He resists authority because of its heteronomous nature and the required submission to a law that has been rationally assumed. He believes autonomy is more likely to give way to theonomy, to direction by the divine spirit without sacrifice of personal being.[205] Tillich resists the "objectivity" of Thomistic proportionate analogy in favor of the "subjective" attributive analogy that more closely resembles his use of symbolic knowledge. He maintains that "symbols of the divine can appear only for the existential situation of ultimate concern; and they are meaningless outside the situation."[206] The symbol is advantageous to Tillich because it gives him a sense of freedom to perceive and to receive dynamically the content of the existential situation. The more objectified Thomistic concept of analogy tends to derive some static, concrete sign as the content of the Christian message demanding of the receiver a sacrifice to its truth. This is the basis for Roman Catholic criticism of Tillich's methodology.

# FOOTNOTES

[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), Combined volumes edition, I:26. All references hereafter to this work in this dissertation will be designated by ST with volume and page.

[2] ST, I:22

[3] ST, I:26

[4] Will Herberg, editor, Four Existentialist Theologians (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1958), p. 253.

[5] ST, I:60

[6] ST, II:13

[7] ST, I:62

[8] ST, I:12

[9] ST, I:14

[10] Will Herberg, Judaism and Modern Man (New York: Harper and Row - Torchbook Edition, 1965), p.9.

[11] ST, I:14

[12] ST, I:14

[13] ST, I:14

[14] ST, I:21

[15] ST, I:60-61

[16] ST, II:13

[17] ST, II:13

[18] ST, I:64

[19] ST, I:61

[20] ST, I:61

[21] ST, II:15

[22] ST, II:15

[23] ST, II:16

[24] ST, II:16

[25] ST, I:62

[26] ST, I:62

[27] ST, I:64

[28] ST, I:65

[29] ST, I:65

[30] ST, I:65

[31] ST, I:65

[32] ST, I:65

[33] ST, I:66

[34] ST, II:7

[35] ST, I:66-67

[36] ST, I:53

[37] ST, I:53

[38] ST, I:55

[39] ST, I:56

[40] ST, I:58

[41] ST, I:58

[42] ST, I:14

[43] ST, I:3-4

[44] ST, I:62

[45] ST, II:13

[46] ST, I:72

[47] ST, I:75

[48] ST, I:79

[49] ST, I:82-83

[50] ST, I:83

[51] ST, I:177

[52] ST, I:180-181

[53] ST, I:185

[54] ST, I:189

[55] ST, I:208

[56] ST, I:210

[57] ST, II:21

[58] ST, II:27

[59] ST, II:35-36

[60] ST, II:36

[61] ST, II:60

[62] ST, II:78

[63] ST, II:80

[64] ST, III:107

[65] ST, III:22

[66] ST, III:38

[67] ST, III:40

[68] ST, III:68

[69] ST, III:87

[70] ST, III:32

[71] ST, III:109

[72] ST, III:302

[73] ST, III:308

[74] ST, III:310

[75] ST, III:312

[76] ST, III:305

[77] ST, III:332

[78] ST, III:342

[79] ST, III:343

[80] ST, III:344

[81] ST, III:350

[82] ST, III:349-350

[83] ST, I:64

[84] ST, II:15

[85] ST, II:15

[86] ST, I:111-112

[87] ST, I:110

[88] ST, I:129

[89] ST, I:147

[90] ST, I:148

[91] ST, I:150

[92] ST, I:150

[93] ST, I:150

[94] ST, I:152

[95] ST, I:152

[96] ST, I:153

[97] ST, I:154

[98] ST, I:154

[99] ST, I:156

[100] ST, I:157

[101] ST, I:235

[102] ST, I:237

[103] ST, I:236

[104] ST, I:252

[105] ST, I:255

[106] ST, I:255

[107] ST, I:255

[108] ST, I:261

[109] ST, I:264

[110] ST, I:266

[111] ST, I:286

[112] ST, II:93

[113] ST, II:118-119

[114] ST, II:119

[115] ST, II:120

[116] ST, III:112

[117] ST, III:129

[118] ST, III:129

[119] ST, III:131

[120] ST, III:134

[121] ST, III:129

[122] ST, III:140

[123] ST, III:133

[124] ST, III:138-139

[125] ST, III:139

[126] ST, III:357

[127] ST, III:363

[128] ST, III:364

[129] ST, I:26

[130] ST, II:28

[131] ST, II:120

[132] ST, I:23

[133] ST, I:77

[134] ST, I:76

[135] ST, I:131

[136] ST, I:131

[137] ST, I:208

[138] ST, I:238

[139] ST, I:240

[140] ST, II:118

[141] ST, II:120

[142] ST, I:127

[143] ST, III:111

[144] ST, III:111

[145] ST, III:111

[146] ST, III:370

[147] ST, III:359

[148] ST, III:350

[149] ST, III:349

[150] ST, III:349

[151] Cf. John B. Cobb, Jr., *Living Options in Protestant Theology* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), p. 261. See also a reprint from *Religion in Life*, Winter, 1966 entitled "Paul Tillich: Theologian of Culture," *Paul Tillich Retrospect and Future* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), pp. 31-41.

[152] Alexander J. McKelway, *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, A Review and Analysis* (New York: Dell Publishing Co. - Delta Book, 1964), p. 66. Cf. David Hopper, "Towards Understanding the Thought of Paul Tillich," *The Princeton Seminary Bulletin*, LV (April, 1962) pp. 36-43.

[153] ST, I:61

[154] Cf. Robert P. Scharlemann, "Theological Method of Correlation," *Journal of Religion*, XLVI (January, 1966) pp. 92-103 which also includes a reply from Paul Tillich, pp. 180-186.

[155] J. Heywood Thomas, *Paul Tillich An Appraisal* (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 187.

[156] Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, editors, *The Theology of Paul Tillich* (New York: The Macmillan Co. - Macmillan Paperback, 1964) pp. 26-49.

[157] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[158] Paul Tillich, *Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Thought*, Edited and with an introduction by Carl E. Braaten (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 242.

[159] Bernard Martin, *Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963), p. 30.

[160] ST, I:61

[161] Karl Barth in his introductory report to Alexander McKelway's The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Dell Publishing Co. - Delta Book, 1964), p. 13. Cf. Two excellent statements on the Tillich-Barth controversy in David Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), pp. 37-38, 63.

[162] ST, I:61

[163] ST, I:61

[164] Cobb, Living Options, p. 261.

[165] Ibid., p. 276.

[166] Ibid., p. 283.

[167] McKelway, Paul Tillich, p. 263.

[168] Ibid., p. 264.

[169] Cf. McKelway, Paul Tillich, pp. 267-268 for a positive alternative to Tillich's correlative methodology.

[170] Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 227.

[171] Ibid., p. 232.

[172] Ibid., p. 28.

[173] Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith (London: Butterworth Press, 1956), p. 428. cited by Hamilton, System and the Gospel, p. 36.

[174] Hamilton, System and the Gospel, p. 49.

[175] Ibid., p. 118.

[176] Ibid., p. 121.

[177] George Thomas, "The Method and Structure of Tillich's Theology" in The Theology of Paul Tillich, Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co. - Macmillan Paperback, 1964), p. 89.

[178] Ibid., pp. 103-104.

[179] Ibid., p. 337.

[180] Ibid., p. 337.

[181] Thomas A. O'Meara, O. P. and Celestin D. Weisser, O. P., editors, Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought with a foreword by J. Heywood Thomas and with an afterword by Paul Tillich (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1964), pp. 323. This collection of essays has drawn together the most significant criticisms on Paul Tillich that have occurred in books and journals elsewhere.

[182] Ibid., p. xxi.

[183] Ibid., p. xxi.

[184] Ibid., p. 4.

[185] Ibid., p. 19.

[186] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[187] Ibid., p. 23.

[188] Ibid., p. 23.

[189] Ibid., p. 23.

[190] Ibid., p. 23.

[191] Ibid., p. 24.

[192] Ibid., p. 183.

[193] Ibid., p. 37.

[194] Cf. Hopper, Tillich, p. 45.

[195] ST, I:83

[196] ST, I:84

[197] Paul Tillich, "An Afterword: Appreciation and Reply" in O'Meara and Weisser, Paul Tillich, p. 304.

[198] O'Meara and Weisser, Paul Tillich, p. 94.

[199] Jacob Taubes, "On the Nature of the Theological Method," Journal of Religion, XXXIV (1954) p. 25. cited by George Tavard, "Protestant Principle and Tillich's System," O'Meara and Weisser, Paul Tillich, p. 95.

[200] George Tavard, "Christianity and the Philosophies of Existence," *Theological Studies* (1957), p. 10. The same point is made in George Tavard, *Paul Tillich and the Christian Message* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp. 52-81.

[201] O'Meara and Weisser, *Paul Tillich*, p. 73.

[202] *Ibid*., p. 75.

[203] *Ibid*., p. 75.

[204] *Ibid*., pp. 302-303.

[205] *Ibid*., p. 304.

[206] *Ibid*., p. 306.

# CHAPTER III

## DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN PAUL TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

Depth psychology is decisive and indispensable to Paul Tillich's theology. It has provided a "depth" dimension to his existential analysis of the human situation and to his interpretation of the symbols of the Christian message. Depth psychology has been decisive in determining qualitatively the essence-existence polarity of his ontological methodology and in undergirding theoretically the correlative principle of _analogia entis_. Depth psychology has been indispensable in enabling Tillich to cognitively grasp holistically the ultimate concerns of man arising out of the basic ambiguities of human existence and to relevantly interpret the revelatory symbols of the Christian tradition as the theological answers to the existential questions. Not only has depth psychology been an aid _tour de force_, but it has also substantiated and enriched the methodology and the content of Tillich's thought by its principles and its insights. Depth psychology has enabled Tillich to achieve the two basic needs of a theological system; namely, "the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation."[1] The "depth" dimension has perhaps enhanced the possibility of the "truth" of both situation and message in Tillich's systematic theology.

Depth psychology has been of central importance to Paul Tillich for many years. It was more than a "vogue" or "Zeitgeist" that he adopted for his American debut in the closing years of the Social Gospel and the beginning of the new emphasis on crisis theology. Tillich said, "I came into contact after the First World War, since 1920 about, with the psychoanalytic movement, coming from Freud at that time, and changing the climate of the whole century--already in Europe at that time."[2] This acquaintance was made when he was seeking an alternative to the traditional terms of "fallen men" and "sinful men" for defining "the demonic" in a paper by the same title written in 1926 while he was a professor at the University of Dresden in Germany. Depth psychological insights and materials have been imperative for the adequate expression of the depth and breadth of his ontological presuppositions that man and the world are indissolubly bound to each other and to God as the ground of being. These insights were also of utmost importance to Tillich because of his conception of the role that experience played as the medium of religious knowledge. These few contributions and many others to be delineated in various ways throughout this chapter will be indicative of the important relationship of depth psychology to Paul Tillich's theology.

It is the purpose of this chapter to indicate the relationship of depth psychology to Paul Tillich's theology. The first task will require (1) a definition of depth psychology; (2) a notation of the importance of depth psychology for Tillich's theology and the influence of Tillich's thought upon depth psychology and pastoral psychology; (3) an examination of the mutual relationship of existentialism and depth psychology and of their relationship to theology; and (4) an analysis of the contributions of depth psychology to theological thought in general. The second task is to demonstrate how Tillich has utilized depth psychology to analyze the existential situation in terms of the questions of reason, being, existence, life, and history.

## A. A DEFINITION OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

The context for a definition of depth psychology is man's search for a meaning in life. A distinctive bench mark for evaluating the contemporary search for meaning might well be the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. Discontent with life and its traditional values men set out to refashion society after their passionate hope for a better world based on reason, liberty, equality, and fraternity.

The influence of religious humanism, reductive naturalism, secular liberalism, and scientism upon successive generations is obvious in even the most cursory examination of social history. Progressively the rationalistic orientation to life and the philosophies of consciousness diminished the content of meaning for man. Man could no longer "sense" or "feel" a meaning for his life from within the depths of himself. He seemed to be as a wayward ship in the rational emphasis upon life. Every emphasis upon the consciousness of man further neglected his deep unconscious nature. In the absence of the dimension of depth in his life,man lost touch with his creative unconscious that evolves a meaning for life.

The term depth psychology refers generally to the various theories of psychology that are concerned with defining and interpreting the unconscious depths of man. Together they formulate the science of depth psychology, suggests Ira Progoff, "by which we mean the study of man and all that pertains to him in terms of the magnitude of the human personality and the dimensions of experience that underlie and transcend consciousness."[3] It is a psychological science that has creatively evolved via theory and therapy from the original work of Freud to the point that today "depth psychology is as much a scientific discipline as the exact natural sciences."[4] It has come of age as a distinct perspective of the discipline of psychology concerned with the resources of the unconscious for a meaning in life.

Depth psychology was first used by the eminent Swiss psychiatrist Eugene Bleuler at the turn of the twentieth century to describe a new development in medical psychology.

> I consider that up to the present the various schools of psychology have contributed extremely little towards explaining the nature of psychogenic symptoms and disease, but that depth psychology offers something toward a psychology which still awaits creation and which physicians are in need of in order to understand their patients and to cure them rationally.[5]

Historically, from the time of Descartes, medical psychology held that consciousness was the distinguishing characteristic of the psychological phenomenon of life. "Psychic life," claims Nuttin, "was practically taken to be the same thing as consciousness."[6] Instinctual or emotional behavior was observed but relegated to an insignificant position in comparison with the superior conscious phenomena of knowledge and will. But the neurological research on hysteria by Charcot, Breuer, and Freud was revealing something quite different from the "higher" more rational faculties of man. These men were recognizing an independent force of the "lower" more rational faculties of man and their motivating factors in personality. Depth psychology was being used, from Bleuler's point of view, to designate generally the study of non-conscious levels of personality and to designate specifically the study of the "unconscious repressed" and its effect upon human behavior. This new theory of the unconscious and its activity in relationship to consciousness was explored by Freud in his study of hysteria and described in his major publication The Interpretation of Dreams.[7]

Ira Progoff observes that Freud's main contribution to the early stages of depth psychology was not his pathological concepts of the depths of man, but "it was, rather, his recognition that there are processes taking place beneath the surface of awareness and that these processes are as real, as subject to law and to scientific principles of understanding, as the processes of the body."[8] The concept of these deep processes in the human psyche had its impact upon the minds of medical practitioners. The boundary lines between the normal and the pathological factors were being determined in the recognition that the mechanisms of the unconscious dynamic forces were similar in both cases. Freud pointed out in his Psychopathology of Everyday Life[9] the deterministic forces of the unconscious and the interdependence of conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche. Nuttin notes that "it is precisely this extension of the unconscious from the pathological to the normal which has gradually but unmistakably caused such considerable changes in our psychological picture of man."[10] In this respect, the concept of depth psychology has altered radically the Renaissance view of the rationality of man that was the idol of the Great Enlightenment. The unconscious must be recognized along with the conscious as comprising the psychic nature of man.

The concept of "depth" is crucial to the definition of the term depth psychology. The original meaning attributed to depth was the "unconscious repressed." Depth referred to a literal and spatial category designating those mental materials that existed below the level of consciousness. It was essentially a negative term that evolved out of Freud's pathological concerns and was based on the traditional views of the natural sciences. It also recognized the cultural conflicts, especially sexual and parent-child relationships, that were consciously repressed into the depths of the psyche only to return later to contaminate consciousness, thereby producing neuroses. This analytical and reductive conceptualization of depth held by Freud soon gave way to new theories.

Carl Jung began to evolve perhaps the first serious consideration of the positive and prospective conceptualization of the depth of the psyche. He saw the dynamics of the psyche in a holistic, affirmative, and constructive way. The depth was not so literal or spatial as it was a dimension of the psyche. It was not to be a contaminant of the psyche but was rather to be the source of its fulfillment in a teleological sense. The deep unconscious for Jung referred to those a priori, inherent, creative propensities for the individuation of man. Ira Progoff describes Jung's conceptualization.

> *Depth is the dimension of wholeness in man.* It is not a level in the psyche literally or spatially; but it is indeed a level in the human organism in *principle*. It is present and it is *deeper* down in the psyche in the sense that it is more fundamental than those mental contents that are in closer relation to surface consciousness and to sensory contact with the outer world. The depths contain what is implicit in the psyche, what is potential there, what is working in the background of individual development toward fulfillment by means of growth.[11]

Depth then is not to be seen as an infectious element of the psyche that contaminates conscious awareness with negative qualities, but rather as an inherent purpose, a *telos*, nonpersonal in nature, that guides the unfoldment of the psyche, in cooperation and competition with environmental factors, to its "destinal" fulfillment. The basic presupposition is that "there is a living seed in man, a seed of growth; yes, a seed of divinity"[12] that guides man to his unique potential in the same way that an acorn becomes an oak tree. Progoff believes that the process of growth indigenous in the depth of the psyche procedes along psychologic principles to a spiritual end and contends that "the processes of growth with which depth psychology is concerned are the processes by which what is potential in man progressively becomes more real, more actual, so that the meaning of man's life as a spiritual being in the natural world and in history is fulfilled in the individual's existence."[13] Depth in this sense underscores depth psychology's concern for the whole man and his existential integrity. It recognizes the interdependence of the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of the psyche in a positive rather than a negative perspective.

The historical development of this concept of the depth dimension will be discussed later when the correspondence between depth psychology and existentialism is examined. At the same time the existential and holistic concepts will be extended. The dynamic aspects of the depth psyche will be evident throughout this chapter in great detail so it need not be elaborated further at this point.

Depth psychology, then, distinguishes itself within the central discipline of psychology at three significant points. First, it is concerned with the psychological study of human behavior rather than the physiological which has become the dominant field in psychology because it lent itself to "scientific methodology" and to empirical data and verification. Second, it is concerned with the dynamic activity rather than a static description of the nature of man because of the tremendous influence of the independent energies of the unconscious upon all conscious activity and decisions. Third, it is concerned with the depth of the dynamic activity that comes largely from below the level of consciousness in which there is a richness of materials that enhances consciousness as well as provides the essential source for the individuation of the personality. Depth psychology is an approach to the unconscious dimension of man revealing the potential, creative, archetypal human nature underlying the existential situation of modern man.

Perhaps more than any other theologian Paul Tillich has understood the richness of the insights of depth psychology for theology. He has grasped the holistic concept of depth psychology and has seen its importance for understanding the estrangement and ambiguities of existential man. He has found the existential aspect of depth psychology helpful, for it makes possible the depth perception of the ultimate concerns of human life. The task now is to note the importance of depth psychology to Tillich's life and thought and also his influence upon the evolving insights of depth psychology and pastoral psychology.

## B. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL TILLICH

There is perhaps no significant writing of Paul Tillich in which depth psychological insights and materials are not explicitly obvious or implicitly the source of his theologizing. Whenever he described the conditions of human existence, he drew upon depth psychology to inform him about the anxiety, estrangement, ambiguities, meaninglessness, guilt, and doubt that assailed finite freedom. Depth psychology was the primary source for analyzing the phenomena of human finitude because so frequently philosophy and theology did not have an adequate conceptualization of the experience he had about man in his human condition. Whenever he described the symbols of the Christian faith, he drew upon depth psychology to interpret the formulative principles of the dogma of the revelatory events or the imagery that formed the final expressions of the inspired faith of the men or councils who described them. Depth psychology has provided a dimension of thought that is not only interpretative but expressive as well.

The task now is to note the importance of depth psychology for Tillich and his influence upon others in the field of psychology.

## 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY TO TILLICH

Tillich admits to the profound effect of depth psychology upon his life and work. In his autobiographical reflections in Kegley and Bretall's The Theology of Paul Tillich he recalls his acquaintance with depth psychology and its importance to him:

> For external and practical reasons it became impossible to maintain the relationship to artists, poets, and writers which I enjoyed in postwar Germany. But *I have been in permanent contact with the depth psychology movement and with many of its representatives, especially in the last ten years*. The problem of the relation between the theological and the psychotherapeutic understanding of men has come more and more into the foreground of my interest, partly through a university seminar on religion and health at Columbia University, partly through the great practical and theoretical interest that depth psychology has aroused in Union Seminary, and partly through personal friendship with older and younger analysts and counselors.[14] (Italics mine.)

In a dedicatory editorial in *Pastoral Psychology*, Seward Hiltner has observed in Tillich's thought, in

> the unusual extent and depth of his psychological knowledge, something which has not always been true of many otherwise well-informed theologians of recent years. Tillich became well acquainted with psychoanalysis while he was still in Germany, before 1933. He was and is convinced that it brings a dimension to our understanding which is of great positive significance. He was exploring the creative revelations of psychoanalysis at a time when most theologians who noticed it at all were misled into condeming it for what seemed to them pan-sexual or anti-moral bias. Tillich penetrated its meaning more deeply.[15]

The depth of Tillich's understanding and use of depth psychological concepts and insights is quite evident in his analysis of anxiety in *Courage to Be*. Hiltner has actually noted that "the psychology is not always 'Telegraphed' by label, but it is very much present" in all of his work.[16]

Walter Leibrecht points up the significance Tillich attributes to depth psychology and existentialism for the understanding of modern man in contemporary theology and for their counter-action to the prevalent philosophies of consciousness. This might be equally true for the more contemporary movement of logical positivism.

> Clearly recognizing the inner limitations of existentialism and existential psychoanalysis, Tillich nevertheless feels that these two movements have bestowed a "tremendous gift" on modern psychology in terms of understanding the human situation. He interprets both existentialism and depth psychology as modern expressions of the age-old protest against philosophies of consciousness. In his view existentialism's emphasis on the unconscious and the irrational will and its analysis of human predicament and estrangement were transformed by Freud into a methodological scientific language. Existentialism and depth psychology are for him indispensable. Though their great significance lies in their detailed description of man's existential predicament and estrangement, they are also significant insofar as they point at least indirectly to man's teleological nature.17

Leibrecht correctly observes, as is basic in Tillich's correlative methodology, that existentialism and depth psychology are unable to provide a definitive analysis of man and his finite condition. They are able to raise the ultimate questions of life philosophically, but they are unable to answer the questions philosophically. The answers are theological. Therefore they are not to be found in the analysis of human existence as Sartre would maintain. They come from beyond. The relationship of the psychologist and the theologian can be one of mutual interdependence, however, if each one dares to risk his knowledge in terms of the other's knowledge. It is Tillich's opinion, claims Leibrecht, that "the psychologist may be able to treat a person's pathological symptoms, but he cannot deal with the basic existential estrangement that made escape into neurosis or psychosis desirable or necessary in the first place."[18] He cites Tillich who says "neither existential analysis nor psychological methodology can overcome the existential negativity, meaninglessness and guilt which not only the sick person, but man universally carries."[19] Therefore Leibrecht interprets Tillich corectly as saying that this "existential estrangement" is "the object of salvation" and that it is necessary at this point for the psychologist and the theologian to work together. The theologian can well benefit from the psychologist's insights into the human situation and the psychologist can well learn from the philosopher and the theologian the ontological nature of man and the nature of "healing grace."

In an analysis of Tillich's use of depth psychology in his theology, Peter Homans has indicated that he, Tillich, "more than any other theologian . . . has permitted his theological work to come under the influence of psychology, and especially depth psychology."[20] Homans points out that

Tillich has found in depth psychology, as well as in existentialism, "the bearer of a fundamental spiritual perception which has resided within Western tradition all along."[21] Homans further indicates that depth psychology represents a "rediscovery" of the spiritual depths of Western culture.

Tillich claims depth psychology is of the utmost importance for the practical theologian as for the systematic theologian who must use

> (1) our present knowledge of the general psychological and sociological structures of man and society; (2) a practical and theoretical understanding of the psychological and sociological situation of special groups; and (3) a knowledge of the cultural achievements and problems within the realms of his special interest: education, arts, music, medicine, politics, economics, social work, public communication, etc. In this way practical theology can become a bridge between the Christian message and the human situation, generally and specially.22

Only the awareness of the richness of the materials of depth psychology has enabled Tillich to undertake the difficult task of a systematic theology, especially in the form of an "answering" theology. The goal Tillich set for himself in his systematic theology required him to be both philosopher and theologian if he were to authentically perform and complete his task. He had the credentials for both. He had a method for correlating the two independent disciplines of thought. It was necessary to find the source for deriving an accurate, and even more important, a depth analysis of the predicament of human finitude. It was also necessary for him to find a source that would enable him to interpret the symbols that held the real meaning of the revelatory events described in the Christian faith as well as provide the new symbols of communication for expressing the relevant truths gleaned from the Christian faith. He found this source in depth psychology and existentialism. He also found a medium for his thought that enabled him to express his intuitive experiences. Depth psychology was not only a source and a medium, but it was also a norm for evaluating his existential analyses and his theological interpretations. Existentialism and depth psychology have served as the source, medium, and norm of the philosophical analysis of both question and answer.

The central statement of Tillich's that perhaps best sums up the importance of depth psychology for him is: "I do not think that it is possible today to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man, especially a Christian doctrine of Christian man, without using the immense material brought forth by depth psychology."[23] Many citations could be offered to further substantiate this point and they would be unanimous as to the importance of depth psychology for Paul Tillich.

The next task is to note the influence of Tillich's thought upon depth psychology and pastoral counseling.

## 2. THE INFLUENCE OF TILLICH'S THOUGHT ON DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Paul Tillich has not only received much from depth psychology; he has given much also from an ontological analysis of man and his existence and from a theological perspective that has emphasized the essential nature of man at those times when man's nature was viewed only from an existential position. Seward Hiltner emphasized that Tillich had an "active participation" among a broad spectrum of professional and pastoral psychologists, both personally and professionally, in conferences and consultations, contributing much to every encounter. One of the unusual characteristics of Tillich's personality was his penchant for dialoguing with another person in that person's professional field. Tillich also had an ingenious "procedure" for achieving the depths in everything by generalizing upon the particular. This gave him an overarching panoramic perspective of the context of the particular, and with that, often a new orientation for himself and his partner in dialogue. These two aspects of Tillich's thought may well be paradoxical, but they do provide a concrete absolute of life as it is. Hiltner observes "there is something stubbornly authoritative about immersion in a concrete situation, and detailed analysis of it, for which no amount of general principles is a substitute."[24] But he also acknowledges "there can be no analysis without principles," the latter of which Tillich has provided many, and for which the field of pastoral psychology is indebted.

The thought of Paul Tillich has had a very special meaning for many psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts who came in large numbers to hear him speak. He has been able to speak to them empathetically, dealing with their problems in search of a greater understanding of the complexities of human finitude; for they were his problems, too, in as real a way as theirs. They came to hear him, says Rollo May, because "Tillich spoke out of our broken culture, but he spoke _believing_."[25] It was not with defiance but with affirmation, for there was much to learn from any resistance. It was not only in theory but also with practicality, for it was man, indeed, his hearers and himself, with whom he was concerned. May believes they came to hear him because of their yearning for meaning, for help in the capacity to care," for the "belief-ful realism" that he offered in terms of _ultimate concern_ to those psychoanalysts who live in the midst of anxious people in an anxious culture seeking a meaning for their lives. This is especially true of a second great contribution of

Tillich to depth psychology in his emphasis upon and an elaboration of "the meaningfulness of the demonic" which he had made such an integral part of his philosophy. He says of Tillich:

> He not only stands within our anxiety, guilt, and despair; but he points out that these are an inescapable part of man's life as man; we do not need to be guilty about despair, nor anxious about our guilt. The demonic then need not develop into "demon possession," but may become the source and impetus of human creativity. But I do not think it is for relief of guilt that professionals and other intellectuals read Tillich. Rather *it is for the sense of having our feet on the bedrock of existence by recognizing the inevitability of anxiety, despair, and guilt, in the human existence*, which is the first step in gaining courage to confront these directly, which in turn is the second step in helping ourselves and our patients to have the "courage to be."26 (Italics mine.)

There was also a spirit of love that Tillich manifested in his life, notes May; indeed he was "a man of *eros*, *philia*, *agapē*." Not only did Tillich speak out of a broken culture, *believing*, he also "loved out of a broken society, and he knew only too well the tragedies and suffering, the demonic and evil aspects of human love. But he loved *believing*, and always with ultimate concern."[27] There is perhaps a sense of new confidence that the professional psychologist gains in his awareness of the meaning of existential anxiety and the courage then to forge new therapeutic procedures for the recognition and acceptance of these conditions of human existence. It is this awareness of the context of his own being in existential anxiety that affords the most important contribution Tillich brings to depth psychologists, a meaning in life. By touching the depths of their existence they seem to take root again and find a source of nurture in the very reality of their being, perhaps the ground of their being.

Tillich's doctrine of forgiveness, influenced indeed by insights of depth psychology, offers in return new dimensions for one of the most pressing therapeutic problems of reconciliation. The most poignant illustration of forgiveness, and probably his most cherished gift of all to the reading public, is his sermon "You Are Accepted" in *The Shaking of the Foundations* in which he says:

> *You are accepted*, accepted by that which is greater than you, and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for the name now; perhaps you will find it later. Do not try to do anything now; perhaps later you will do much. Do not seek for anything; do not perform anything; do not intend anything. *Simply accept the fact that you are accepted*.[28]

This concept of forgiveness is possible in his theology, claims Daniel Williams, because "while he affirms human freedom he also affirms the paradox of absolute predestination."[29] He notes four implications in Tillich's doctrine of forgiveness for the therapeutic process in dealing with the practical issues of human reconciliation. The first, recognizing that "to forgive is to participate in the New Being, and to share in the power of God," sees the possibility of overcoming "the moralistic calculating view of forgiveness as sheer cancellation of debts" with the "healing and creative function" of forgiveness as Tillich understands it.[30] The second indicates the possibility of understanding man's need for forgiveness as part of the total context of his experience of estrangement and meaninglessness in terms of the New Being, "the power that united man with the source of being."[31] The third implication in Tillich's doctrine of forgiveness stresses the importance of the grace of God who forgives man, man who has been unable to accept his unacceptance. Williams says, "The therapist who communicates acceptance is in that action representing an objective healing power which is not his own, but in which he and another participate."[32] The fourth implication is derived from Tillich's understanding of "an absolute faith" which grasps the power of being as it overcomes meaninglessness. Since estrangement as well as salvation are experienced in many forms at the very center of life, Williams suggests that in "uniting the interpretation of forgiveness with the radical forms of alienation of contemporary man, Tillich shows the way to the rediscovery of the meaning of forgiveness just where those traditions which have given it a more exclusive emphasis have tended to lose their hold upon it."[33]

There are five areas in Tillich's thought that are held up by Joseph Fletcher as significant for depth and pastoral psychology. In Fletcher's opinion, Tillich's position on ethics is situational, based essentially on his correlative methodology that stresses a point of contact with the reality of any particular situation. In speaking about love, especially as agapē, he says, "It is life itself in its actual unity . . . and this is the meaning of ethics."[34] There is no separation between the essential and existential nature of man. In the encounter between law and love in a concrete situation it is the demand of love that rules, as is obvious in Tillich's response to a student: "I tell him to find out what the commandment of agapē in his situation is, and then decide for it even if traditions and conventions stand against his decision."[35] The ultimacy of love is the key to Tillich's concept of the "transmoral conscience" in which there are no right decisions, but only decisions made in love with the courage to risk one's being in the choosing. The importance of interpersonal relationships and the supremacy of persons in Tillich's thought is crucial to ethics, and especially to situational ethics. It is a position that has been influenced by Buber's I-Thou concept that has a numinous center in which the power of the divine, as the Holy, resides and provided for Tillich, in Progoff's opinion, "the insight that the moral imperative and its unconditional character is identical with the demand that I acknowledge every person as a person, every thou as a thou, and that I am acknowledged in the same way."[36] In this way the integrity and authenticity of each person is accepted and respected, and in this relationship a new power is felt in each person's life for each has come into the presence of God in his very being. In this relationship, opines Fletcher, "man's infinitely precious role is to 'meet' the being of God as he 'meets' the being of his fellowman, in some genuine sense *imago Dei*. And this encounter is the very essence of ethics."[37] The method of correlation enabled Tillich to sharply formulate the question and answer of morality. Fletcher observes, noting Tillich's abstract concept of moral law, "It is the situation only that can ask the right question, not a moral principle, and only love, with or without the aid of such principles . . . can make reply."[38] The *Grenzesituation* of Tillich's life illuminated his situational theory of ethics wherein he found that every decision in life is made somewhere within the boundaries of right and wrong. All of Fletcher's observations about the importance of Tillich's ethic for psychology might be summarized in Tillich's words: "Final revelation conquers the conflict between the absolutistic character and the relativistic fate of every decision and action. It shows that the right decision must sacrifice its claim to be the right decision.

There are no right decisions; there are trials and defeats and successes."[39]

Don Browning questions the rejection of the theistic God and the legal modality of the sin-salvation syndrome, two concepts that many psychotherapists have accepted gladly from Tillich. He claims that Tillich has misunderstood the psychotherapeutic principle upon which his reasoning was based and has violated his own basic methodology of analogy. He believes that Tillich did not understand that the psychoanalytical presuppositions would invalidate his concept of God as being-itself. He emphasizes:

> Psychotherapeutic psychology does not support Tillich in his banishment of the God of theism. When the psychotherapeutic relation is rightly understood and the anthropology and soteriology which it implies is comprehended correctly and applied analogically to the divine A PRIORI which revelation makes manifest, it drives toward a redefinition rather than an elimination of the God of theism.[40]

In Browning's opinion, the redefinition of God ought to follow more closely the analogic argument assuming that God possesses the same attributes experienced in man and makes God, not Being-itself, but rather a being, a Supreme Being. The concept of God as being-itself tends to essentialize life, in his opinion, and therefore "the experience of an immovable, absolute, and unconditioned ground and power of being would not convey a sense of acceptance." He goes on to say:

> The experience and awareness of the power of being is not equivalent to a sense of being accepted by this power of being. We feel accepted by the divine only when we believe that the divine literally knows or experiences our distortions and yet accepts us in spite of them. Since being-itself cannot literally be said to know or experience (he has no destiny outside of himself, and therefore cannot experience or know the uniqueness and individuality of my guilt and anxiety) it becomes impossible to know that one is accepted.[41]

Tillich's main contribution, says Browning, has been to catalyze an anthropological approach to the theology of the future that will, in Mircea Eliade's thought, through myth and cult and religion, in its way and time,provide a concrete model of God for man.[42]

A somewhat similar criticism is voiced by Kenneth Mitchell of the Menninger Foundation who suggests that Tillich, in his reflections upon the relationship of depth psychology to the task of the pastor, has clearly indicated the dimensions of pastoral care and psychotherapy as well as the stance and attitude of the pastor within this dimension. But he has failed, in Mitchell's estimate, because of his ontological posture and his psychoanalytical modality of thought, to delineate the pastor's role in the healing enterprise.[43] There is a conflict between the pastor's role as a mediator of the acceptance of God, which Browning neglects in his analysis of Tillich, and his role in accepting the person with whom he is relating. Mitchell believes that goals ought to be set in the initial encounters to provide some guidelines for the acceptance the minister expresses both of God and of himself. These goals are given largely by the organizational context of life in which one lives and they must always be respected. Earlier it was noted that Hiltner felt much the same way, but wisely recognized that Tillich's role as a theologian was to bring the basic principles to bear upon the field of pastoral psychology, and not to bring specific professional processes and procedures for the professional in his field. Tillich strongly believed that this specific task was to be extrapolated from his ideas by the professional himself in his own situation. Here the existentialism of Tillich is clear.

Five significant contributions have been made by Tillich to the field of pastoral psychology in Wayne Oates' opinion. First, having refused to juxtapose the "ordinary knowledge" of the depth dimension of the human situation over against the knowledge of revelation from the transcendent Ultimate Reality and the Ground of Being, he "opened the door once again for the use of the psychological method in theology."[44] Second, his method of correlation has provided a methodology for "translating the power of the gospel into idiom of twentieth century thought, namely a psychological way of thinking, a psychological idiom."[45] Not only was this done in theory but also in practice for it "opened the conversation between Tillich and contemporary psychologists:" Karen Horney, Gotthard Booth, Harold Kelman, and many others. Third, Tillich made a distinction between ontological and pathological anxiety that "opened the way for the development of existential approaches to pastoral psychology"[46] at a time when geneticism and pathology reigned supreme. Fourth, by virtue of his conceptualization of the demonic, "Tillich has bridged the gap between the disciplined naivete of Biblical images of man and the secular images of man set forth by contemporary psychology and psychotherapy" enabling the pastoral psychologist to make an authentic _theological_ contribution by "constantly assaying and analyzing the idolatrous elements in the subjective religious experience of disturbed people."[47] Fifth, Tillich has provided a "theological _raison_ _d'etre_ for the unique function of the minister," who, in representing "the unconditional acceptance of the God of grace and hope," is "to be a harbinger of hope and a catalyst of the kind of community which overcomes the estrangement of the person."[48]

There is no doubt that Tillich has perhaps been as influenced by depth psychology as he has in turn influenced it. He has learned and he has taught. But this is the very essence of Tillich's life and thought. As he found himself in the dialogic situation, he found himself experiencing the most creative moments in his life. Depth psychology has been the source and medium and norm for his analysis of the human situation and for his explanation of the Christian symbols. The task now is to examine the mutual relationship between depth psychology and existentialism and their relationship to Tillich's systematic theology. A somewhat syllogistic argument will be followed. First, the basic philosophy-theology correlation established in chapter two will be restated briefly. Second, the correspondence between existentialism and depth psychology will be shown in the philosophical matrix for depth psychology. Third, it will be assumed that depth psychology and theology can be correlated as philosophy and theology have been.

## C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY TO THEOLOGY

The relationship of depth psychology to theology is posited basically upon the correlation of an interdependent relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich has clearly recognized the divergent independent concerns as well as the convergent dependent concerns of philosophy and theology as established in chapter two. He accepts the philosopher's passion for objective truth as well as the theologian's subjective commitment to his faith. He accepts the philosopher's ultimate source of knowledge as the universal *logos* as well as the theologian's Logos, the *logos* manifest in a special historical event. He accepts the philosopher's cosmological structure of his assertions as well as the theologian's soteriological analysis. He accepts these divergent concerns because this is the dialectical nature of *Dasein*. The truth lies not in a Hegelian synthesis of the two, but rather in the authenticity of the interdependence between the philosophical-theological concerns in correlation. The authenticity of each discipline of thought is respected by a correlative methodology that unites the two. In correlation each informs and "corrects" the other.

Since there is no common basis between philosophy and theology, it was necessary to correlate them on one or the other's terms. Tillich chose philosophy because both philosophy and theology ask about the question of being, one about the structure of being itself and the other about the meaning of being for us, *pour soi* and *en soi* in Sartre's two modes of thinking, on philosophical grounds. Both philosophy and theology answer this question of being: philosophy structures the form of the answer in terms of the *logos* of being; theology answers meaningfully the question from the Logos, the rational Word that grasps and embraces being.[49] Ontologically then, philosophy and theology are correlated by *analogia entis*, an analogy of being.

But Tillich has not subjected theology to philosophy in so doing. He holds the interdependent concerns of philosophy and theology within a "theological circle" in which the theology remains indebted to philosophy for an ontological analysis of the structure of being and conversely philosophy is indebted to theology for the ultimate meaning of being. Tillich is not proposing a division of labor, as Albert Outler has proposed in an alliance between the two disciplines of depth psychology and theology,[50] or as Browning and Mitchell have suggested above, but rather an interdependent relationship because neither can perform their tasks alone in any meaningful way. They are interdependent because "the doctrine of the theological circle has a methodological consequence: neither the introduction nor any other part of the theological system is the logical basis for the other parts. Every part is dependent on every other part."[51]

In so far as philosophy and theology may be correlated in terms of their common concern for being on the rational basis of the logos of being, one may then assume that depth psychology may also be correlated with theology if depth psychology has a correspondence with philosophy and existentialism in particular. The examination of this possible correspondence between depth psychology and existentialism is the next task.

## 1. EXISTENTIALISM AND DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

Existentialism and depth psychology offer perhaps the two most important approaches to the analysis of human nature. They have gone beyond the traditional philosophies of consciousness to the "deeper" dimensions of the unconscious in search of an understanding of the precipitant factors of what R. D. Laing calls "ontological insecurity."[52] Both have a common focus in an analysis of man's existential predicament. Tillich claims "it is a fact that psychoanalysis and existentialism have been connected with each other from the very beginning; they have mutually influenced each other in the most radical and profound ways."[53]

Existentialism had its beginning in a protest against the philosophy of consciousness that appeared as early as the thirteenth century in a conflict between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and continued through the Renaissance and Reformation up to a final victory for the philosophy of consciousness in Protestantism's alliance with Cartesian thought. Tillich has observed "the history of industrial society . . . represents the history of the victory of the philosophy of consciousness over the philosophy of the unconscious irrational will."[54]

It was perhaps Pascal's resistance to Decartes in the seventeenth century that marked the first existentialist analysis of the human situation in describing the symptoms of man's decentralization by Newtonian physics in contemporary existential terms such as anxiety, finitude, doubt, guilt, and meaninglessness.[55] One might even mention Hamann's existentialist ideas as a representative of the eighteenth century.[56] But the most serious attempt to refute the philosophy of consciousness began with Schelling's attack upon Hegel in 1841 and may well be the beginning of the existentialist movement as it is known today. Tillich notes:

> The most radical protest came at the moment when the philosophy of consciousness reached its peak in the philosophy of Hegel. Against this victorious philosophy of consciousness Schelling arose, giving to Kierkegaard and many others the basic concepts of existentialism; then Schopenhauer's irrational will, Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, Nietzsche's analysis which anticipated most of the results of later depth-psychological inquiries. The protest appeared also in Kierkegaard's and Marx's description of the human predicament, in finitude, estrangement, and loss of subjectivity. And in Dostoyevsky we find the description of the demonic subconscious in man; we find it also in French poetry of the type of Rimbaud and Baudelaire. This was the preparation of the ground for what was to follow in the 20th century.[57]

An almost fanatic interest in existentialism has followed in the twentieth century, especially in the last twenty-five years, touching almost every discipline of thought and influencing new perspectives and goals. It has been especially influencial in literature and the arts, education, and in the formulation of a philosophy of life for contemporary youth. The whole movement of situational ethics is based upon existentialism's contribution to American thought. Existentialism, now gaining a broader perspective than its original posture first noted in American life in terms of Sartre and Camus, has essentially permeated American culture in the last twenty-five years and is the basic philosophical position of many contemporary thinkers in the Western world.

The evolvement of depth psychology was similarly a protest movement as was existentialism. The history of depth psychology hinges upon the physiological research of a few medical practitioners into the mental phenomena of hysteria in the closing years of the nineteenth century. In retrospect of that point in time, there was an elusive struggle to understand the psychological nature of man from the primitive to the modern era almost solely in terms of mysticism, philosophy, and physiology. At the turn of the century the study of hysteria by men like Brücke, Meynert, Charcot, and particularly by Freud led to the distinction between a physical and a psychical etiology of hysteria, and in turn, to a conceptualization of the psyche as an interdependent phenomenon of man related to his physical nature. In prospect of this new concept of the psyche, depth psychology evolved numerous schools of thought delineating the psychological nature of man in terms of medical and philosophical perspectives.[58] Without seeming too precocious one might designate three major periods in the history of depth psychology: the pre-historical period, the transitional period, and the developmental period.

The pre-historical period might be so justifiably entitled because it was not until after the studies of hysteria that there was any serious recognition of the psychical nature of man or the dynamic activity of the psyche. The mystical and philosophical speculations and the practical concerns of philosophy gave way to a deeper understanding of the unconscious from the phenomenological data of clinical experience. This is clearly evident in Zilboorg's classical work, The History of Medical Psychology.[59] Until the twentieth century the dynamic activity of the psyche was "charismatic" in quality and considered "too sacred and good or too powerful for anyone to venture to reduce them to the unblessed state of normalcy." [60] Not even medicine had the right or power to deal with these assumed heironomous events in man's life. The "sacred" was not to be touched by the "profane." Mental illness was the domain of jurisprudence, theology, and philosophy, not medicine.[61]

The transitional period in the history of depth psychology encompasses the "psychoanalytic" period reflecting the neurological investigations and resulting conceptualizations of an apparent non-organic etiology of hysteria.[62] From this research Freud developed his structural, dynamic, and economic modes of conceptualizing the unconscious. But it never escaped the hold of the scientific spirit that supported the philosophy of consciousness noted above. Reuben Fine characterizes these formative and destinal influences upon Freud.

> The dominant influence in Freud's thought, as in that of most scholars of his day, was the implicit faith in the scientific method and the scientific spirit. Let science attack the problems that beset mankind, and they will disappear, was virtually universal belief. Even toward the end of his life, in 1932, when he considered the relationship of psychoanalysis to philosophy, Freud maintained that psychoanalysis had no need of any special Weltanschauung, since it was a part of science. And science alone is sufficient, without any metaphysical speculation.[63]

Fine goes on to indicate the major focus of the day as "the reduction of physiology to physics and chemistry" held especially by Brücke, Freud's first master, and by DuBois, and "the extraordinary explanatory value of evolution."[64] These concepts were the direct result of the Newtonian deterministic system and the Darwinian evolutionary principles. It was these two ideas, claims Fine, that were "the major formative influences in Freud's thought" and that "they remained fundamental to him to the end."[65] These two ideas were also characteristic of the transitional period in the history of depth psychology.

The developmental period began concurrently with Freud in the thought of Adler, Jung, and Rank who initiated a broader and deeper view of the unconscious philosophically and recognized many more cultural implications of the psyche. Psychology grew more cognizant of philosophy in this period and evolved jointly three important fundamental approaches to the analysis of the human psyche. Kurt Reinhardt has described these three methodologies as the phenomenological, the understanding psychology of Weltanschauungen and Lebensformen, and depth psychology. The first is Heideggerian employing a hermeneutic of "the ontological structure of human essence and the ontic structure of human existence." The second is almost exclusively concerned with the conscious life of the psyche. The third is "undoubtedly in its psychological relevance the most significant method" because "the principal aim is a more and more adequate understanding of both the conscious and unconscious life of the psyche, from the theoretical-metaphysical as well as from the empirico-scientific and practical-therapeutic points of view."[66] It is the current developmental period in the history of depth psychology that has recognized explicitly the long standing implicit mutual relationship with existentialism in a protest against a philosophical consciousness.[67]

In the twentieth century existentialism and depth psychology have united in a common concern for the existential integrity and wholeness of the total person. Tillich believes "the focus in both existentialism and depth psychology is man's estranged existence, the characteristics and symptoms of this estrangement, and the conditions of existence in time and space."[68] Existential philosophy provides a set of principles for interpreting clinical phenomena thereby enabling the analyst to grasp the depth dimension of man's existence. Hendrik Ruitenbeek, in observing the crucial impact of existential thought upon the crises of our time, believes "existential philosophy has given psychoanalysis a new dimension, a dimension which is desperately needed in order to meet the challenges of the individual's coping with the complexities of existing in a modern man's society."[69] In addition to this broad cultural perspective of human finitude existentialism points to another dimension, its opposite, essentialism, since "philosophical ideas necessarily appear in pairs of contrasting concepts."[70] Depth psychology needs the dialectical balance of the existential-essential understanding of the nature of man. And this ought to be said also for existentialism, for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche so pointed out the necessity for getting beyond the subject-object cleavage to the reality that undergirds both rationality and irrationality. Heidegger offered the possibility in his Dasein conceptualization of man and his existence as well as Binswanger in his tripartite analysis of existence in terms of Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt. Both point to a more encompassing and meaningful concept of man's existence, toward an "ontic integration" as Thomas Hora notes is possible in Binswanger's delineation of Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" as "being-able-to-be," as "being-allowed-to-be," and as "having-to-be."[71] Such is the basis for existential psychotherapy, claims Rollo May, because "it is based on the assumption that it is possible to have a science of man which does not fragmentize man and destroy his humanity at the same moment as it studies him. It unites science and ontology."[72] It is from his fundamental ontological approach to the analysis of the human situation that leads Tillich to observe that "unambiguous life is impossible whenever the subject-object scheme is unbroken."[73] Depth psychology must recognize existentialism's concern with the basic presuppositions about the essential-existential nature of man that point to the two chief sources of Western man's anxiety and despair noted by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: "first his loss of sense of being and, secondly, his loss of his world."[74]

Tillich correctly observes in criticizing Freud's naturalistic assumptions, saying, "it cannot only be existential, it must also be essential thought which provides the philosophical matrix for the psychoanalytic practice." He goes on to say:

> Let us not talk of existentialist psychoanalysis as such, but of a possible philosophical matrix of psychoanalysis, being aware of the fact that every constructive philosophy and theology unites essentialist and existentialist elements. In order to understand sin, the theologian must understand creative goodness. In order to understand estrangement, the philosopher must understand that from which we are estranged, namely, our own essential nature. This means psychotherapy must remain aware of its dependence on the doctrine of man, on the doctrine of life, on the doctrine of being. As psychotherapy, it cannot create such a philosophy, although it can influence it.[75]

Certainly the relationship of existentialism and depth psychology is two sided. As an example, Tillich cites the strength and weaknesses of Freud's thought. Of his "true existentialist" strength he says:

> Naturalism, the philosophy from which Freud came, is, together with idealism, the main expression of an essentialist philosophy. Freud's determinism was his naturalistic heritage, his moralism was his idealistic heritage,. . . but with the empirical rediscovery of the old philosophical concept of the unconscious, he broke through his own moralism, and with the concept of sublimation, he broke through his determinism. The first, the rediscovery of the unconscious, was confirmation of the inability of autonomous morals to lead man to his fulfillment. . . . Freud showed the ambiguity of goodness as well as of evil, and in doing so, he helped to undercut Protestant moralism. This perhaps was the most important existentialist contribution of psychoanalysis to the doctrine of man. Man is not what he believes himself to be in his conscious decisions.[76]

But his strength was also his weakness. In criticism of Freud's understanding of the superego as having no objective validity in itself because it is derived from the materials of the id, Tillich notes that "Freud did not distinguish the essential structure of man's being, from which norms and principles are derived, and their existential distortion in the images of the superego."[77] It might be said that Freud was perhaps too existentialist and that Jung was perhaps too essentialist. Freud presented a "scientific methodological foundation" for the existentialist protest movement. Jung refined existentialism's ontological intuitions in terms of his "collective unconscious." Whereas Freud was concerned with the "outside" forces and their effect upon the psyche, Jung was concerned with the "inside" forces upon and with the environment.

Existentialism and depth psychology are mutually interdependent, both historically and contemporarily, as noted above. Matter of fact, Tillich claims they "are in reality one thing."[78] Their independent distinctions can be seen in that "existentialism as philosophy speaks of the universal human situation . . . depth psychology points to the ways in which people try to escape the situation."[79] But this difference between them only points to the necessity of their interdependence, and especially to the essential understanding of both approaches to the analysis of the human situation. Tillich has so opined:

> Existentialism has discovered many characteristics of man's predicament which are able to provide a philosophical matrix for psychotherapy. But this does not mean that there should be a definite marriage between existentialism and psychotherapy. It is an alliance which should not be exclusive. Without a powerful essentialist frame the alliance would not hold. It would fall into vagueness and irrelevance, both on the philosophical and the psychotherapeutic side. But it is the task of a philosophical matrix in all realms of man's intellectual life to help these realms toward definiteness, clarity, fundamental principles, and universal validity.[80]

Having demonstrated the mutual interdependence and correspondence of depth psychology and existentialism, the next task is to indicate the relationship that exists between depth psychology's existential posture and theology's essential posture. It is assumed that the two may be correlated on the same ontological basis as were philosophy and theology in terms of being as known in the universal logos.

## 2. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOLOGY

When existentialism and depth psychology recognize their contrasting perspective of the nature of human existence, they admit the essential dimension of theology to their domain. The opposite of this is equally true. Tillich has observed that man's essential nature as well as his existential predicament have most often been analyzed exclusive of one another. Theologians have frequently described man's existential predicament at the expense of his essential nature as did Flacius and the early Karl Barth. He says, "Man was seen as a mere object of divine action and man's productive activities in culture and history were devaluated. This is theological existentialism without the essentialist frame in which classical theology has stated it."[81] The existentialism of Sartre, who has said man's essence is his existence, has completely denied the essential aspect of human nature. Tillich claims that "neither in theology nor in philosophy can existentialism live by itself. . . . Existentialism is an element within the larger frame of essentialism, and it exists only as such an element, even in its most radical antiessentialist statements."[82] Depth psychology, in Tillich's view, has grasped this emphasis for understanding the psychological processes in human nature. He says of these processes:

> No understanding or even description of them is possible without an image of this Gestalt, without a doctrine of man in the several dimensions of his being. No therapeutic theory can be developed without an implicit or explicit image of man. But we must go beyond this step. No doctrine of man is possible without a general understanding of the general processes of life, their trends, and their ambiguities. And finally, no understanding of life processes is possible without a doctrine of being and of the structure of being universally.[83]

The best example of this essential-existential interdependence is Tillich's analysis of anxiety in Courage to Be in which he clearly indicated the importance of the distinction between essential goodness and existential distortion.

Theology brings the essential "judgment" to bear upon depth psychological and existential analyses of the nature of man. Tillich maintains that "the relation between man's essential nature and his existential predicament is the first and basic question that theology has asked whenever it encounters existential analyses and psychoanalytic materials."[84] Theology holds three fundamental presuppositions about human nature: (1) essential goodness based on the dogma of _Esse qua esse bonum est_; (2) existential estrangement that accounts for the universal fall, i.e., the transition from essential goodness to existential estrangement from God, from others, and self; and (3) salvation that represents the potential transcendence beyond essence and existence in terms of his teleological nature.[85] These three fundamental elements of theological thought form a cannon by which depth psychology must be measured.

Tillich believes Freud did not distinguish between man's essential and existential nature in his doctrine of man as is evident in his concept of the libido.[86] This is especially true of his dual instinct theory of Eros and Thanatos which he developed in _Beyond the Pleasure Principle_.[87] The Eros, never to be satisfied, seeks Thanatos to return to its uncomplicated state of existence and hopefully therein satisfaction. Human nature had only negative potential. Tillich illustrates this point well by a comparative analysis of the classical concept of concupisence.

> This concept is used in Christian theology exactly as libido is used by Freud, but it is used for man under the conditions of existence; it is indefinite striving beyond any given satisfaction, to induce satisfaction beyond the given one. But according to theological doctrine, man in his essantial goodness is not in the state of concupisence or indefinite libido. Rather he is directed to a definite special subject, to content, to somebody, to something with which he is connected in love, or eros, or agapē, whatever it may be. If this is the case, then the situation is quite different. Then you can have libido, but the fulfilled libido is real fulfillment, and you are not driven beyond this indefinitely. This means that Freud's description of libido is to be viewed theologically as the description of man in his existential self-estrangement. But Freud does not know any other man, and this is the basic criticism that theology would weigh against him on this point.[88]

But Freud, inconsistent as he was, also had a concept of teleological man that formed the aim of his psychoanalytic process; the overcoming of man's existential predicament. Tillich correctly observes that this basic dichotomy of existential pessimism and essential optimism was never reconciled.

Adler, Jung, and Rank were more essential in their "corrective" postures to existential views of Freud. The

Neo-Freudians in the cultural analyst school of thought have denied Freud's profound insight into the existential libido that "made him and still makes him the most profound of all the depth psychologists."[89] Tillich levels the same criticism against Sartre and Heidegger who appear ambivalent in their understanding of man. Sartre, by the very nature of his "humanistic existentialism," implied he knows what essential man is and the possibility of his freedom which he has lost as existential man. Heidegger in his analysis of authentic and inauthentic existence indicates that he holds essential presuppositions of human nature, especially in his third constitutive factor in care of "fallenness." Tillich also criticizes Fromm who speaks of the possibility of becoming "an autonomous non-authoritarian personality who develops himself according to reason," and Jung who "thinks that there are essential structures in the human soul and that it is possible (and one may be successful) to search for personality."[90] All of these men miss the existential depths Freud achieved, claims Tillich, for they have missed the irrational element that existential literature has captured so well.[91]

It is well to indicate however that neither the essential or existential depth psychologists really grasp the teleological perspective in their practice. They still attempt to heal those existential presuppositions of anxiety, estrangement, meaninglessness, or guilt in therapy failing to recognize they are universal or existential elements in finite being.[92] Tillich notes, "they call all anxiety, all guilt, all emptiness, illnesses which can be overcome as any illness can be, and they try to remove them. But this is impossible."[93] These are existential structures and as such are objects of salvation rather than refined techniques of the therapeutic process. The therapist can be an instrument of salvation but the theologian points rightfully to the only source of salvation in the ground of being, being-itself. Tillich says, "The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt."[94]

Theology and depth psychology can be correlated on the same basis as philosophy and theology; i.e., on the basis of analogia entis in the logos of existence. They have the same mutual interdependent relationships that inform each other of the authentic question and answer that are in the situation and the message. Theology has brought the essential element to depth psychology's existential concern and the two together provide an adequate understanding of man in relationship to his ground of being.

The next task is an analysis of the contributions that Tillich believes depth psychology has made to theology.

## D. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY TO THEOLOGY

Paul Tillich has seen more clearly than perhaps any other theologian the importance of depth psychology for theology. He has observed that "theology has received tremendous gifts from existentialism and psychoanalysis, gifts not dreamed of fifty years ago or even thirty years ago."[95] He has described these contributions collectively in two different publications. The first occasion was in a collection of articles by Tillich on the role of theology and culture edited by Robert Kimball entitled _Theology of Culture_. The article in question is "The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis" which has been altered from its original form when it appeared in _Faith and Freedom_, in the Autumn of 1955. The second occasion, in _Pastoral Psychology_, February of 1960, was very likely an elaboration of the section in the first article dealing with broad, general contributions of depth psychology to theology. Therein he made special reference to depth psychological influences upon the doctrines of the Christian faith.

In his early article Tillich singles out four significant contributions of depth psychology: the rediscovery of depth psychological materials in religious literature, the rediscovery of the meaning of the word "sin", the rediscovery of the demonic, and the rediscovery of the meaning of grace. The first rediscovery of the importance of the depth psychological insights into religious literature might well include also the broad field of the humanities for Tillich saw significant contributions in art, philosophy, history, science, sociology, psychology. Tillich's mind saw implications for his theological task in almost every field. David Soper has observed his breadth of interest in an analysis of Tillich's concern about the self-sufficient bourgeous spirit. He says of Tillich:

> He rejoices at the antibourgeois revolt which he finds in art, through Cézanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin; in literature, through Strindberg and Nietzsche; in science, through Einstein, Planck, and Bohr; in philosophy, through Bergson, Simmel, and Husserl; in psychology, through Freud and Jung.[96]

All of these men who have caught Tillich's attention in their own way reject the authoritarianism of the philosophy of consciousness seeking to control man by reducing him to some thing, some means, or some object of existence. Tillich believes that all of these forms of revolt against the objectified world of the nineteenth century, and not just literature, were insights into the nature of human finitude and "were confirmed and methodically organized by depth psychology."[97] Of literature specifically he says, in noting the infinite value of depth psychology and existentialism has for theology;

> Both of them brought to theology something which it always should have known but which it had forgotten and covered up. They helped to rediscover the immense depth psychological material which we find in the religious literature of the last two thousand years and even beyond that. Almost every insight concerning the movement of the soul can be found in this literature, and the most classical example of all is perhaps Dante's Divine Comedy, especially in the description of hell and purgatory, and of the inner self-destructiveness of man in his estrangement from his essential being.98

A further illustration of this point is the depth psychological effect in Anselm's doctrine of Christ. Tillich says:

> The discovery of an often deeply hidden guilt feeling has given us a new key for an explanation of the tremendous effect of the Anselmian theory on personal piety, hymns, liturgy, and much of Christian teaching and preaching. A system of symbols which gives the individual the courage to accept himself in spite of his awareness that he is unacceptable has every chance to be accepted itself.99

The "heart-warming" experience of John Wesley would attest to this same point. Wesley, in the restless moments when doubt and fear prevailed and quiet assurance of the Lord was sought, had gone to a Moravian gathering in Aldersgate Street, London. There a reader was reading Martin Luther's preface to Romans. Something happened in the heart of John Wesley which he so describes; "While he (Luther) was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in

Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation; and an assurance was given me that he had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me from the law of sin and death."[100] This point is well made by Tillich in his Dynamics of Faith.[101]

A second major contribution has been depth psychology's understanding of sin. Tillich says:

> It was a rediscovery of the meaning of the word "sin" which had become entirely unintelligible by the identification of sins with sin, and by the identification of sins with certain acts that are not conventional or not approvable. Sin is something quite different. It is universal, tragic estrangement, based on freedom and destiny in all human beings, and should never be used in the plural. Sin is separation, estrangement from one's essential being. That is what it means; and if this is the result of depth psychological work, then this of course is a great gift that depth psychology and existentialism have offered to theology.102.

This particular contribution has had a significant influence upon Tillich's thought; it is perhaps the central presupposition in his systematic theology. It is crucial to his understanding of the existential nature of man in Courage to Be, for his conception of faith in Dynamics of Faith, and the understanding source for much that he has said in his sermons, especially one "On Healing" in The New Being. This understanding is the source for his concept of the New Being. Particular reference to this point will be made in detail later in the next chapter.

A third fundamental contribution has provided a dynamic awareness of the role of the unconscious in our life and has pointed up the holistic nature of man. He claims:

> Depth psychology has helped theology to rediscover the demonic structures that determine our consciousness and our decisions. . . . It means that if we believe we are free in terms of conscious decision, we can find that something has happened to us which directed these decisions before we made them. The illusion of freedom in the absolute sense in which it was used is included in this rediscovery. But existentialism and especially psychoanalysis and the whole philosophy of the unconscious have rediscovered the totality of the personality in which not only the conscious elements are decisive.[103]

In an analysis of man's existential condition he says:

> It is not an exaggeration to say that today man experiences his present situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life. This experience is expressed in the arts and in literature, conceptualized in existential philosophy, actualized in political cleavages of all kinds, and analyzed in the psychology of the unconscious. It has given theology a new understanding of the demonic-tragic structures of individual and social life.[104]

As the telos of the unconscious is experienced in the existential condition, an awareness of the New Being provides the possibility for overcoming self-estrangement, for reconciliation and reunion, for creativity, meaning and hope.

Tillich has said that the libido is good and ought to be defended against Freud's depreciation of it in terms of the concept of Thanatos. Tillich claims:

> Without libido life would not move beyond itself. The Bible knows this as well as recent depth psychology, and we should be grateful that our new insights into the deeper levels of human nature have rediscovered the Biblical realism which was covered by several strata of idealistic and moralistic self-deception about man. Biblical realism knows both that libido belongs to man's created goodness and that it is distorted and ambiguous in the state of man's estrangement.105

The unconscious places an extremely important role in the cognitive function of man and this will be dealt with in considerable detail in the next chapter.

The fourth contribution is the belief that "moralism can be conquered to a great extent in Christian theology."106 Tillich holds that

> the call for moralism was one of the great forms of self-estrangement of theology from its whole being. And it is indeed important to know that theology had to learn from the psychoanalytic method the meaning of grace, the meaning of forgiveness as acceptance of those who are unacceptable and not of those who are the good people. On the contrary, the non-good people are those who are accepted, or in religious language, forgiven, justified, whatever you wish to call it. The word grace, which had lost any meaning, has gained a new meaning by the way in which the analyst deals with his patient. He accepts him. He does not say, "You are acceptable," but he accepts him.107

Because of the "moralistic" attitude in Protestant American culture Tillich has noted that "psychoanalysis has seemed more desirable for educated people than religion, especially Protestant religion."[108] He attributes this success to two main reasons:

> (1) the rigorous moralism which developed in Protestantism after the sacramental grace was taken away and which poisons the personality through repressing vital impulses by moral law and social conventions and (2) the solitude of the deciding individual, who has to bear the responsibility and guilt without the help of confession and the related forgiveness which comes from the outside.109

Peter Homans has observed Tillich learned from depth psychology in making a comparative analysis of Freud's concept of the super-ego and Tillich's concept of the "bad, moral conscience." He notes:

> Tillich has distinguished between the bad, moral conscience and a good, transmoral conscience, indicating that the former is identical with the Freudian superego. . . . The good, transmoral conscience is the fruit of self-acceptance (justification) and transcends its moralistic counterpart, . . .[110]

In his later article Tillich deals with specific contributions that depth psychology has made to theology, from the particular position of pastoral psychology, for specific doctrines. The first of these insights of psychotherapy which theology must concern itself is "the rediscovery of the truth of the doctrine of man's predicament as professed by Augustine and the Reformers." Pelagianism, in both Protestant and Roman Catholic thought, in its belief about sin and grace, has "weakened the valuation both of the hidden power of sin and the unconditional power of grace which reconciles man with God, and consequently with himself and his world."[111] The Augustinian-Reformation theology opposes the Roman-legalistic and Protestant-moralistic attitudes. Tillich observes that "it is an astonishing fact that Protestant theology had to rediscover its own tradition about what man is and about what healing powers are through the impact of the psychology of the unconscious."[112] Protestantism needed now to learn anew from depth psychology how unconscious motivations might be changed, that they can be changed even if the forces must enter through the door of consciousness.

The basic presupposition underlying the question of healing man's existential condition must consider a reformulation of the concept of God. Tillich believes that depth psychology has had an effect upon the doctrine of God, and "profoundly so" just as Augustine's "awareness of the labyrinth of sin and guilt and his experience of saving forces in the community of the Church" or Luther's "experience of the breakdown of the will to be good and the hearing of the message of forgiveness," or Kierkegaard's "feeling of despair about the combination of finitude and infinity in his centered self and of the necessity of the leap of faith" all influenced their idea of God.[113]

Because every statement that is to be made about God must be rooted in the correlation that exists between man's self-awareness and his experience of the divine, the changes that come in the concept of God come from man's human situation. Therefore, whatever statement that is made about God is at least partly dependent upon man's resources, and in this case upon depth psychology's understanding of man and his existence. Tillich believes that "one can say that psychotherapy has replaced the emphasis on the demanding and remote God by an emphasis on his self-giving nearness."[114] Tillich would be bolder still to suggest that depth psychology has helped to reintroduce the "female element" into the idea of God, a concept that has been lacking in Protestant thought.[115]

Depth psychology has also something important to say for the doctrines of divine acceptance--the doctrine of justification by grace through faith--and of the religious symbol--the religious symbols that have their roots in the deep unconscious. The doctrine of divine acceptance fell prey to doctrinal rigidity and aridity; and moral legalism buried all of the trust and hope in the possibility of one's feeling of unacceptability ever being accepted by the God of Theism. Legalistic distortions of the doctrine of justification forced the Christian to the offices of the psychotherapist rather than to his pastor or to worship or to personal prayer and devotions. Depth psychology entered theological thought in the search for a new means of understanding and conveying the good news of the Christian message. Psychoanalytic procedures were utilized for conveying some means of acceptance, amorally at best, to the man beset by doubt and guilt. Though superficial at first, the process matured to the point where practice without theoretical understanding gave way to a search for the theoretical basis for the practice and, in turn, the influence upon theological thought. Tillich notes, "one can say that in spite of Freud's own antireligious assertions, the transformation of the intellectual climate by him was the greatest intellectual support for a rediscovery of the central Christian message, the good news of acceptance."[116]

With the final acknowledgement that rational will can not direct man's life totally, as St. Paul so clearly understood, a new consideration was given to the understanding of the unconscious which provides a revealing as well as a healing power in man's life. Symbols had become hollow and no longer trusted. Emphasis had been given to rational words and concepts that were to be the mainstay of man's moral existence. But in the threat of meaninglessness and despair man has turned to the recognition of the importance of symbolic meaning in his life. This is extremely crucial in this age of transition in which the meaningful signs of the old age are giving way to the symbols of a new age that restore hope, meaning, and the possibility of a "courage to be." Tillich agrees that the symbols of the unconscious, religious symbols that is, may well be what Jung called "archetypes", symbols that are prospective in nature that reveal a telos that is indigenous to mankind.[116]

Tillich believes "the decisive test of the influence of psychotherapy on theological thought is the theological interpretation of salvation."[117] In the early church salvation was a cosmic event but this idea gave way to an emphasis upon the individual and his destiny which was conceived of as resulting in a heaven or a hell. It was no longer thought of as a healing event or a means of being made whole. The doctrines took on an almost total essential aspect in which the humanity of man was denied. The unconscious and the subconscious elements of the personality were disregarded. Tillich believes that depth psychology was one of the major factors causing theology, in both theory and practice, to take the subject element in man as seriously as the objective element.[118] The ambiguities of life must be dealt with in any consideration of the salvation of man.

Depth psychology has contributed much to the understanding of the doctrine of the Spirit. It has allowed theology to see more clearly the dichotomy that exists between the neo-orthodox and the humanistic conceptualizations of the Spirit. It has enabled theology to see that neither is a viable option because the Neo-orthodox Spirit can never encounter the spirit to heal it, and the humanistic spirit can never heal the spirit because the self never heals the self. This has been taught so clearly by the psychotherapeutic process. Tillich believes that theology must give some concreteness to the Spirit and contends "the divine Spirit grasps the human spirit, raising it beyond itself and healing it through the creation of faith and love."[119] How does this happen, the analyst questions. Tillich answers:

> The theologian must show how the creation of a centered self by the experience of ultimate concern spreads healing forces over a personality in all dimensions of his being. He must show this in the dimensions of the spirit, of psychological self-awareness, of bodily functions, of social relations and of historical self-realization.[120]

The Spirit must take on more than "breath" if it is to be of significance in the human realm--it must take on existential as well as essential elements if it is to minister to man in the human situation. The healing activity of the Spirit takes place in all dimensions of personal life, but it does so only fragmentarily. It is able to heal in the spiritual dimension but it does not heal in the material dimension. In any particular case the body may be healed but not the emotions, or vice versa. Final salvation, healing, comes with eternal life.

The theologian can gain much from his encounter with the materials and insights of depth psychology. Likewise the depth psychologists can learn much from the theologian about the essential nature of man. Together they can inform each other and enjoy an encounter that cannot but help fulfill each other professionally if not personally. Tillich has given a specific response to a summarial question of the influence of depth psychology on systematic theology. He says:

> The interpretation of man's predicament by psychoanalysis raises the question that is implied in man's very existence. Systematic theology has to show that the religious symbols are answers to this question. Now, if you understand the relation of theology and depth psychology in this way, you have grasped the fundamental importance, the final and decisive importance, of all this for theology.[121]

The next task is to demonstrate how Paul Tillich has utilized the depth psychological materials and insights in his existential analysis of the human situation from which he derives the ultimate questions of man for the existential category in his method of correlation.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] ST, I:3

[2] "Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers: A Dialogue," *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968) p. 57.

[3] Ira Progoff, *Death and Rebirth of Psychology: An Integrative Evaluation of Freud, Adler, Jung, and Rank and the Impact of Their Culminating Insights on Modern Man* (New York: Julian Press, 1956), p. 23.

[4] Dieter Wyss, *Depth Psychology: A Critical History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1966), p. 13.

[5] Ira Progoff, *Depth Psychology and Modern Man: A New View of the Magnitude of Human Personality, its Dimensions and Resources* (New York: Julian Press, 1959), p. 9. Cf. "Die Kritiken der Schizophrenien" by Eugene Bleuler in Z. ges. Neurol. Psychiat. 22, 19 (41, 173).

[6] Joseph Nuttin, *Psychoanalysis and Personality: A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953), p. 114.

[7] Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955), IV & V, *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Hereafter references to any volume in this collection will be designated by Sigmund Freud, SE with title of specific volume, and date.

[8] Progoff, *Depth Psychology and Modern Man*, p. 10.

[9] Sigmund Freud, SE, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, VI, 1901.

[10] Nuttin, *Psychoanalysis and Personality*, p. 115.

[11] Progoff, *Depth Psychology and Modern Man*, p. 8.

[12] *Ibid*., p. 15.

[13] *Ibid*., p. 16.

[14] Paul Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections" in _The Theology of Paul Tillich_ edited by Charles Kegley and Charles Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co. - Macmillan Paperbacks, 1964), pp. 18-19.

[15] Seward Hiltner, "Editorial" in _Pastoral Psychology_ III (December, 1952), p. 9.

[16] _Ibid_., p. 10.

[17] Walter Leibrecht, "Paul Tillich" in _A Handbook of Christian Theologians_ edited by Dean Peerman and Martin Marty (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1965), p. 489.

[18] _Ibid_., p. 490.

[19] _Ibid_., p. 490.

[20] Peter Homans, "Introduction" in _The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology_ edited by Peter Homans (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 3.

[21] _Ibid_., p. 3.

[22] ST, I:33

[23] Paul Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections" in Kegley and Bretall, _Paul Tillich_, p. 19.

[24] Seward Hiltner, "Editorial" in _Pastoral Psychology_ XIX (February, 1968), p. 19. Note: This entire issue is a memorial to Paul Tillich.

[25] Rollo May, "Paul Tillich in Memoriam" in _Pastoral Psychology_, XIX (February, 1968), p. 8.

[26] _Ibid_., p. 9.

[27] _Ibid_., p. 10.

[28] Paul Tillich, "You Are Accepted" in _The Shaking of the Foundations_ (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 162. cited by Daniel Day Williams, "Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Forgiveness" in _Pastoral Psychology_, XIX (February, 1968), p. 22.

[29] _Ibid_., p. 22.

[30] _Ibid_., p. 22.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[34] Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), pp. 94-95. cited by Joseph Fletcher, "Tillich and Ethics: The Negation of Law" in *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968), p. 34.

[35] Paul Tillich, *My Search For Absolutes* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 109. cited by Fletcher, *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968), p. 36.

[36] Paul Tillich, "Martin Buber 1778-1965" in *Pastoral Psychology*, XVI (September, 1965), p. 52. cited by Ira Progoff, "The Man Who Transforms Consciousness: The Inner Myths of Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, and C. G. Jung" in *Eranos Jahrbuch*, XXXV (1966), p. 55.

[37] Joseph Fletcher, "Tillich and Ethics: The Negation of Law," *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968), p. 38.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[39] ST, I:152-153

[40] Don Browning, "Analogy, Symbol, and Pastoral Psychology in Tillich's Thought," *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968), pp. 49-50.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[43] Kenneth R. Mitchell, "Paul Tillich's Contribution to Pastoral Care and Counseling," *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968), p. 32.

[44] Wayne E. Oates, "The Contribution of Paul Tillich to Pastoral Psychology," *Pastoral Psychology*, XIX (February, 1968), p. 12.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[47] Ibid., p. 16.

[48] Ibid., p. 16.

[49] Paul Tillich, "Philosophy and Theology," Religion in Life, X (Winter, 1941), pp. 21-30.

[50] Cf. Albert Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 286. for a comparative analysis of depth psychology and theology and for his terms of the alliance between them.

[51] ST, I:11

[52] R. D. Laing, The Divided Self, An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (London: Tavistock, 1960).

[53] Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) edited by Robert C. Kimball, p. 113. Cf. David Belgum, Editor, Religion and Medicine (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1967), p. 4.

[54] Ibid., p. 115. Cf. Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas V (January, 1944), pp. 44-70.

[55] Ibid., p. 116.

[56] Ibid., p. 116.

[57] Ibid., p. 116. Cf. Rollo May, Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1948) for a discussion of the understanding of the nature of Western man by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Freud, pp. 23-36. See also Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York: Ronald Press, 1950) for a summary of Kierkegaard's analysis of anxiety, pp. 31-45.

[58] Cf. Gregory Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1941). See also Garfield Tourney, "A History of Therapeutic Fashions in Psychiatry: 1800-1966," American Journal of Psychiatry CXXIV (December, 1967), pp. 784-796.

[59] Zilboorg, Medical Psychology, p. 21.

[60] Ibid., p. 23.

[61] Ibid., p. 26.

[62] Cf. Ira Progoff, *Death and Rebirth* for an excellent comparison of Freud, Adler, Jung, and Rank and their role in the psychoanalytic period in the history of depth psychology.

[63] Reuben Fine, Freud: *A Critical Re-Evaluation of His Theories* (New York: David McKay Co., 1962), pp. 307.

[64] *Ibid*., p. 4. Cf. Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Basic Books, 1953-57) for a further discussion of the formulative influence of science upon Freud in volume I, pp. 40ff.

[65] *Ibid*., p. 5.

[66] Wilfried Diam, *Depth Psychology and Salvation* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 10-11.

[67] Cf. Kurt F. Reinhardt, *The Existentialist Revolt* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960) for a discussion of the existentialist relationship to depth psychology.

[68] Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, p. 117.

[69] Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek, Editor, *Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co. - Dutton Paperback, 1962), p. xxvi.

[70] Paul Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and The Nature of Man" in *The Nature of Man in Theological and Psychological Perspective* edited by Simon Doniger (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1962), p. 42.

[71] Ruitenbeek, *Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy*, pp. 70-71.

[72] May, *Existence*, p. 36.

[73] ST, III:76

[74] May, *Existence*, p. 56.

[75] Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and The Nature of Man" in Doniger, *Nature of Man*, p. 47.

[76] *Ibid*., p. 48.

[77] *Ibid*., pp. 50-51.

[78] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 118.

[79] Ibid., p. 118.

[80] Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and The Nature of Man" in Doniger, Nature of Man, p. 52.

[81] Ibid., p. 43.

[82] Ibid., p. 44.

[83] Ibid., p. 46.

[84] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 118.

[85] Ibid., p. 119.

[86] Ibid., p. 119.

[87] Sigmund Freud, SE, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, XVIII, 1920, pp. 40-47. for Freud's discussion of the two classes of instincts.

[88] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 120.

[89] Ibid., pp. 120-121.

[90] Ibid., p. 122.

[91] Ibid., p. 122.

[92] Cf. Paul Tillich, Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 65-67. and also Paul Tillich, "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and The Nature of Man" in Doniger, Nature of Man, pp. 48-52.

[93] Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp. 122-123.

[94] Tillich, Courage to Be, p. 190.

[95] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 126.

[96] David W. Soper, Major Voices in American Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), pp. 144-145. Note: The entire chapter entitled "The Bridgebuilding Theology of Paul Tillich" is an elaboration of the numerous disciplines that have played an important role in Tillich's thought.

[97] Tillich, Courage to Be, p. 137.

[98] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 113.

[99] ST, II:173

[100] Membership Manual of the Methodist Church for Young People and Adults (Nashville: The Methodist Publishing House, 1964), p. 44.

[101] Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Brothers - Torchbook edition, 1957), p. 83.

[102] Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 123.

[103] Ibid., pp. 123-124.

[104] ST, I:49

[105] Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications (New York: Oxford University Press - A Galaxy Book, 1960), pp. 116-117.

[106] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 124.

[107] Ibid., p. 124.

[108] Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, Abridged Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press - Phoenix Books, 1957), p. 228.

[109] Ibid., Footnote, p. 228.

[110] Peter Homans, "Toward a Psychology of Religion: By Way of Freud and Tillich" in The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology edited by Peter Homans (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 69-70.

[111] Paul Tillich, "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought," Pastoral Psychology, XI (February, 1960), pp. 17-18.

[112] Ibid., p. 18.

[113] Ibid., p. 18.

[114] Ibid., p. 19.

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[119] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[121] Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, p. 125.

# CHAPTER IV

# PAUL TILLICH'S USE OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN SITUATION

The materials and insights of depth psychology have been the source, the medium, and the norm for Paul Tillich's analysis of the human situation. Depth psychology has been the source for the analysis in providing a meticulous phenomenological analysis of the human psyche and its manifold forms of expression in the life of man and society. Depth psychology has been the medium for the analysis, having provided a methodology for correlating the knowledge that has been gleaned about the existential condition of man from the numerous disciplines of thought concerned with the human situation. Depth psychology has been the norm for the analysis with its rather profound conceptualization of the existential nature of man derived from the psychic depth of man's being. The existential posture in each case has been "checked and balanced" by Tillich's own overarching philosophical methodology that stresses equal importance from the essential point of view as well. Depth psychology obviously has been more than a sign indicating direction, or a tool for digging depths, or a scales for weighing observations. It has also been an integral part of Tillich's thought enabling him to cognitively grasp and comprehend a depth analysis of the nature of man and his existence. The depth dimension which Tillich has derived from depth psychological sources has been a decisive and indispensable factor in his analysis of the human situation.

The principal task of this chapter is to demonstrate how Tillich has utilized the depth dimension in his analysis of the five concepts in the category of existence: reason, being, existence, life, and history. A basic problem of each concept--cognition, anxiety, estrangement, ambiguity, and meaning, respectively--has been chosen to indicate how decisive and indispensable depth psychology has been to Tillich in the analysis of the human situation. Not all of the ramifications of each problem will be followed for they reach beyond this writer's knowledge and would also lead away from the thesis of this dissertation.

## A. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF COGNITION

The problem of cognition is central in Tillich's concept of reason. It occurs in both of the essential and the existential states of ontological reason. In the essential state of reason, cognition becomes a problem at the point of reason's union with its depth. One must ask, therefore, what is the nature of the logos structure of reality that is grasped and received in the depth of reason. In the existential state of reason, cognition is an even greater problem in that the structure and depth of reason are separated because "the depth of reason becomes opaque and can henceforth be symbolized only through myth and cult."[1] Hence, one must ask what is the content of the symbol that is grasped and received in existential reason. There is an additional problem of cognition in the basic grasping and shaping activity of reason. In this interdependent relationship Tillich believes that "we transform reality according to the way we see it, and we see reality according to the way we transform it," and cites John 3:21 as an example, noting that one knows the truth by doing the truth.[2] This is an Aristotelian concept which holds that truth is manifest in the realization of truth. It is important then to determine what is the nature of the absolute in the cognitive realm.

Tillich has an answer to each of these three fundamental questions about the problem of cognition. To the question of the nature of the logos structure of reality he answers, it is being. The structure of being, he asserts, consists of "absolutes within the relativities of encountered reality" cognitively possible at all times in the thought of all people. In Tillich's opinion, "You can deny anything particular whatsoever, but not being, because even your negative judgments themselves are acts of being and are only possible through being. Being is the basic absolute."[3] But the absoluteness of the structure of being is always relative because human reason is fragmentary under the conditions of finitude. To the question of the content of the symbols revealed in myth and cult, Tillich answers, it is Being-itself. Being-itself is "the absolute that underlies all other absolutes as well as the stream of relativities, the absolute that makes the idea of truth possible."[4] Being-itself as simply being would be an empty absolute. But Being-itself is experienced in both a negative and a positive way: negatively in the shock of non-being, either philosophically or in the threat of physical death; and positively in the experience of *eros* or perhaps even Otto's *das Heilige*. Tillich claims that this is so because of transcendent qualities of Being-itself.

> This "being" transcends everything particular without becoming empty, for it embraces everything particular. "Being" in this sense is power, and it is an infinitely full, inexhaustible, but indefinite absolute. It is the basis of truth, because it is the transcendence of subject and object. It is the basis of the good, because it contains every being in its essential nature and . . . the norms of every ethical command. And it is identified with the Holy, the ground of everything that has being.[5]

But the absoluteness of Being-itself is always relative to man's experience in his existential situation. To the question of the nature of the cognitive absolute, Tillich answers, it is essences. Essences are that which man encounters in being. They are the absolutes in the process of becoming immersed in the stream of relativities: absolutes that make language, understanding, and truth possible in the powers of abstraction. The universal essence, encountered in the unique human power of abstraction, is man as "human nature." Man is essence to other men and to himself. He is seen generically as the absolute essential man by the artist and sculptor, the scientist and the historian, the dramatist, novelist, and the poet. He is seen individually in his personal name, the name given him as a unique person. Any expression of an essence, whether it be universal man or a particular person's name, is an attempt to determine the absoluteness of the essence as over against a changing temporal existence. But the absoluteness of an essence is subject to the relative cognition of finite man.

Relativism is not denied in these concepts of absolutes, but rather that relativism is dependent on the structures of the absolutes in the logos of reality, being; in the symbol of myth and cult, Being-itself; and in the cognitive realm, essences. The problem of cognition is one of grasping and shaping the absolutes of human knowledge from the stream of relativities in human existence. Theoretically, cognition of these absolutes is possible through the depth of reason in which reason is transparent to its depth and united with its structure. The transparency of essential reason, however, becomes opaque under finite conditions. The depth of reason becomes hidden in existence and can only express itself in the symbolic form of myth and cult. "The question of the cognitive encounter with reality, the question of the absolute and the relative in this encounter," claims Tillich, "is an existential concern--a concern that involves our whole existence."[6] But existential reason is also conflicted by its structural elements that move against each other. The grasping and shaping, receiving and reacting functions of reason, are estranged and no longer interrelate and inform each other in their quest for truth. Both the essential and the existential states of reason, conflicted under existential conditions, quest after revelation which will inform essential reason of the meaning of the symbolic contents of myth and cult and which will reunite the estranged elements of existential reason. Reason "asks for revelation, for revelation means the reintegration of reason."[7]

The problem of cognition, in both essential and existential states of reason, is a problem of "understanding." For Tillich, understanding "involves an amalgamation of controlling and receiving knowledge, of union and detachment, of participation and analysis."[8] One may be able to grasp the logical meaning of the nature of man through the detached, analytical objectification of controlling knowledge. But he has only an external, descriptive characterization of the symptoms of human behavior similar to academic psychology. Or he may be able to know man subjectively through receiving knowledge: by participation in and with being of man. In this way he gains an internal, dynamic awareness of man himself as gained by clinical psychology to a degree and by depth psychology to a much larger degree. Tillich maintains that "without union there is no cognitive approach to man."[9] A verification of this understanding may be experimental or experiential. The former is by far the safer of the two because it can deal with the object of knowledge in an isolated, static condition. But the latter of the two is the more personal and dynamic for knowledge is gained in union and participation with the object. But the problem of cognition is in conflict. Tillich observes:

> Knowledge stands in a dilemma; controlling knowledge is safe but not ultimately significant, while receiving knowledge can be ultimately significant, but it cannot give certainty. . . . it must lead either to a desperate resignation of truth or to the quest of revelation, for revelation claims to give a truth which is both certain and of ultimate concern--a truth which includes and accepts the risk and uncertainty of every significant cognitive act, yet transcends it in accepting it.[10]

The problem of cognition demands the risk of participation in the depth of reason, the transcendence to the depth of being, if it is to know the ground of being manifest in the rational structures of reality and if it is to gain the meaning of being.

The possibility of cognitive understanding and meaning in life is the depth of being in Being-itself known through the depth of reason. Truth is in the "depths" and is available to man via "the depth of suffering which is the door, the only door, to the depth of truth."[11] It is indeed suffering to dwell among the evil forces and demonic powers that reside in the depth of the soul. It is not unusual that men avoid the depth of their being when faced with the threat to their human existence and accepted values. Adams observes that depth psychology has pointed Tillich to the depths of suffering, even

> the depths of emptiness, as Thomas Muntzer called it, or the depth of humanity, as Marx called it, but also the chthonic depths, which in religious language is often called the dwelling place of the evil forces, of the demonic powers, of death and hell. It is through these depths that men must go if they are to find the depth of truth and being.12

But beyond these depths in the ultimate depth of the divine ground is the right and powerful word, the liberating word in all its fullness. Men like Paul, Augustine, and Luther knew the extreme suffering that came in their search of the depths of their being. It surely must have been as death or hell. But it was the necessary way to "the deep things in God, as the spiritual way, as the way to truth."[13] Truth is available in suffering and in sacrifice if one knows the right and powerful word. In response to a question Tillich raises about the presence of the evil and demonic in life, he answers:

> When the soul leaves the body it has to traverse many spheres where demonic forces rule. And only the soul which knows the right and powerful word can continue its way to the ultimate depth of the divine ground. No soul can avoid these tests. If we look at the struggle of the saints of all times, of the prophets and reformers, of the great creators in all realms, we recognize that the myth tells the truth. Everybody has to face the deep things in life. Danger is no excuse. He has to conquer danger. He has to know the liberating word. The German people and many people in all nations have not known this word, and so they were caught by the evil forces of the depth and missed the ultimate, saving depths.14

Tillich cites the words of Nietzsche who was caught by the destructive forces of the depth in his passionate striving for truth because he did not know the word to conquer them: "The world is deep, and deeper than the day could read. Deep is its woe. Joy deeper still than grief can be. Woe says: hence go! But joys all want eternity. Want deep, profound eternity."[15] This eternal joy that Nietzsche sought is in the depths of man, of the word, and in God.

Tillich claims:

> At every moment in which we reach the last depth of our lives we can experience the joy that has eternity in it, the hope which cannot be destroyed and the truth on which life and world are built. For in the depth is the truth, and in the depth is the hope, and in the depth is the joy.16

The depth of reason is the road to the depth of truth, hope, and joy. It is a road that has been travelled by men of all ages and continents. Men have found despair and cynicism, but in digging deeper into the depth of the sustaining creative powers of "the infinite and inexhaustible ground of being" they have found the ground of hope and the dynamic source of all creative decision.[17] Those who have journeyed to the depths of their being all speak of a similar experience, observes Tillich.

> They were not what they believed themselves to be, even after the surface had vanished and a deeper level had appeared to them. This level too became surface when a still deeper level appeared, and so it happened again and again as long as they were living--if they kept to the road into their depth.18

Truth, hope, and joy await those who journey to the depth of their being and find there, in the ultimate depth of being, Being-itself. It is true that the freedom to search the depths of being may court disaster, if one seeks to make his finiteness infinite, for he is inviting demonic possession with all of its fury and wrath and vengeance.

It can be a tragic decision. But there can also be a creative risk in the decision, a decision for the unconditioned, Being-itself, in the true dimension of depth. This depth of the self, of being, and of reason must be seen, not only in the historical perspective of myth and cult; it must also be seen in the present.

## 1. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT ABOUT COGNITION

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of cognition is well informed by the insights of depth psychology. He acknowledges its decisive and indispensable importance to him in referring to all the innumerable paths which men of the ages have followed to the depth of meaning:

> In our days a new form of this old way has become famous: the so-called "psychology of depth." It leads us from the surface of our self-knowledge into levels where things are recorded of which we knew nothing on the surface of our consciousness. It shows us traits of our character which contradict everything we believed we knew about ourselves. It can help us to find the way into our depths, although it can not give the final help because it cannot guide into the deepest ground of our being and of all being, the depth of life itself.[19]

Depth psychology is especially important to the theologian, Tillich opines, "for he who knows about the depth within himself knows about God."[20]

Depth psychology has provided a dimension of cognition for Tillich in his understanding of the essential and existential states of reason and the problem of cognition. It has been significant in illuminating the effects of the deeper irrational elements of the psyche upon the higher rational elements. It has shown how the unconscious psyche is both creative and destructive in the rational process of knowing, both creative and destructive because it has its common source in the same divine ground. Tillich observes that "wisdom is in both creation and destruction. This is the deepest insight the Old Testament reached."[21] In this sense wisdom is a matter of life and death. It is more than knowledge. "It is insight into the meaning of one's life, into its conflicts and dangers, into its creative and destructive powers, and into the ground out of which it comes and to which it must return."[22] The psyche is creative in its essential state, evoking from the depth of being a sense of meaning and purpose in human existence. But it is also destructive in its existential state, antagonizing the rational processes by its demonic nature. Cognition is possible in the depth of reason where man is in touch with the a priori propensities of the archetypes that seek cognitive and dynamic expression in the life of man. Adams has noted that Tillich's view of the depth reality is one that is infinitely powerful and dynamic. That deepest "depth" for Tillich is "the depth in which one confronts the infinite and inexhaustible ground and abyss of all being and meaning."[23] However, Adams goes on to emphasize that man may not identify himself or any of his creations of this depth because man is not self-existent but rather separated from his ground of being. Though man may be separated from his ground of being he is not lost to it. He can still transcend this abyss in his depth of reason and receive the power of his ground of being in symbolic form. The reunion is possible in the passion that Kierkegaard mentions, the moment in which the individual "realizes existentially a unity of the infinite and the finite which transcends existence. . . . In passion the existing subject is rendered infinite in the eternity of the imaginative representation, and yet he is at the same time the most definitely himself."[24] Cognition is thwarted and frustrated in actual reason where man is seeking only a conscious, logical analysis of his finite existence. The attitude of pure theory, in which distance falsely attributes an absolute position to the subject, and to the dynamic nature of reality and knowledge, destroys the relationship between man and the source of knowledge that is possible in the common context of creative freedom. The result is intellectual asceticism. Adams points out Tillich's alternative position in what he calls "the fundamental Protestant attitude" which is an attitude of participation, one that "stands in nature, taking upon itself the inevitable reality."[25] This is a concern for the concrete in the present. Ontological reason recognizes both the creative and destructive elements and seeks cognitively to unite these estranged psychic elements. Technical reason fails to recognize the subjective, irrational elements of the unconscious psyche in favor of the objective, rational elements and seeks to distinguish clearly between them for its scientific methodology. Tillich has learned from depth psychology that the latter rational activity dehumanizes man and is itself "impoverished and corrupted", limiting whatever it might perceive about man and his existence whenever it fails to recognize its dependence upon the former.[26]

Tillich's conception of the essential nature of the unconscious psyche as "mere potentiality" is not unlike Jung's conception of it as "propensities" for evolving a prospective pattern of growth in interaction with external conditions.[27] Objectively conceived, the unconscious psyche is a dynamic process that provides a direction for the unfoldment of a life pattern somewhat analogous to the role of animal instincts. Subjectively conceived, the unconscious psyche is a cognitive process that is numinous in character integrating psychic elements into meaningful forms analogous to rational concepts.[28] The objective aspect is biological and the subjective is psychical. The correlation of these two dimensions of the unconscious psyche with consciousness in the life process offers potentially the individuation of the Self that is cognitively capable of deriving meaning and purpose. Jung claims:

> The transcendent function does not proceed without aim and purpose, but leads to the revelation of the essential man. It is in the first place a purely natural process, which may in some cases pursue its course without the knowledge or assistance of the individual, and can sometimes forcibly accomplish itself in the face of opposition. The meaning and purpose of the process is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, political wholeness, completeness, and perfection.[29]

If individuation does not occur spontaneously, it can be enabled through the conscious recognition and understanding of the symbols emanating from the unconscious psyche. In either case, observes Progoff, "the essence of the psyche is that it is the directive principle by means of which meaning unfolds in the individual's experience."[30]

Tillich's conception of the existential nature of the unconscious psyche is similar to Freud's objective, biological conceptualizations of the id as those indestructible forces, osmotically powered by the libido-quantum, that seek cathexis of the instinctual desires regardless of external consequences.[31] If the id is cathected in the primary processes, cognition of the depth of being is manifest according to the pleasure principle. If the id, however, is denied cathexis, cognition of the depths is distorted by the reality principle in the secondary process that overlays the primary processes as it searches for an acceptable mode of expression. After the pleasure principle, the id can manifest itself impulsively without involving the ego, allowing the primary process to regard the image of an object as though it were reality. But when the id has been thwarted or frustrated by the ego according to the reality principle, the ego becomes involved in the secondary process of rationalizing an acceptable mode of expression and thereby distorts cognition.[32] The original impulse has been distorted in the secondary rationalization process, in thinking or reasoning, so that the object perceived is abstracted as an object distinct from its subjective nature. Freud observed, in describing two compulsive acts of a patient, that the second act neutralized the first because "the patient's consciousness naturally misunderstands them and puts forward a set of secondary motives to account for them--rationalizes them, in short."[33] The classic example of rationalization is a person's explanation of his actions carried out under post-hypnotic suggestions. Cognition is likewise distorted when the irrational tacit knowing must be translated into rational explicit knowing, when the subjective knowing of essential knowledge must be made objective in an existential state. As Adams points out, "depth psychologists have revealed the tortuous processes of rationalization whereby men conceal from themselves their own insecurity and attempt to compensate by projecting a false security."[34] In their projective compensation men distort the subjective truth they intuit by the rational truths they reason, and in turn hopefully believe they have objective truth. Their rationalizations have repressed their tacit knowing, evoking a state of anxiety and the threat of not being able to decide the truth of any matter, as experienced by the schizophrenic.

Cognition in Tillich's depth of reason is analogous to Michael Polanyi's use of tacit knowledge. Objective knowing is possible of formulated knowledge; i.e., abstracted and objectified data of reality. Subjective knowing is possible of unformulated knowledge; i.e., consciousness of that in which we are participating. The first is explicit and the second is tacit knowing. Polanyi believes that "we always know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true."[35] To the question of whether tacit knowing distorts explicit knowledge Polanyi answers: "I deny that any participation of the knower in the shaping of knowledge must invalidate knowledge, though

I admit that it impairs its objectivity."[36] This is similar to the same problem that Tillich encounters in the cognition of the depth contents of reason. One is able to perceive these deep contents that are manifest in symbolic form; however, any attempt to objectify them distorts their essential meaning. But their meaning is not totally lost. Mircea Eliade has spoken of the heirophanous event, an act of manifestation, in which something sacred shows itself to us, not itself in abstraction but something *ganz andere*.[37] For Tillich, the cognition of the contents of the depth of reason, Being-itself, does not alter in any way the substance of the ground and power of being. What man perceives is that content which has been transmuted to him in the transcendence of Being-itself into consciousness. In a sense the "real" becomes unreal in its abstracted form under existential conditions, but it is known nevertheless in its reality. Polanyi, Eliade, and Tillich all share the Gestalt psychology's insight into tacit knowing as "a process of comprehending: a grasping of disjointed parts into a comprehensive whole"[38] and emphasize the knower's personal participation in the cognitive process. In this participation, in this risk of penetrating the depths of reason, man is capable of knowing much more than he can consciously grasp and abstract in some cognitive structure. Polanyi claims that "tacit knowing achieves comprehension by indwelling, and that all knowledge consists of or is rooted in such acts of comprehension."[39] Tillich is not unlike Dewey who believed that we shape knowledge by the way we grasp it, yet Tillich equally believes we grasp knowledge by the way we shape it because the activities are interdependent.[40]

In Dynamics of Faith Tillich speaks of the cognitive dimension from a perspective of faith. Of the objective dimension he notes that

> Modern psychology is afraid of the concept of the soul because it seems to establish a reality which is unapproachable by scientific methods and may interfere with their results. This fear is not unfounded; psychology should not accept any concept which is not produced by its own scientific work. Its function is to decide man's processes as adequately as possible, and to be open to replacement of these descriptions at any time. This is true of the modern concepts of ego, superego, self, personality, unconscious, mind, as well as of the traditional concepts of soul, spirit, will, etc. Methodological psychology is subject to scientific verification, as is every other scientific endeavor.[41]

And with this Tillich agrees. There is an explicit knowledge to be gained of reality. But there is more to be recognized than external manifestations of objects that can be cognitively abstracted. This Tillich has learned well from depth psychology. Of the subjective dimension of cognition, Tillich continues noting:

> The truth of man's eternal meaning lies in a dimension other than the truth of adequate

> psychological concepts. Contemporary analytic or depth psychology has in many instances conflicted with pro-theological and theological expression of faith. It is, however, not difficult in the statements of depth psychology to distinguish the more or less verified observations and hypotheses from assertions about man's nature and destiny which are clearly expressions of faith. The naturalistic elements which Freud carried from the nineteenth into the twentieth century, his basic puritanism with respect to love, his pessimism about culture, and his reduction of religion to ideological projection are all expressions of faith and not the result of scientific analysis. There is no reason to deny a scholar who deals with man and his predicament the right to introduce elements of faith. But if he attacks other forms of faith in the name of scientific psychology, as Freud and many of his followers do, he is confusing dimensions.42

The decisive factor in cognition is the self which transcends both objective and subjective dimensions of knowing. Man's essential nature is not identified with his rationality because he can "decide for or against reason" as well as "create beyond reason" or "destroy below reason." Tillich believes "this process is the power of his self, the center of self-relatedness in which all elements of his being are united." It is obvious then that "faith is not an act of any of his rational functions, as it is not an act of the unconscious, but it is an act in which both the rational and the non-rational elements of his being are transcended."[43] The depth of man's cognitive powers are in his depth of reason which ("preceeds reason and is manifest through it,") and in that which transcends the objective-subjective structures of reason "in power and meaning."[44] And Tillich clearly indicates that "in the cognitive realm the depth of reason is its quality of pointing to truth itself, namely, to the infinite power of being and of the ultimately real, through the relative truths in every field of knowledge."[45] This is a dynamic conceptualization of truth of which Tillich speaks.

> The dynamic conception of truth is not relativistic. It has nothing statically absolute in reference to which it can be called relative, while the static conception of truth forces one to relativism, as soon as the arrogance of the absolute position is broken down. The dynamic thought of truth overcomes the alternative "absolute-relative." The Kairos, the fateful moment of knowledge, is absolute insofar as it places one at the moment before the absolute decision for or against truth, and it is relative insofar as it knows that this decision for or against truth, and it is relative insofar as it knows that this decision is possible only as a concrete decision, as the fate of the time. Thus the Kairos serves to reveal rather than to conceal the Logos.[46]

This moment of knowing in this ontological concept of truth occurs for Tillich by way of a "phenomenological intuition" which looks through the depth of reason to the inner transcendence of the ground of being. As Adams observes, "it discriminates an impact that is manifest in existence but is related to a qualification that lies 'beyond' the existential order."[47] This phenomenological intuition is not dissimilar to the depth psychological dimension described by Progoff in The Symbolic and The Real. He claims that the real is transparent to man in the symbol, that man can experience the real without understanding it intellectually. Cognition of the reality of the Spirit then is not dependent upon the forms or signs of rational doctrine, but rather occurs when man is able to penetrate to the depth of his being and experience the Spirit in non-rational ways. Progoff claims that "beyond the symbols there is a dimension of reality which does not depend upon the symbols at all but rather uses them."[48] In this sense symbols are more than representative but are the conveyors of reality itself. In reference to Buber's analogy of the search for truth to the construction of a road and to the Islamic story of a Mecca pilgrimage, Progoff conceives of the image of the holy city as a representative symbol of that which is real in human existence. To reach the city of Mecca is to reach ultimate realization, symbolically, for the level of awareness is not materially objectified. He says:

> Mecca is the symbol acting itself out, unfolding in the course of the journey. The symbol expresses the goal which directs the course of action, but the goal is not separate from the steps by which it is reached. It is integral with the actions and with the quality of consciousness that permeates these acts. As the symbol unfolds reality enters the world and becomes present. . . . It is reality increasing its presence among mankind by means of symbolic events that are enacted upon the depth dimension of the psyche . . . as a breakthrough of spirit, into human experience.[49]

He believes that the symbolic is the road to the real, not as a means to an end, but rather as a process, as an act in which man can participate in reality. Although man cannot grasp reality because of his finite condition, he can participate in it and cognitively grasp meaning from the experience.

The depth psychological influences upon Tillich's thought at this point are implicit in several of his sermons on the problem of cognition. In a sermon, "On Wisdom," Tillich clearly indicates the awesomeness of the cognitive process in its striving for wisdom. He notes:

> there cannot be wisdom without an encounter with the holy, with that which creates awe, and shakes the ordinary way of life and thought. Without the experience of awe in face of the mystery of life, there is no wisdom. Most removed from wisdom are not those who are driven by desire for pleasure or power, but those brilliant minds who have never encountered the holy, who are without awe and know nothing sacred, but who are unable to conceal their ultimate emptiness by the brilliant performances of their intellect.
>
> He who has encountered the mystery of life has reached the source of wisdom. In encountering it with awe and longing, he experiences the infinite distance of his being from that which is the ground of his being. He experiences the limits of his being, his finitude in the face of the infinite. He learns that acceptance of one's limits is the decisive step towards wisdom. The fool rebels against the limits set by his finitude. He wants to be unlimited in power and knowledge. He who is wise accepts his finitude. He knows that he is not God.[50]

This position has been demonstrated by Job and St. Paul. They were aware of man's attempt, in response to the demonic forces within him tempting the ego, to overcome the limits of man's knowledge. In some respects Pilate's avoidance of an important decision is illustrative with what man thinks is wisdom, as the clever and shrewd manipulations of the Pharisees were conceived as marks of wisdom. This false wisdom was far removed from the wisdom that came from Jesus as the Christ in the very depths of his relationship with God. It is indeed fearful to wander among the depths. It is temporarily at least more comfortable to deal superficially with life. But Job makes it obvious, in Tillich's opinion, that "only in the confrontation with eternal wisdom in all of its darkness and inexhaustible depth can man accept the misery of his finitude" so that "in our encounter with the holy, facing with awe the ultimate mystery of life, we experience a dimension of life that gives us the courage and the strength to accept our limits and to become wise through acceptance."[51] And Tillich has learned well from the insights of depth psychology the nature of man's resistance to accept his finite limitations. The grandiose schemes of the ego, fed by the desires and eros of the libido, seek to repress the existential reality of life in favor of the essential nature of the id. He wisely notes:

> The greatest wisdom is needed where it is most painful to accept our finitude--in

> our failures, errors, and the guilt acquired by our foolishness. It is hard for us to accept failure, perhaps total failure, in our work. It is difficult to acknowledge error, perhaps in the judgment of those we love in friendship and marriage. It is humanly impossible to confess guilt to oneself or to others without looking at that which is greater than our heart, the eternal. He who possesses this wisdom, this painfully acquired wisdom, knows that nothing can separate him from the eternal wisdom which is with God, neither failure nor error nor guilt.52

Man is wise in accepting his foolishness of finitude, even the apparent foolishness of the revelatory events, for therein is the existential and essential wisdom of Being-itself.

Arne Unhjem has observed in Tillich's thought the consequences of man's resistance to self-acceptance. He believes it is no accident that feelings of doubt beset modern autonomous man because "man is so constituted that he must find something within the compass of his experience that stands out as being of supreme significance and value. . . . If he fails in this regard, his whole existence becomes vague and uncertain."[53] Doubt is fed by the demonic forces of the unconscious psyche disabling the self from accepting doubt as part of his cognitive process. In turn man turns to despair and guilt. Unhjem observes:

> The despair and guilt are manifestations of the individual's tacit acknowledgement that something has gone wrong in his life. He cannot readily accept the idea that his

> existence is entirely meaningless; he cannot avoid the feeling that there *ought* to be some significance to his life and that he *ought* to know it. And he cannot avoid the feeling that he himself is responsible for the loss of meaning--even though he may be able to identify any specific mistakes or misdoings as the cause of his distress. The fact that life is slipping by without showing any indications of fulfilling the promises that once looked so good adds poignancy to the despair.[54]

This kind of radical doubt, driven in part by man's existential condition and in part by egoistic *eros*, soon becomes intolerable and becomes destructive at the point of inhibiting the capacity for any decisive encounters with truth. In the fear of not knowing, man seeks to know something even if it be but a straw in the wind. But even that knowing becomes further incriminating evidence evoking deeper guilt feelings and in turn a greater anxiety for knowing. Tillich was aware of these dynamic functions of the psyche, its defensive mechanisms that automatically rush to the protection of the ego, and saw the necessity for positing the concept of courage as the means of overcoming doubt and despair created by the ambivalent emotions of man in his search for truth. He claims that "in the depths of every serious doubt and every despair of truth, the passion for truth is still at work."[55] Tillich saw clearly the urge within man's psyche for the grasping of truth; he learned from depth psychology the guidelines for appropriating that truth which exceeded even depth psychology's greatest expectation. In both content and methodology Tillich learned that the truth of any reality exceeds man's cognitive grasp of it in any abstract form and that the truth is available in the participation or the doing of it in one's experiences. Truth is not to be grasped from a static moment for it is never there except fragmentarily. Truth is to be grasped as it grasps man in his experiences. Tillich observes:

> Suddenly, true reality appears like the brightness of lightening in a formerly dark place. Or, slowly, true reality appears like a landscape where the fog becomes thinner and thinner and finally disappears. New darkness, new fogs will fall upon you; but you have experienced, at least once, the truth and the freedom given by the truth. Or you may be grasped by the truth in an encounter with a piece of nature--its beauty and its transitoriness; or in an encounter with a human being in friendship and estrangement, in love, in difference and hate; or in an encounter with yourself in a sudden insight into the hidden strivings of your soul, in disgust and even hatred of yourself, in reconciliation with and acceptance of yourself. In these encounters you may meet the true reality--the truth which liberates from illusions and false authorities, from enslaving anxieties, desires, and hostilities, from a wrong self-rejection and a wrong self-affirmation.56

Tillich has learned the importance of forgiveness and self-acceptance as the key not only to cognition of self, but also to cognition of others, of God, of the universal logos in which everything is potentially knowable. He points to the crucial factor of love in cognition.

> The truth which liberates is the power of love, for God is love. The father of the life binds us to himself by binding us to ourselves--or to that in us which is not our true self. Love liberates from the father of the lie because it liberates us from our false self to our true self--to that self which is grounded in true reality. Therefore, distrust every claim for truth where you do not see truth united with love; and be certain that you are of the truth and that the truth has taken hold of you only when love has taken hold of you and has started to make you free from yourselves.[57]

It is important to distinguish between the "Yes" and the "No" in the cognitive process. The "Yes" alone can falsely deceive by creating over-confidence and arrogance. The "No" alone can likewise deceive by creating despair and resignation. The "Yes" and the "No" are interdependent; they underlie and inform each other. Tillich opines "truth as well as life unites Yes and No, and only the courage which accepts the infinite tension between Yes and No can have abundant life and ultimate truth."[58]

From the insights of the rich sources of depth psychological materials, as well as from the methodology of the therapeutic process, Tillich has received a depth perspective into the dimensions of the problem of cognition. His own correlative methodology, growing out of his personal experience "on the boundary" and in the personal encounters with the historical events of his life and others, has been confirmed both in the process and in the end, by the important contributions of depth psychology to the central problem of cognition in the concept of reason. It has been obvious that Tillich has not always been explicit in announcing the role that depth psychology has played in his knowing about the problem of cognition in the existential situation. But it is equally obvious from the materials cited from his work that he has not been without the insights that depth psychology has contributed to man's cognitive process. Tillich has enriched these valuable resources by his own methodology and has gained from holding depth psychology's existential concerns in correlation with the essential concerns expressed in theological thought.

## B. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEMS OF ANXIETY, ESTRANGEMENT, AND AMBIGUITY

The problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity are of central significance in Tillich's existential concepts of being, existence, and life. These are not problems of a pathological nature but rather problems that arise from the existential conditions of the ontological analysis of the nature of being. All three problems are considered together because of the commonalities that are present in an ontological analysis of them. They share a common dialectic in the self-world, subject-object structure of being. They share in common the ontological elements that frame the polarities of the basic structure of being. They share commonly in the categorical forms by which the mind grasps and shapes reality. Their greatest commonality is seen in the essential analysis of them and, therefore, they will be considered together.

Distinctive aspects of the existential analysis of the problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity occur within the commonalities shared in the concepts of being, existence, and life. The ambiguity in life is experienced as a result of the estrangement of the existential from the essential nature of man in the human situation. Anxiety is the resultant of the ambiguous condition created by estrangement. These distinctions need to be seen independently.

The depth psychological insights regarding these problems derive largely from the existential analysts. The existential insights of Freud into the libidinal forces that foster man's urge for actuality and the ensuing transition from an essential to an existential state are helpful for understanding the dimension of the problem of estrangement. The essential insights of Jung provide an understanding of the ambiguities of life in terms of his concept of the individuation of the Self. But the existential analysts, especially Rollo May, have been able to inform Tillich of the understanding of all three. This is particularly clear in Tillich's conceptualization of existential anxiety.

The task now is to analyze the commonality that exists in the Gestalten of these problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity, to indicate the distinctive distortions that finitude brings to each one, and to describe the insights Tillich has gleaned from depth psychology for understanding these problems of the human situation.

## 1. AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS OF ANXIETY, ESTRANGEMENT, AND AMBIGUITY

The problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity occur in the concept of man because of the ontological awareness of the subject-object, self-world structure of being in existence. Essentially, the subject-object structure is in unity. Man is a microcosmos. Existentially, however, the ontological structures of being are separated. In the awareness of the separation of being man experiences himself as a self, as a self in the world, and as a self that exists prior to the experience of his self. Tillich claims "a self is not a thing that may or may not exist; it is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all qualities of existence."[59] It is a self that is more than a conscious ego but includes the subconscious and the unconscious in its conceptualization. This self possesses a "centeredness" which essentially, and to a degree existentially, unites the conscious and the unconscious dimensions in a psychic Gestalt. In terms of the psyche "man is a fully developed and completely centered self. He 'possesses' himself in the form of self-consciousness."[60] But as a self, man is separated from himself and the world. He can see himself and the world as an object which he can grasp and shape, receive and react to. But he also knows that he belongs to that which he is grasping and shaping. The self and the world mutually determine each other. Tillich has observed:

> When man looks at this world he looks at himself as an infinitely small part of his world. Although he is the perspective-center, he becomes a particle of the universe. This structure enables man to encounter himself. Without its world the self would be an empty form. Self-consciousness would have no content, for every content, psychic as well as bodily, lies within the universe. There is no self-consciousness without world-consciousness, but the converse also is true. World consciousness is possible only on a basis of a fully developed self-consciousness. Man must be completely separated from his world in order to look at it as a world. Otherwise he would remain in the bondage of mere environment. The interdependence of ego-self and world is the basic ontological structure and implies all others.[61]

This microcosmic concept of man is the source of his anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity. Man is able to recognize both his essential oughtness from his existential isness, and vice versa, in his powers of transcendence in terms of the universal logos of being and reason. Not only is this fact confirmed for Tillich by the philosophical structure of being, but it is also affirmed by the depth psychological processes as well.

The ontological elements that constitute the structure of being indicate the common points of the concepts of being, existence, and life. The polaric elements of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, as well as freedom and destiny are the component parts of man's essential nature. In each case Tillich holds that "the first element expresses the self-relatedness of being, its power of being something for itself, while the second element expresses the belongingness of being, its character of being as a part of the universal being."[62]

The ontological elements of individualization and participation essentially constitute the "person" and "community." Man becomes a person, in spite of his centeredness, only in the context of the resistance of his participation with another in community. Tillich holds to the interdependence of the relatedness of these polar elements for "there is no person without an encounter with other persons"[63] and "the person as a fully developed individual self is impossible without other fully developed selves."[64] The individuality of man's being is grasped in the community in which he participates. These same polaric elements are the basis for man's existence. His potentiality of being (me on) is possible only in terms of his existence, his standing-out-of non-being (ouk on). To exist as a person means to stand out of his essence through participation in the actualization of his essence. Personhood is existence in self-actualization.[65] In the participation of his self-actualization he has become an existent being. The individualization-participation polarization is also the possibility for the multidimensional mixture of the essential-existential states of life. Self integration is dependent upon the dialectical function in life where identity is established, drawn into alteration, and then reestablished.[66] Life is the "actuality of being." The identity of the individual is dependent upon his participation in life. In each case of being, existence, and life, the polaric ontological elements of individualization and participation are present. The basic assumption of centeredness is that it is never completed in itself but only in participation in the context of its existence.

The ontological elements of dynamics and form also constitute the structure of being in the concepts of being, existence, and life. The elements appear as "vitality" and "intentionality" in man as he expresses the creative aspect of his potentiality of being and the purposefulness or meaning in life that gives direction to creative experiences. They relate interdependently. One cannot speak of the form of being without also speaking about the dynamics of becoming. Growth is an existential inevitability for all form is in a dynamic process. Man is in constant flux. Tillich notes that "self-transcendence and self-conservation are experienced immediately by man in man himself."[67] This was the monumental thought that also evoked the depth psychological movement. It pointed to the underlying force that not only constituted the life processes but also that which gave direction to this force. Tillich has observed that the dynamic could not be thought of as either existent or non-existent. It was "mere potentiality," or _me_ _on_, as the _Urgrund_ of Böhme, the will of Schopenhauer, the will to power of Nietzsche, the unconscious of Hartmann and Freud, the _élan_ _vital_ of Bergson, and the strife of Scheler and Jung.[68] These dynamic qualities are not without form or direction because of their polaric interdependence. These polaric elements of dynamics and form are present in existence, unified in man's essential nature and distorted under existential conditions. Even when the form is transcended by the dynamic drive, "these are forms of the self-transcendence of form" into which form is transcended.[69] Under existential conditions dynamics is without form, without direction or purpose, and therefore becomes "distorted into a formless urge for self-transcendence."[70] The dynamics-form polarity is effective in the self-creative functions of life and the principle of growth. Life creates itself through those dynamics of growth that are given to it by the underlying divine creativity.[71] The form that evolves from the dynamic creativity is relative. Creation and chaos belong to each other, for neither exists without the other. Under existential conditions they are ambiguous and it is difficult to assess which factor, self-creation or self-destruction, is the dominant one. Ambiguous life is the result of the self-integrative, centering, dynamic process in conflict with the disintegrative, diffusive, structuring process. As noted above in the individualization-participation elements, the ontological polaric elements of dynamics and form are determining factors pointing out the self-world relationship--dynamics representing the personal functions and form representing the "molding" context of the world.

The ontological elements of freedom and destiny are perhaps the most informing of all the elements about man's being, existence, and life. Tillich contends that "freedom in polarity with destiny is the structural element which makes existence possible because it transcends the essential necessity of being without destroying it."[72] Man's freedom must be understood in terms of his destiny. He experiences the freedom of his self only within the larger context of the structure of the world that determines his destiny. It is the quality of destiny to point to "the situation in which man finds himself, facing the world to which, at the same time, he belongs."[73] To the degree man experiences freedom, tacitly grasped in the acts of deliberation, decision, and responsibility, man also becomes aware that destiny is not an external determining force acting upon these distinct human functions. Tillich observes that destiny "is myself as given, formed by nature, history, and myself. My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny."[74] He goes on to point out that "only he who has freedom has a destiny" because "everything that participates in being must participate in this polarity" of freedom and destiny.[75] The self-world polarity is unified in existence where the "dreaming innocence" prevails in the essential condition rooted in the ground of being. It is separated and distorted under existential conditions and freedom becomes "arbitrariness" and "mechanical necessity" in terms of indeterminism and determinism. Tillich has learned well from depth psychology at this point and observes that "if man's freedom is not directed by destiny or if it is a series of contingent acts of arbitrariness, it falls under the control of forces which move against one another without a deciding center."[76] The apparent freedom man experiences is conditioned by either inner compulsions or external forces. The self in this conflict loses its identity and its destiny. This accounts for the ambiguity man experiences in his life. The elements of freedom and destiny "create the possibility and reality of life's transcending itself."[77] This self-transcendence cannot be expressed concretely, however, as self-integration or self-creation can be, except by man's conscious reflection upon this experience. Tillich says "the self-transcendence of life is contradicted by the profanization of life, a tendency which, like self-transcendence, cannot be described empirically but only through the mirror of man's consciousness."[78] However, it can be experienced and is experienced when man witnesses the conflict in the ambiguity between the oughtness of the sacred and the isness of the profane, for where the holy is, so is the profane. Man is aware of the great and the tragic whenever life transcends itself. The elements of freedom and destiny are vital factors in being, existence, and life. They are perhaps the central context for the other two polarities of individualization and participation, and dynamics and form. In freedom and destiny the individual being senses his identity, recognizes his estrangement, and despairs in the ambiguity of life, because every attempt at self-actualization fragments the essential unity of his centeredness resulting in an ambiguous state. The ambiguities of man's life cannot be overcome because of his microcosmic state that makes the subject-object, self-world characteristics of his being self-evident. This becomes clear in the common categorical form by which man perceives his reality.

The problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity all share in the categories of finitude--time, space, causality, and substance. The categories enable man to grasp and shape the positive and negative elements of reality in which he participates. "It is anxiety about having to die," claims Tillich, "which reveals the ontological character of time" by revealing the impending threat of nonbeing that "permeates the whole of man's being" and "shapes soul and body and determines spiritual life."[79] The anxiety of this negative element of transitoriness is overcome as man is able to effect the creativity of the positive element and courageously affirm the possibility of death in the present. Although the threat of nonbeing occurs in the essential structures of man's being, this threat is intensified in the existential situation by man's estrangement when he finds it increasingly difficult to affirm courageously his essential being that can overcome nonbeing. All of his attempts at self-actualization increase the doubt and despair which must be overcome by courage. Even in the ambiguities of life, where these essential-existential states of being are mixed, hopelessness prevails because these states of being appear to be irrevocably separated. The experience of the category of time progressively provokes in man a tension between the unrealized potentiality of being and the possibility of nonbeing. Estrangement and ambiguity in man's existence and life increase the anxiety under the finite limitations of the human predicament.

All three problems are present in man's ontological striving for space, space to be in the present. Anxiety is heightened by man's sense of pilgrimage. Estrangement is felt in the distance from essential being. Ambiguity is expressed in man's being unable to overcome the duality of his essential-existential states of his existence. The ontological insecurity experienced in anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity in not-having-a-place-to-be is overcome only by the courageous acceptance of this finite predicament. The acceptance of the dynamics of life is threatening to man in both time and space. Threatening, too, is the acceptance of the form of life. Man is trapped by the static and dynamic condition of life in finite freedom.

The other two categories, causality and substance, though as ambiguous as time and space, tend to indicate the source of man's ontological insecurity that provides understanding as well as possible answers to the threat of the possibility of nonbeing. Although anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity is felt more keenly by the awareness that both causality and substance have the quality of Geworfenheit, it is this very fact, says Tillich, that "affirms the power of being by pointing to that which precedes a thing or event as its source" and therefore, "if something is causally explained, its reality is affirmed, and the power of its resistance against nonbeing is understood."[80] This understanding is at least potentially possible, for substance points to that "relatively static and self-contained" source from which ontological courage is possible. Because of the ambiguous polarity of the ontological categories, the security gained in any encounter with Being-itself through the depth of being in the rational logos of existence can be equally lost under the existential conditions provoking anxiety in the estranged and ambiguous condition of existence and life.

The essential commonalities of the problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity in terms of the ontological elements and categories they share have been demonstrated. The task now is to indicate the existential conditions of anxiety in being, estrangement in existence, and ambiguity in life, independently.

### a. THE PROBLEM OF ANXIETY

The problem of anxiety occurs in the concept of being at the point of man's awareness of his finite condition.

Tillich claims that "anxiety is the self-awareness of the finite self as finite."[81] Man becomes anxious in his finitude as he senses the possibility of his nonbeing. In his essential state, nonbeing is taken into being. But existentially the two are separated and man is threatened by the fact that his being is limited by nonbeing, his finitude. Anxiety has the same ontological quality as finitude in that it is omnipresent, though often latent. Anxiety is distinguished from fear because it is independent of any object, that is, any object that might produce it. Whereas fear has an object that can be conquered by action, "anxiety cannot, for no finite being can conquer its finitude."[82] The object of anxiety is no-thing-ness, or nonbeing. Tillich has observed:

> Fear and anxiety are distinguished but not separated. They are immanent within each other: the sting of fear is anxiety, and anxiety strives toward fear. Fear is being afraid of something, a pain, a rejection by a person or a group, the loss of something or somebody, the moment of dying. But in the anticipation of the threat originating in these things, it is not the negativity itself which they will bring upon the subject that is frightening but the anxiety about the possible implications of this negativity.[83]

As an ontological concept, anxiety is distinguished from the pathological which is still prevalent in psychoanalytic thought. The initial section of this chapter pointed out that depth psychology has learned much from Tillich about the existential and pathological concepts of anxiety. Psychotherapists, aware of the source of what they have frequently called "creative anxiety" as being existential anxiety, and aware of their inability to alter the structures of finitude, have effected new therapeutic processes that allow them to affirm this ontological anxiety and accept empathetically the sense of meaninglessness in life as basic to the nature of man. In this respect anxiety possesses a positive as well as a negative aspect. Its eschatological nature imposes meaning on the present. Tillich says of this inescapable dialectical problem of finitude that unites being with nonbeing that "man's finitude, or creatureliness, is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical nonbeing."[84] Moreover, there is no escape from this awareness of nonbeing because the very structure of finitude forces finite being to transcend itself.[85] It drives man to that which is beyond nonbeing, to Being-itself, who negates the negative element of finitude. There is at least meaning in the awareness of the omnipresent quality of anxiety and its distinction from the pathological compulsive forms of anxiety in terms of fears.

This is the point where Tillich's awareness of the essential nature of anxiety serves as a corrective for the existential analysis derived from Kierkegaard and Heidegger.

Bernard Martin observes that "Tillich differs from most of the Existentialists in that, instead of concentrating largely on the uprootedness and lostness of human existence, he emphasizes also the essential structures of being which remain at least partially effective even in the most disrupted and estranged forms of existence."[86] Whereas the Existentialists anticipate nothing more than despair in the end, as "sickness unto death" in Kierkegaard or as "being-toward-death" in Heidegger, Tillich believes anxiety can be balanced and perhaps conquered by the courage to accept the threat of nonbeing as a reality for the present moment.

The problem of anxiety is clearly demonstrated in the ontological categories and elements under existential conditions. In those categories anxiety is aroused in the cognition of the structure of existence. Time provokes anxiety in the absence of a present reality. Tillich points out that "anxiety about transitoriness, about being delivered to the negative side of temporality, is rooted in the structure of being and not in a distortion of this structure."[87] Time makes man aware of his finitude and impending loss of being. The present moment in time involves man's being present in it. As Tillich notes, "the present implies space. Time creates the present through its union with space" and not unlike time, "space unites being with nonbeing" producing a state of anxiety. Space is as affected by finitude as time.[88] There is no space as there is no time that belongs to man at any time. He is always a pilgrim in time and a nomad in space. Tillich claims that "to have no definite and no final space means ultimate insecurity."[89] Insecurity is indigenous to man in finitude and anxiety is the obvious result. Thereby estranged, man attempts in these times and places of despair to follow the alternatives offered by the unconscious psyche. Sublimative and rationalistic options often appear to solve the problem of anxiety but they serve only to repress anxiety rather than overcome it. The ambiguity caused by time and space cannot be absolved for these elements are ontological structures of being. The same dialectic condition of being and nonbeing is present in the category of causality. This is not causality in a deterministic sense but rather causality in terms of contingency. "The anxiety in which causality is experienced," claims Tillich, "is that of not being in, of, and by one's self, of not having the 'aseity' which theology traditionally attributes to God. Man is a creature. His being is contingent; by itself it has no necessity; and therefore man realizes that he is the prey of nonbeing."[90] Man desires to relate to that which he belongs, to be attached to the source of his being. Estranged from the essential nature of himself, man seeks various relationships: socially with others in conformity, vocationally in his professional expression, and religiously with a cultic form. All of these expressions, inadequate to provide the source of his being beyond the present, fail to sustain him and man becomes anxious about the sustaining force of his life. The ambiguity of the causality factor does not provide any meaning for him. Man is torn between two live alternatives of power--the depths of the unconscious psyche that puts him in touch with Being-itself, and the surface of the conscious psyche that makes him cognizant of the social, vocational, and religious alternatives--and he is impotent to act because anxiety destroys the decisive powers. Life becomes meaningless from the loss of necessity for being. This points up the anxiety felt in the category of substance. Tillich believes that "everything finite is innately anxious that its substance will be lost."[91] Because life is a dynamic process, as experienced in time, space, and causality, substantial reality is vague and elusive, neither substantiating being or resisting nonbeing. Man is even anxious about change in general for all that appears to be real is now changing. The personal and social realities are never final. Identity changes in alteration that occurs in participation in reality. Tillich notes "this anxiety reaches its most radical form in the anticipation of the final loss of substance--and accidents as well."[92] The experience of human finitude, in all of its categorical forms, is one of anxiety for there is nothing permanent. Existence is always in change and the change destroys the points of contact with which one derives a source of power for his being. Man is anxious without something concrete to depend on. He is even more anxious when he depends upon the accidental sources of being--"a creative work, a love relationship, a concrete situation, himself"--knowing that these are but temporary and ultimately impotent.

Anxiety is equally provoked by the polaric character of the ontological elements. As noted above, these elements in their essential condition are unified and no tension or anxiety ensues. But under existential conditions each pole of the three pairs of elements tends to become independent, fulfilling itself at the expense of the other, and thereby estranges itself from the other. In this estrangement each becomes ambiguous because no balance of the two polar elements is possible. But the ontological tension caused by the categories is not the same as that caused by the elements. Tillich makes the distinction in noting the difference from the categorical anxiety of nonbeing:

> It is the anxiety of not being what we essentially are. It is anxiety about disintegrating and falling into nonbeing through existential disruption. It is anxiety about

> the breaking of the ontological tensions and the consequent destruction of the ontological structure.[93]

The reality of the possible fragmentation is the potential source of anxiety. This is apparent in each of the polar elements. In individualization and participation, anxiety is evoked with the possibility of complete self-relatedness creating alienation and loneliness, a complete separation from others and the world, and even from the self in either neurotic or psychotic forms. The other possibility of complete participation leads to the transformation of self-identity into group identity and to the eventual loss of any sense of personal being. All subjectivity is given over to conformity and objectivity. The threat of approaching either pole at the expense of the other produces anxiety in man. Tillich observes of man in this situation that "anxiously he experiences the trend from possible loneliness to collectivity and from possible collectivity to loneliness. He oscillates anxiously between individualization and participation, aware of the fact that he ceases to be if one of the poles is lost, for the loss of either pole means the loss of both."[94] This principle applies equally to the other two polar elements and it is this very principle that explains the problem of anxiety in all three.

In the polarity of dynamics and form, anxiety occurs as dynamics seeks out some form, something concrete representative of its activity, and if successful loses its dynamic character in static form. Likewise, as form seeks to become dynamic, more open and creative, and applicable to the numerous alternatives its form might take, it loses its concreteness, its identity, and gives way to a representative sign or symbol of its original nature. Man seeks to change identity derived from personal, social, economic or religious contexts yet fears the loss of that identity already established. He is concerned and anxious about the intentions he possesses for his vitality and for the extent that his vitality will achieve his intentions. Tillich notes that "man is anxious about the threat of a final form in which his vitality will be lost, and he is anxious about the threat of a chaotic formlessness in which both vitality and intentionality will be lost."[95] This kind of anxiety is best illustrated in the "philosophy of life" literature and particularly in the Existentialists Camus and Sartre. The literature of despair, especially much of Kierkegaard, points out the anxiety that prevails in man's indecision about the powerful potentiality, both negative and positive, present in the relationship between his intentions and his vitality.

Man is also anxious in the tensions between the elements of freedom and destiny in his life. Aware of his freedom, man strives against the structures that his destiny establish. He wants to overcome what appears to him as a "predetermined" pattern of life and to effect the creative intuitions that arise from his unconscious psyche. He wants to individualize his vitality, to "make something of himself," to make himself and the world over in his own image. He wants to be creative with his life. He refuses the possibility of participation in history and desires to make his own history. This is why initiation rites are almost extinct in Western culture. But at the same time man is fearful of his freedom to create because it may take him beyond any meaningful structure of existence. He may very well lose everything, for in isolation he may lose all relationship to things other than himself, and may even lose himself as a schizophrenic does. Destiny provides not only a context for the present but also an eschatological dimension that structures the freedom of the future. In participating in destiny, a form is derived that gives structure to man's identity, intentions, and decisions in his freedom. The potentials of freedom and destiny produce anxiety. Tillich opines:

> Man is threatened with the loss of freedom by the necessities implied in his destiny, and he is equally threatened with the loss of his identity by the contingencies implied in his freedom. He is continuously in danger of trying to preserve his freedom by arbitrarily defying his destiny and of trying to save his destiny by surrendering his freedom.96

Anxiety assails man because he can affirm either one independently or interdependently. The dialectic between them forces him to become decisive and arbitrary. But to do so, he is in danger of losing both. For every affirmation is a negative. To lose one's freedom or one's destiny is to lose all possibility for meaning in life. To incorporate both is to be threatened with the possibility of one overcoming the other. The end result is anxiety. But it is only a potential threat and not necessarily an actual threat to self-destruction. Tillich astutely observes:

> Finitude is the possibility of losing one's ontological structure and, with it, one's self. But this is a possibility, not a necessity. To be finite is to be threatened. But a threat is a possibility, not actuality. The anxiety of finitude is not the despair of self-destruction. Christianity sees in the picture of Jesus as the Christ a human life in which all forms of anxiety are present but in which all forms of despair are absent. In the light of this picture it is possible to distinguish "essential" finitude from "existential" disruption, ontological anxiety from the anxiety of guilt which is despair.97

This is the basis for Tillich's concept of courage which he believes to be the only way for dealing with the disparity that occurs in the categories and elements of being. It is this concept of courage that he employs as the answer to the problems of ontological anxiety which must now be discussed.

Tillich makes a distinction between three types of ontological anxiety in which nonbeing threatens man in his existential situation. He suggests:

> Nonbeing threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate, absolutely in terms of death. It threatens man's spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt, absolutely in terms of condemnation. The awareness of this threefold threat is anxiety appearing in three forms, that of fate and death (briefly, the anxiety of death), that of emptiness and loss of meaning (briefly, the anxiety of meaninglessness), that of guilt and condemnation (briefly, the anxiety of condemnation).[98]

It is obvious that these are forms of existential anxiety and not pathological anxiety. But it is not so obvious that these existential forms of anxiety are the sources of the pathological conditions that ensue. They are not accepted by man as the conditions of his finitude. In lieu of accepting the existential threat of death, for example, man tries to forget this possibility in creative activity almost believing that creativity alone will absolve him from death. Or he might ignore the reality of death by an intellectual affirmation of immortality or even reincarnation. Rather than accept the fact of the finite limitations of knowledge, man in his perfectionistic attitude strives to accumulate via technical reason a wealth of data. Or he may resign himself to emotional sensationalism. He may choose to reject condemnation of his life by adopting a purist attitude toward life, participating only in those activities which are above question. Or he may become amoral. He may reject the superego and adopt only the suggestions of the id. In each case pathological conditions may result from these ontological conditions of man's being finite. And these ontological conditions are being treated by psychoanalysts as if they were only pathological conditions. Tillich has seen, however, in the depth psychology's approach to this problem of anxiety, and especially in the existential analyst's school, the existential distortions of the ontological nature of man's existence.

The anxiety of fate and death is perhaps the most universal of the three types. The possibility of death interrupts man's ontic self-affirmation of his being in its simple existence.[99] There is an historic precedent that death defies refute. All men die. All men are born to die. The will to live is to defy death. Death is not only waiting for its own time and place but it accepts as well willful and accidental events. This was pointed out by Tillich in his analysis of the finite state of the ontological categories. The relative threat of fate is always seen against the background of death. There is a contingency about the threat of nonbeing because the anxiety about the threat of death is not derived, but given. Tillich believes "contingently we are put into the whole web of causal relations. Contingently we are determined by them in every moment and thrown out by them in the last moment."[100] The threat of nonbeing is present in every moment of being; it is overcome by the passing of that moment; yet the arrival of the new moment brings with it a new threat. Tillich says:

> Nonbeing is omnipresent and produces anxiety even where an immediate threat of death is absent. It stands behind the experience that we are driven, together with everything else, from the past toward the future without a moment of time which does not vanish immediately. It stands behind the insecurity and homelessness of our social and individual existence. It stands behind the attacks on our power of being in body and soul by weakness, disease, and accidents. In all these forms fate actualizes itself, and through them the anxiety of nonbeing takes hold of us. We try to transform the anxiety into fear and to meet courageously the object in which the threat is embodied. We succeed partly, but somehow we are aware of the fact that it is not these objects with which we struggle that produce the anxiety but the human situation as such.101

The awareness of finitude is the source of anxiety. It is not the finite events but the finite condition that throws up the threat of nonbeing.

The anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness occurs when man is unable to participate creatively in the life process. When man is no longer able to gain meaning from his existence and to receive and transform these experiences in terms of his self-affirmation, he becomes anxious. He has become estranged from his source of being. Tillich believes:

> Everyone who lives creatively in meanings affirms himself as a participant in these meanings. He affirms himself as receiving and transforming reality creatively. He loves himself as participating in the spiritual life and as loving its contents. He loves them because they are his own fulfillment and because they are actualized through him.[102]

Man feels a sense of emptiness when there is nothing to grasp. Moreover, he feels an even deeper sense of meaninglessness when what he grasps does not affirm himself in any way. Doubt tends to punctuate this threat of nonbeing. He is so threatened by despair and doubt, emptiness and meaninglessness, that he wants to escape his condition of finite freedom. Erich Fromm suggests an "escape from freedom" to something that is concrete.[103] But this concept is not operating on the level of existential anxiety. It deals more with the pathological conditions that arise from the condition of finite freedom. In Fromm's analysis, man wants to grasp something concrete, regardless of its significance, just so he might escape nonbeing or perhaps extract something meaningful from it. The person who uses L.S.D. if motivated by pathological factors may well be seeking a new meaning and relevance to his life that he has not been able to grasp heretofore. Whether man be fanatic or erotic, he is in search of something that will fill his void. Self-surrender is acceptable if the emptiness and meaninglessness is overcome in relatedness. Tillich observes that "the anxiety of meaninglessness is anxiety about the loss of an ultimate concern, of a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings."[104] The threat to man's ultimate concern, to his spiritual self-affirmation, is not unlike the threat to his ontic self-affirmation for "the threat to his spiritual being is a threat to his whole being."[105] Without meaning, there is no life, and the suicide is but an expression of this. Tillich notes that mistakingly "Freud identified this reaction to the meaninglessness of the never-ceasing and never-satisfying libido with man's essential being."[106] Meaninglessness is rather an expression of man's existential self-estrangement from anything meaningful in his life.

The anxiety of guilt and condemnation threatens man's moral self-affirmation because he is "finite freedom." He has the potential freedom in his powers of deliberation, decision, and responsibility to actualize himself and to fulfill his destiny. But he is threatened by the ambiguity of good and evil where being is mixed with nonbeing, and threatened because moral perfection is an impossibility for him. Man is free to contradict his essential being and lose his identity. To do so is to provoke guilt and condemnation. Regardless of whether he defines the negative judgments against him, anomism, or whether he accepts the moral rigor of the demands upon his life, legalism, the anxiety of guilt and condemnation break in upon him and produce an extreme situation of moral despair.[107] The disparity that occurs in all of these polaric ontological elements under existential conditions of life fragmentizes man's decision for moral self-affirmation. He is left to despair the anxiety of guilt and condemnation for it is in the structure of his existential being. Man cannot escape the option for actualizing his being allowed him in his freedom. If he does not attempt it he feels guilty for fearing his actualization. If he does attempt his actualization he feels guilty for leaving his essential nature, but more than that, he feels condemned in his new form of actualization. This is not unlike the anxiety that the adolescent faces in the actualization of his life in all of its modalities of being. It has been pointed out above that man cannot choose from among the ambiguous forms of his life one form or the other, for to lose one is to lose both, and to gain nonbeing. His ontic, spiritual, and moral self-affirmations are always clouded by this possibility of nonbeing: to affirm oneself is to affirm one pole at the expense of the other and to lose one's being.

Tillich understands the pathological anxiety that evolves as symptoms of existential anxiety. This will be noted in the last section of this chapter when the contributions of depth psychology to Tillich's doctrine of man will be discussed. It will be important to indicate how Tillich's concept of existential anxiety provides meaningful theories for dealing with both existential anxiety in terms of courage and pathological anxiety in terms of acceptance based on the courage to be.

### b. THE PROBLEM OF ESTRANGEMENT

The problem of estrangement is exposed in the depth dimension of the concept of existence. It is a problem of man's separation from his essential nature. In his finite freedom man chooses to actualize the potentiality of his essential being. He chooses to exist, to "stand out" of nonbeing, to become actual. And in so doing, observes Tillich, "man's existential situation is a state of estrangement from his essential nature."[108] Hammond points out that existence is the fundamental problem that precedes all of man's problems. Existence is estrangement, total estrangement for Tillich and therefore affects every aspect of human existence.[109] Estrangement does not affect only one area of human life but all of life. If it were effective in only special areas of life, those areas could be corrected by man's initiative or by depth therapy as many have so long believed was possible. The central theme of estrangement has been prominent in existentialist literature, as pointed out by Heinemann, but it has not been taken seriously.[110] It has been viewed largely as a cultural phenomenon rather than as a basic ontological condition in human existence.

Tillich has recognized the context for estrangement in man's freedom, especially finite freedom. This means that man's freedom is limited by his destiny. Martin notes that for Tillich this means "that finite freedom produces the human transition from essence to existence not individually and accidently but within the framework of a universal destiny. Sin is the result neither of individual moral choice alone nor of necessity alone. Decision and destiny are both involved here."[111] The transition may occur in one of two ways. On the one hand, transition may take place from without. Tillich cites the divine prohibition not to eat from the tree of knowledge and notes this "presupposes a kind of split between creator and creature, a split which makes a command necessary . . . for it presupposes a sin which is not yet sin but which is also no longer innocence."[112] This is a desire to sin, a desire that evolves out of the state of "dreaming innocence" when man realizes his finitude; it is this awareness that produces tension. "The tension occurs in the moment in which finite freedom becomes conscious of itself and tends to become actual," claims Tillich and "this is what could be called the moment of aroused freedom."[113] But in the moment of aroused freedom man also senses the desire of dreaming innocence to preserve itself. In this moment "man is caught between the desire to actualize his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming innocence. In the power of his finite freedom, he decides for actualization."[114] The result is estrangement. On the other hand, Tillich claims the same analysis can be made from within, from man's anxiety which he experiences in the awareness of his finite freedom. He says:

> At the moment when man becomes conscious of his freedom, the awareness of his dangerous situation gets hold of him. He experiences a double threat, which is rooted in his finite freedom and expressed in anxiety. Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualizing himself and his potentialities. He stands between the preservation of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the actuality of being and the loss of his innocence through knowledge, power, and guilt. The anxiety of this situation is the state of temptation. Man decides for self-actualization, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence.[115]

Man is driven by the anxiety experienced in finite freedom to actualize himself and thereby lose his original essence or to deny his self-actualization and preserve his innocence. In both cases he will lose himself if either is chosen. Tillich summarizes this condition of estrangement:

> Man is a whole man, whose essential being has the character of dreaming innocence,

> whose finite freedom makes possible the transition from essence to existence, whose aroused freedom puts him between two anxieties which threaten the loss of self, whose decision is against the preservation of dreaming innocence and for self-actualization.116

It must be stressed, also, that as man decides for self-actualization he decides his existence, an existence that has a universal nature and that incorporates the essential as well as the existential states of being which produce an ambiguous life.

Estrangement is the basic characteristic of the human predicament. Man, as he is, is estranged from what he ought to be. And man is anxious because he is aware of this double nature of estrangement. This is indicated in Tillich's three concepts of sin. In unbelief, man's self-actualization is the recognition of himself as separate from God. It is the denial of God in the center of one's being, his self. In hubris, man's self-actualization is the denial of his finitude. It is the recognition of one's self as the center of his being and his world. In concupiscence, man's self-actualization follows the tendency to draw the whole world into himself, to make himself universal in his potentiality. Separated from the center of his existence man seeks to make himself the center. In all three forms of sin man recognizes his finite condition as estranged from his infinite potential. All three point out to man the contradictions of his essential being and his power for self-actualization. Under existential conditions man contradicts the very structure of his being and moves toward self-destruction. Man is threatened with self-estrangement, with self-alienation, and seeks to overcome this condition.

Hammond contends that Tillich has "elevated" the philosophical concept of estrangement into a theological concept by way of the criterion of self-estrangement.[117] In so doing Tillich has gone beyond the existentialist conceptualization. Hammond believes that Tillich has generalized existentialist thought by emphasizing estrangement, but that he has gone beyond this thought in suggesting self-estrangement. He further notes Tillich's recognition of two schools of thought that hold divergent views from his; namely, one that he calls "radical" existentialists and the other "utopian" existentialists.[118] The radical group, consisting of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Bergson, and Sartre, suggests that the self-estrangement is total and reconciliation is impossible. He also includes Freud's view of the libido as equally tragic. The utopian group, basically Hegelian and Marxist, hold that estrangement is temporary and can be overcome by subsequent social and psychological processes. Tillich includes Jung and Fromm in this category because both view estrangement as a condition resulting from human weakness only and therefore susceptible to change.[119] Indeed, Tillich does go beyond the philosophical conceptualization of estrangement. He gives estrangement a theological perspective that has been influenced by depth psychology. He understands estrangement not only in social terms but also in personal terms, in the sense of self-estrangement. Self-estrangement is not the result of human nature; it is rather the transition of man from the essential to the existential state of being as a result of his choice of self-actualization in finite freedom. Neither is self-estrangement a result of the historical situation, for the same reason. Self-estrangement is, therefore, neither tragic nor existential, but rather an ontological result of human finitude under the conditions of the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny.

This self-estrangement that occurs because of man's decision to actualize himself is the loss of the self. Tillich notes that

> self-loss is the loss of one's determining center, the disintegration of the unity of the person. This is manifest in moral conflicts and in psychopathological disruptions, independently or interdependently. The horrifying experience of "falling to pieces" gets hold of the person. To the degree in which this happens, one's world also falls to pieces. It ceases to be a world, in the sense of a meaningful whole. Things no longer speak to man; they lose their power to enter into a meaningful encounter with man because man himself has lost this power.[120]

In losing self-centeredness man loses touch with his essential being and is the center of nothing. He wanders aimlessly about unattached to anything in his environment and draws no meaning from his existence. Indeed, man is at the mercy of the impact of the environment upon him. This is obvious in the conflicts of the ontological polarities under the conditions of existence.

As freedom is separated from destiny it becomes arbitrary. Every willful act under the control of hubris and concupiscence takes man further from his destiny. Every choice of man that makes him the center of the universe tends to distort his freedom and remove him from his destiny. Man loses a sense of contingency and ultimacy in his choices. Tillich notes:

> Existentialism, supported by depth psychology, described the dialectics of this situation in terms of the restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness connected with it. If no essential relation between a free agent and his objects exists, no choice is objectively preferable to any other; no commitment to a cause or a person is meaningful; no dominant purpose can be established.[121]

When man's freedom loses touch with his destiny or becomes arbitrary he is subject to the forces of the environment which indiscriminately act upon him. All that seemed to be free is now subject to either internal compulsions or external causes. The self loses its centeredness and is fragmentized by new motives. Contingent motives battle for supremacy over each other but none can unite the self and give it purpose and direction. No deciding center is possible in this condition. The arbitrariness of freedom and the mechanical necessity of destiny make man impotent. In an analogy of this situation with the traditional controversy between determinism and indeterminism Tillich observes:

> Indeterminism makes man's freedom a matter of contingency. In so doing, it removes the very responsibility which it tried to preserve against determinism. And determinism surrenders man's freedom to mechanical necessity, transforming him into a completely conditioned thing which, as such, has no destiny--not even the destiny of having a true theory of determinism; for under the control of mechanical necessity there is neither truth nor destiny. Indeterminism, as well as determinism, is a mirror of man's state of estrangement.122

Whenever his dynamics are separated from form in self-estrangement, man's creative expressions are distorted and become unreal. His existence is a fantasy because there is no form to give reality to his being. And when form is separated from dynamics, legalism rules all expressions of man's creativity. The oppressive nature of form over dynamics results in sterile submission or rebellious chaos. Self-estrangement results in either case. Self-estrangement occurs also when individualization is separated from participation. The more man individualizes himself the more he isolates himself, for he resists participation in community. In his alienation from community man is subject, nevertheless, to his environment and Tillich believes "he falls under the power of objects which tend to make him into a mere object without a self."[123] He is swallowed up by his subjectivity. If man chooses full participation without individualization he tends to become a mere object without any unique or particular existence that distinguishes himself. He becomes one object among others. Self-estrangement is the result of any separation between the ontological polaric elements of man's existence, for any choice of one or the other in his finite freedom eliminates the possibility of both. This is why man's life becomes ambiguous and, in turn, anxious.

Man in his estrangement is cut off from the ultimate dimension in his life and, in turn, subject to doubt and insecurity which drives him to despair. He may choose any one of the polarities noted above, but that very act will only deepen his despair rather than overcome it. Or he may not choose at all, and in his indecision experience restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness. In either case only despair awaits him. As Sartre suggests, there is "No Exit" from his situation. Man is estranged because he exists.

## c. THE PROBLEM OF AMBIGUITY

The problem of ambiguity is experienced by man because life is a multidimensional unity of the essential and existential states of being. Ambiguity in life occurs because, in the dimension of the spirit, man is aware of both his potentiality and his actuality. Tillich suggests that "the predominance of the psychological dimension makes it possible for the dimension of the spirit to become actual" in "the interplay of freedom and destiny under the directing creativity of God."[124] But it is precisely at this point, the transition from the psychological to the dimension of the spirit, that the creative act of divine providence, the overcoming of the psychological by the spirit, is so often missed by man in his ambiguous condition.[125] It is sufficient to note here that the problem of ambiguity is the result of man's sensitivity to his self-transcendence which is possible only in the dimension of the spirit. The psychological dimension will be delineated in the next section.

Life is ambiguous because of the actualization of potential being. Three distinct functions of life are manifest in this actualization process for Tillich:

> self-integration under the principle of centeredness, self-creation under the principle of growth, and self-transcendence under the principle of sublimity. The

> basic structure of self-identity and self-alteration is effective in each, and each is dependent on the basic polarities of being: self-integration on the polarity of individualization and participation, self-creation on the polarities of dynamics and form, self-transcendence on the polarities of freedom and destiny. And the structure of self-identity and self-alteration is rooted in the basic ontological self-world correlation.[126]

The integration or unity of the basic self-identity and self-alteration is possible in the three functions of life. The unambiguous life, however, created by the unity of the elements of self-identity and self-alteration, is threatened whenever existential estrangement drives life in one or the other polar direction. Ambiguity occurs, then, as integration encounters disintegration, self-creation encounters destruction, and self-transcendence encounters profanization. In this sense ambiguity is a reality, for "every life process has the ambiguity that the positive and negative elements are mixed in such a way that a definite separation of the negative from the positive is impossible: life at every moment is ambiguous."[127] The effect of existential estrangement upon the life functions is clear in each of the basic polarities of being.

In self-integration ambiguity arises in the realization of the necessity to individualize oneself by creating a unique centeredness in order to be a fully centered being, and of the necessity for the participation of this centered self in the world drawing into itself the vitality gained by its self-creation in other centers outside of itself. Individualization and participation is achieved through a circular motion of self-identity, self-alteration, and reidentification. Tillich points out that self-integration of life is always an inescapable sacrifice of the possible for the real or of the real for the possible.[128] Man, driven by an eros toward the world, must always risk himself in the decisions of his choosing the real or the possible. Usually, the familiarity with the real determines the choice even though the eros for the possible is demanding. The degree to which one or the other is chosen in the decisive moment determines the possibility of being: the inability to leave self-centeredness leads to the death of self-identity; the inability to return to self-centeredness leads to the death of self-alteration.[129] Therefore, life is ambiguous in the face of the sacrifice and risk involved in the decisive choice concerning the real and the possible alternatives of being. The ambiguity is intensified because both positive and negative motives are of similar strength. One is faced with what the experimental psychologist calls the approach-approach conflict.

In self-creation ambiguity arises between dynamics and form. Self-creativity implies growth which is dependent upon dynamics. But self-creativity implies also a form, for there is no creation without form which makes that which is created a reality. Ambiguity is most intense at the point where the "no-longer-form" is a "not-yet-form." It is precisely at this moment of transition where creation is potentially destructive and where ambiguity between self-creation and self-destruction is most real.[130] The ambiguity of life and death is present in every life process and is especially pertinent to man because he is aware of the growth and decay existing all around him, and even in him. As self-creation manifests itself in work and procreation, ambiguous effects evolve. Work negatively affects bodily decay, both in the moment as well as in the end. Work positively affects a new self-identity in the art forms of its creative self-expression. Man wants to work to create a new identity; yet he does not want to work because it destroys his being. Every labor is mixed with the ambiguity of necessity and fear. Propagation is motivated by the anticipation of the highest human form of ecstasy, in the physical oneness achieved in coitus with one's mate; yet the dissolution of one's self in the very act of ecstatic union produces the deepest ambiguity. The ambiguity is keen in the present historical situation; for man enters into sexual relations to gain self-identity in his meaningless existence, only lose this identity if the relation is creative. In some lower forms of animal life, death is occasionally the end result of copulation. Every new creation implies the death of the old elements that give birth to the new creation. Every form destroys dynamics and every dynamics destroys form. Self-creation is ambiguous in its dynamics-form polarity, for growth implies destruction.

In self-transcendence man is keenly aware of the ambiguities he has witnessed in both the affirmation and the denial of the sacredness of all life. Profanization of his being is evident to every man in each resistance he has to self-transcendence. The security of self-identity is threatened by self-transcendence, for the profane is viewed from the sacred in the dimension of the spirit. Tillich observes that "life, transcending itself, appears in the mirror of man's consciousness as having greatness and dignity . . . the great in the qualitative sense shows a power of being and meaning that makes it a representative of ultimate being and meaning and gives it the dignity of such representation."[252] But in the very moment that man exceeds his finitude in the awareness of greatness, he encounters the threat of the smallness of his actual being. Where the sacred is, so is the profane. And wherever either is encountered, both are encountered in their ambiguous unity. Tillich contends that "the holiness of a living being, its greatness and dignity, is ambiguously united with its profanization, its smallness, and its violability."[132] The intentionality of self-transcendence is subject to the reality of being. As Tillich clearly points out, "the self-transcendence of life, which reveals itself to man as the greatness of life, leads under the conditions of existence to the tragic character of life, to the ambiguity of the great and the tragic."[133] Hubris and concupiscence lead to the tragedy of self-destruction as well as to the destruction of others. Because of this many avoid greatness, even if unconsciously, so as not to experience tragedy. But to avoid tragedy is also to be incapable of greatness. The ambiguity of the great and the tragic in the human predicament is the source of the demonic element that devours man unless he is capable of experiencing the unambiguous life in the dimension of the spirit. In his freedom, finite as it is, man is tempted to risk his identity in the creativity that is possible in self-transcendence. He aspires to greatness. But the demonic structures cannot be overcome by intentionality. They are rather strengthened by the self-idolatry that emanates from the security of self-identity. Aspiration denies destiny. It breaks the structure of being; it breaks the structure of human finitude which destiny establishes. In ambiguous life both freedom and destiny are distorted, the sacred and the profane are confused, and self-transcendence only deepens the ambiguity that man encounters by obviating any possible decision to accept a compromise of the two.

In all three life functions--self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence--the ontological polarities of being are potential sources of ambiguity. In every case man is driven to an ambiguous condition by existential estrangement. Disintegration, destruction, and profanization awaits either the affirmation or the denial of any one polar element. Under existential conditions, in the actualization of the potential being in finite freedom, man is driven to the awareness of his identity, his creativity, and the ambiguity of both in the self-transcendence that threatens him with tragedy in his option for greatness. The awareness of this multidimensional character of life is the source of the problem of ambiguity.

The task now is to describe the depth dimensional insights into these problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity that Tillich has gleaned from the rich resources of existentialism and depth psychology.

## 2. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT ABOUT ANXIETY, ESTRANGEMENT, AND AMBIGUITY

The rich resources of existentialism and depth psychology have had a significant influence upon Tillich's existential analysis of the human situation. They have yielded the depth dimension of his thought about "the totality of man's creative self-interpretation" in the praxis of the personal and communal acts of life and from the theoria about the meaning in life. It is this dimension of depth that contributes a holistic perspective to the category of human existence. In this regard, Tillich's thought about the anxious, estranged, and ambiguous characteristics of life are extended beyond the pathological conditions to the ontological states of being. He grasps the depth dimension of each of these problematic situations and understands they are not caused by personal willful acts or by communal cultural patterns of existence, but rather by the very nature of man's ontological being. These problems are the result of man's finite freedom and not the response to any particular stimulus in a given situation. The depth dimension in Tillich's thought will be obvious in his analysis of these problems.

### a. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT ABOUT ANXIETY

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of anxiety is clearly distinguished by his distinction between fear and anxiety. He says:

> The recovery of the meaning of anxiety through the combined endeavors of existential philosophy, depth psychology, neurology, and the arts is one of the

> achievements of the twentieth century. It has become clear that fear as related to a definite object and anxiety as the awareness of finitude are two radically different concepts. Anxiety is ontological; fear, psychological.[134]

He does not refer to anxiety as a psychological phenomenon, not even in the traditional sense that anxiety is the undifferentiated response to an unidentifiable stimulus. Tillich contends that anxiety is the self-awareness of one's finitude, of the limitations of being. Anxiety does not have an object as fear does or even as anxiety does in the technical psychological sense because "anxiety is independent of any special object which might produce it: it is dependent only on the threat of nonbeing--which is identical with finitude."[135] Anxiety is a phenomenon that has no causality because it cannot be derived. It is a phenomenon that occurs only with the awareness of being finite. Therefore, anxiety is not something that can be altered by therapy, for the structure of finitude is unalterable. It is given. However, anxiety can be made a part of consciousness, thereby relieving the compulsiveness and the intensity of emotional behavior. In this respect anxiety can be potentially accepted and controlled but not disposed of. Only the symptoms of anxiety can be dealt with by psychotherapy. Tillich makes it clear that "ultimately the attempts to transform anxiety into fear are vain. The basic anxiety, the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of nonbeing, cannot be eliminated. It belongs to existence itself."[136] Fear and anxiety must be distinguished if either one is to be properly understood.

Most attempts to derive an adequate understanding of basic anxiety have been futile. Rollo May illustrates this point in his book The Meaning of Anxiety. In the course of analyzing several points of view, he shows the importance of making a distinction between what is basic anxiety and what is derived anxiety.[137] Tillich notes the same:

> It is the lack of a clear distinction between existential and pathological anxiety, and between the main forms of existential anxiety. This cannot be made by depth-psychological analysis alone; it is a matter of ontology. Only in the light of an ontological understanding of human nature can the body of material provided by psychology and sociology be organized into a consistent and comprehensive theory of anxiety.[138]

Anxiety must be seen in its depth dimension. Man's attempt to actualize his potentiality of being in his finite freedom makes him aware of his destiny, and in turn, anxious. Any attempt to particularize this anxiety in terms of the categories of being distorts existential anxiety into pathological forms. These forms then become symtoms of the basic anxiety and are not unlike the characteristics of fear. If these symptoms cannot be affirmed for what they are, the anxiety may then turn into neurosis. All too often psychoanalysis and psychotherapy deny this basic anxiety and hold the view that all anxiety is pathological, that it is largely psychosomatic and to some degree psychological. Tillich contends:

> The psychiatrist who asserts that anxiety is always pathological cannot deny the potentiality of illness in human nature, and he must account for the facts of finitude, doubt, and guilt in every human being; he must, in terms of his own presupposition, account for the universality of anxiety. He cannot avoid the question of human nature since in practicing his profession he cannot avoid the distinction between health and illness, existential and pathological anxiety. This is why more and more representatives of medicine generally and psychotherapy specifically ask for the cooperation with the philosophers and theologians.[139]

This depth dimension of anxiety requires a doctrine of man to be able to grasp its total character. The essential as well as the existential states of being must be understood to comprehend the dual nature of anxiety in its existential condition. Tillich has derived five basic principles regarding pathological and existential anxiety.

> 1. Existential anxiety has an ontological character and cannot be removed but must be taken into the courage to be. 2. Pathological anxiety is the consequence of the failure of the self to take anxiety upon itself. 3. Pathological anxiety leads to self-affirmation on a limited, fixed, and unrealistic basis and to a compulsory defense of this basis. 4. Pathological anxiety, in relation to the anxiety of

> fate and death, produces and unrealistic security; in relation to the anxiety of guilt and condemnation, an unrealistic perfection; in relation to the anxiety of doubt and meaninglessness, an unrealistic certitude. 5. Pathological anxiety, once established, is an object of medical healing. Existential anxiety is an object of priestly help.140

The significant point made by Tillich in these principles is that pathological anxiety exists to the degree that existential anxiety cannot be accepted and affirmed. This is not unlike Jung's observation that most of his patients were suffering from problems of a religious nature rather than of a pathological condition. Jung was no doubt implying that his patients could neither accept nor affirm their awareness of an existential anxiety. Their problems were more ontological than pathological. Very similar presuppositions undergird Victor Frankl's logotherapy.

Tillich's depth analysis of anxiety follows the existentialist position, and in particular, the thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Kierkegaard is usually credited with the first significant analysis of anxiety in the human situation. He was able to delineate man's awareness of the nothingness that man felt as the object of his dread. Heidegger, following the insights he derived from Kant, extended Kierkegaard's ideas from an ontological perspective. William Barrett describes Heidegger's concept of nothingness as

> a presence within our Being, always there, in the inner quaking that goes on beneath the calm surface of our preoccupation with things. Anxiety before Nothingness has many modalities and guises; now trembling and creative, now panicky and destructive; but always it is inseparable from ourselves as our own breathing because anxiety is our existence itself in its radical insecurity. In anxiety we both are and are not, at one and the same time, and this is our dread. Our finitude is such that positive and negative interpenetrate our whole existence.[141]

Martin suggests that Heidegger's view of anxiety which describes man's awareness of impending death might be more central in Tillich's thought than Kierkegaard's view which deals with man's realization of his moral problem.[142] The most fundamental contribution to Tillich's analysis of the problem of anxiety has come from existential analysis of the problem of anxiety and its basic concerns with ontology and Dasein. Tillich has grasped the significance of understanding man in the context of the structure of existence rather than in the drives and dynamisms that evolve from the awareness of finitude. Psychotherapy has painfully become more aware of the necessity for dealing with anxiety, not in terms of symptoms that resemble fear but with anxiety itself, or rather with the whole person whom the therapist encounters. As Rollo May points out, "the grasping of the being of the other person occurs on quite a different level from our knowledge of specific things about him."[143] It is man himself whom the therapist deals with when he deals with anxiety. Tillich follows rather closely Heidegger's ontological concept of Dasein for this very reason because it conceives most freely the concept of the anxiety of man in his existential situation. Heidegger's Dasein is a "Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others."[144] Dasein is the source of man's anxiety or dread in Kierkegaard's thought as well as in Heidegger's, for it deals with the fundamental ontological question of the meaning of being. Anxiety for Heidegger is a basic state-of-mind, a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed. Having been "thrown" into the world, man is aware of and seeks his authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self. Heidegger delineates this anxiety-provoking experience noting that:

> From an existentiell point of view, the authenticity of Being-one's-Self has of course been closed off and thrust aside in falling; but to be thus closed off is merely the privation of a disclosedness which manifests itself phenomenally in the fact that Dasein's fleeing is a fleeing in the face of itself. That in the face of which Dasein flees, is precisely what Dasein comes up "behind". Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can it flee in the face of that in the face of which it flees. To be

> sure, that in the face of which it flees is not grasped in thus turning away (Abkehr) in falling; nor is it experienced even in turning thither (Hinkehr). Rather, in turning away from it, it is disclosed "there". This existentiell-ontical turning-away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, to grasp it as such.[145]

It is in this phenomenon of falling that Dasein grasps itself and learns about the ontological nature of its being. For Heidegger, "the turning-away of the falling is grounded . . . in anxiety," and it is the awareness of the fact that "Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein . . . that in the face of which one has anxiety (das Wovor der Angst) in Being-in-the-world as such."[146] Magda King emphasizes this point as the key to Heidegger's whole thought, noting:

> The unique power of dread lies precisely in bringing things into the mood of total insignificance, and is making manifest that the dreadsome is not a thing, it is not of the character of any beings at all: it is nothing. Consequently, it cannot be found anywhere within the world; it cannot approach from any definite place or direction in a certain neighborhood. The dreadsome is nowhere and nothing. But, as Heidegger goes on to point out, the nowhere and nothing are not mere nothings: in them lies the disclosure of place itself, of world itself.[147]

If anxiety were an entity, it would be fear. For as man encounters the entities within-the-world he shrinks back in fear, fleeing that which threatens his authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. When anxiety is objectified it becomes fear. Heidegger claims "*that which* fear fears *about* is that very entity which is afraid--Dasein. Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing disclosed this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself."[148] Heidegger succinctly observes that "Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious."[149] In this respect anxiety discloses the world as world, the reality of being, and more precisely *sichängsten*, anxiousness itself. But Heidegger claims anxiety is also *sich abangstet*, anxiety about itself because "anxiety is not only anxiety in face of something, but as a state-of-mind, it is also *anxiety about* something."[150] In either case anxiety is aroused from Being-in-the-world. In this way anxiety removes from *Dasein* the possibility of understanding Being-there and makes *Dasein* anxious about its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Yet it does not disclose anxiety *as Being-possible*. In Being-possible, *Dasein* is also aware of *Being-towards*, that it is "*Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free* for (propesio in . . . ) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is."[151] In this way both *sichängsten* and *sich abangstet* are manifest and coincide in *Dasein*. But because they coincide, it does not follow that their distinctiveness is dissolved; rather, they are two modes which occur in *Dasein*. This occurs, says Heidegger, because potentiality-for-Being is an impossibility. Being has no realistic future, only hope, a *Für-sich-erhoffen*, a hope for something for oneself.[152] To be realistic is to fear and to fall away or thrust in the opposite direction. To hope is to be anxious about the nothingness that man stands in the face of and yet prevails. Tillich has derived much of his thought from this position espoused by Heidegger who extended Kierkegaard's thought and likewise made a similar distinction between fear and anxiety. But Tillich does differ with Heidegger at the point of the despair of anxiety. Perhaps it was Tillich's tutelage under Scheler and Schelling that broadened his ontological view into a more holistic perspective than Husserl provided for Heidegger, even the later Heidegger. Tillich believes that anxiety is overcome in the ontological possibility of courage to accept *Dasein* as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole in the present. He is not resigned as Heidegger is to the Being-toward-death position of Kierkegaard's sickness-unto-death. Courage enables man to find a meaning for his authentic existence and to challenge face to face the unauthentic possibility in his thrownness. This is specifically the depth dimension of Tillich's thought, for he contends that man is able to perceive the universal *logos* of being in the depth of his being, even the Logos with the right word that was unknown to Nietzsche and perhaps Heidegger.

Tillich understood the moral aspect of anxiety from Kierkegaard and, in part, from Freud. Anxiety occurs because of man's freedom, the freedom to actualize the potential. Anxiety for Kierkegaard then is "the possibility of freedom."[153] Whenever man is aware of the possibility of his being, he is both potentially anxious and a reality as well in the process of actualizing possibility. Anxiety is of a universal nature for Kierkegaard because the will to be man, which is his true vocation, is the will to be an anxious man. As Rollo May indicates, "individuation (becoming a self) is gained at the price of confronting anxiety inherent in taking a stand *against* as well as *with* one's environment."[154] Karen Horney has delineated the same view in terms of her understanding of anxiety, especially the neurotic forms of anxiety as being *toward*, *against*, or *away from* that which threatens man's existence. Whether it be an inner conflict as with Kierkegaard and Freud or an external conflict as with Fromm and Horney, it is nevertheless debilitating. Kierkegaard says that "anxiety is an alien power which lays hold of an individual, and yet one cannot tear oneself away, nor has a will to do so; for one fears, but what one fears one desires. Anxiety then makes the individual impotent."[155] The ambiguity of anxiety creates a sympathetic antipathy. It is this ambivalent attitude that distinguishes fear from anxiety for Kierkegaard. Fear moves away from its object whereas anxiety possesses an ambivalent relation to its "object" because it is drawn toward it. Freud and Kierkegaard share a common point of view about anxiety, according to James Loder who observes that "there is a clear-cut functional analogy between Kierkegaard's view of 'dread' and Freud's view of 'doubt'. Both are forms of ambivalence."[156] The ambivalence is created by a compulsion aroused by doubt. Freud claims "the compulsion is an attempt at a compensation for the doubt and at a correction of the intolerable condition of inhibition to which the doubt bears witness."[157] This is not unlike Kierkegaard's concept of venture, to become conscious of oneself, that causes anxiety. Actualization of the potential being is to create "the dizziness of freedom" and to create anxiety that eludes man's grasp. However, a normal anxiety evolves from man's attempt to act responsibly as a self. Neurotic anxiety occurs when man is unable to effect his individuation and is enclosed by a "shutupness" not within himself but from himself.[158]

In terms of these analyses there can be no doubt that Tillich has followed existentialist thought in his conceptualization of anxiety as man's awareness of his finitude. He has based his ontology on this very concept. Anxiety is for Tillich man's most fundamental psychic experience. It is the answer to the "fallenness" and "estrangement" of man from the ground of his being. Martin observes that "Tillich appeals particularly to psychoanalysis and depth psychology for support of his contention that anxiety, in the sense of awareness of finitude and threat of nonbeing, is a basic constituent of man's psychic being."[159] The insights of most depth psychological materials, especially those derived from religious literature, indicate the universal condition of man's awareness of the threat of his nonbeing, the threat of possible nothingness, and the meaning man has derived from the pen-ultimate eschatological event of death. Normal anxiety is analogous to being. Anxiety is awareness of existence, as Dasein, and confronts man in every encounter with his essential being.

### b. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT ABOUT ESTRANGEMENT

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of estrangement is evident in his description of the transition from the essential to the existential state of being. For him this was a universal quality of finite being despite the fact that "the whole description has a psychological-ethical character and is derived from the daily experiences of people under special cultural and social conditions."[160] The myth of the Fall carries within it the truth about man's self-actualization in his finite freedom, the tragic-universal character of existence. The act of self-actualization which estranges man from his essential being is within the universal destiny of existence. Tillich notes that "analytic psychology, as well as analytic sociology, has shown how destiny and freedom, tragedy and responsibility, are interwoven in every human being from early childhood on and in all social and political groups in the history of mankind."[161] The empirical data has emphasized that the concepts of "original sin" ought to include more of the moral and tragic elements of man's existential estrangement in their definition. Sin ought to grasp the deeper dimensions of the tragic element of universal destiny as well as the moral element of man's responsible decisions. This means that man must not be viewed in his existential estrangement dualistically, as innocent or guilty, but as a whole. Because of the holistic nature of man Tillich believes that first, there can be "no absolute discontinuity between animal bondage and human freedom," and second, one cannot determine when "in the development of the human responsibility begins and ends."

The element of destiny is clear in each act of human freedom. He goes on to point out:

> *Third*, we must refer to the present rediscovery of the unconscious and its determining power in man's conscious decisions. The way in which this happens has been described in past and present existentialist literature as well as in the psychoanalytic movements of our period. One of the most striking facts about the dynamics of the human personality is the intentional ignorance concerning one's real motives. The motives themselves are bodily and psychic strivings, often far removed from what appears as conscious reason in a centered decision. Such a decision is still free, but it is freedom within the limits of destiny. *Fourth*, the social dimension of unconscious strivings must be considered. The questionable term "collective unconscious" points to the reality of this dimension. The centered self is dependent not only on the influences of its social surroundings which are consciously given and received but also on those which are effective in a society without hope being apprehended and formulated. *All this shows that the independence within an individual decision is only half the truth*.[162] (Italics mine)

Estrangement is not the result of the fall from the essential state due to accident, but it is the result of man's decision in finite freedom. This decision is not a compulsive act over which man has no control, but it is a decisive expression of man's freedom, "the possibility of a total and centered act of the personality, an act in which all the drives and influences which constitute the destiny of man are brought into the centered unity of a decision."[163] It is a decision that is made in the depths of the whole man to be man, to actualize himself in his awareness of responsibility and guilt. Tillich moves beyond the traditional theological view that discusses creation and the fall as separate events from a historical perspective because "it is my assertion that the fulfillment of creation and the beginning of the fall are, though logically different, ontologically the same."[164] Man's creative and destructive acts are of a universal nature, for they are indigenous in the nature of man's finite freedom. Every act of man is an act of the whole man at any given time. The essential and the existential elements of man's being are dialectical, for both are subject to a _non passe non peccare_ and _passe peccare_. The depth dimension of estrangement moves beyond the historical perspective to view itself from the ontological whole in which the existential contradiction of the essential is a possibility rather than a necessity.[165] This emphasizes the fact that creation and the fall are but two dimensions of the depth dimension of man's condition as finite freedom. Reinhold Niebuhr, though acknowledging Tillich does justice to the historical dimension of man's existence, contends that "we experience ourselves as creatures with indeterminate possibilities of good and evil, possibilities of seeking our life at the expense of other life, and of finding our life by losing it; and these possibilities and perils always confront us as persons and wills within a particular context, quite above the level of ontological fate."[166] Tillich agrees with Niebuhr that the transition from the essential to the existential states of being is a humanly experienced act, that it has "the character of a leap and not of structural necessity," but would maintain that "existence cannot be derived from essence" because essence loses its created goodness as it becomes actualized in existence.[167] Man is estranged from his essential being and the marks of this estrangement are the manifestation of man's sin. The personal character of estrangement noted by Niebuhr is seen in Tillich's concept of sin which emphasizes man's personal responsibility for his estrangement as the result of the ontological nature of his being in finite freedom.

Tillich illustrates this problem in terms of the doctrine of concupiscence which he believes "can be supported by much material and deeper insights from existential literature, art, philosophy and psychology."[168] As examples he chooses Kierkegaard's analysis of the demonic aspects of Nero's use of unlimited power and Don Juan's erotic strivings which point out the inner emptiness and despair of their selves. He also cites Faust's unlimited striving for knowledge and the eventful pact with the devil to gain his desired end. The nature of these unlimited strivings for knowledge, sex, and power are symptoms of concupiscence, according to Tillich, as are Freud's "libido" and Nietzsche's "will to power". Tillich believes "both of these concepts have contributed immensely to the rediscovery of the Christian view of man's predicament" yet, both fail to grasp the essential-existential dialectic of man's being for they see only the existential condition of man. He comments particularly on Freud's libido:

> Libido in Freud is the unlimited desire of man to get rid of his biological, especially his sexual, tensions and to get pleasure from the discharge of these tensions. Freud has shown that libidinous elements are present in the highest spiritual experiences and activities of man, and, in doing so, he has rediscovered insights which can be found in the monastic traditions of self-scrutiny as they had been developed in early and medieval Christianity. Freud's emphasis on these elements, which cannot be separated from man's sexual instincts, is justified and agrees with the realism of the Christian interpretation of man's predicament.[169]

He stresses that Freud should not be rejected on the basis of a pseudo-Christian view of sexual taboos but rather be accepted for his characterization of concupiscence. However, Tillich warns that Freud's view is "adequate for man only in his existential predicament but not in his essential nature" and therefore is unacceptable to theology as an adequate conceptualization of concupiscence. Tillich makes this point clear.

> The endlessness of libido is a mark of man's estrangement. It contradicts his essential

> or created goodness. In man's essential relation to himself and to his world, libido is not concupiscence. It is not the infinite desire to draw the universe into one's particular existence, but it is an element of love united with the other qualities of love--_eros_, _philia_, and _agape_. Love does not exclude desire; it receives libido into itself. But the libido which is united with love is not infinite. It is directed, as all love is, toward a definite subject with whom it wants to unite the bearer of love. Love wants the other being, whether in the form of libido, _eros_, _philia_, or _agape_. Concupiscence, or distorted libido, wants one's own pleasure through the other being, but it does not want the other being. This is the contrast between libido as love and libido as concupiscence. Freud did not make this distinction because of his puritanical attitude toward sex. Only through repression and sublimation of libido can man become creative. In Freud's thought there is no creative _eros_ which includes sex.170

Freud failed to see in his depth analysis of the existential libidinal qualities the essential nature of libido that desires not the mere derivation of pleasure at the other's expense, but rather the expression of the desire to be united, at one, with the object of his libidinal cathexis. Estrangement is the result of concupiscent love even in the relationship with another. It is also conceivable that self-estrangement occurs within the same concupiscent structures.

A similar analogy appears in an analysis of Nietzsche's concept of power. Tillich observes that depth psychology has tended to interpret libido in terms of power rather than sex. For him, that interpretation is too literal. He believes that Nietzsche's "will to power" is "an ontological symbol for man's natural self-affirmation in so far as man has the power of being" and that this "will" is a universal quality of all existence.[171] In this sense, "will to power" possesses the quality of essential goodness and is symbolic of the dynamics of self-realization that characterizes finite freedom. Yet it possesses the negative aspect of human will, Tillich notes, because Nietzsche and Freud both follow Schopenhauer's view. Libido drives man to self-negation as a means of controlling the threats of the superego and, in the end, the denial of the id. Tillich does accept, however, Nietzsche's intention to overcome the demonic and tragic elements of libido by taking courage to incorporate the negativities of being into oneself.[172]

Harry Tiebout believes there is considerable similarity of thought between Freud and Tillich. The concept of sin manifests itself in estrangement in Tillich's thought and in neuroses in Freud's thinking. Tillich's concept of finite freedom is not unlike Freud's non-deterministic metaphysical understanding of responsibility in man's life for those conditions that provoke guilt. Tiebout is critical of Freud because "many of his descriptions of the relations between ego, superego, and id and of the operations of the instincts cannot possibly be reconciled with his biological assumptions but clearly require a concept of spirit or finite freedom or subjectivity."[173] Moreover, Tiebout claims that Tillich's concept of sin as the result of man's essential state of "dreaming innocence" is similar to Freud's "primary narcissism." He argues that the traumatic encounters with the reality of existence shatter man's essential state and provoke a sense of powerlessness, a condition of "oceanic feeling" that is unrealistic and immature and in which man remembers hauntingly his "dreaming innocence" or "limited narcissism."[174] In both analogies one can agree with Tiebout about the commonalities of the idea that "sin presupposes itself." Tillich sees, however, the possibility of a reunion of the self with the infinite whereas Freud holds to a stoic attitude of detachment and resignation much like the futility of reconciliation between Sartre's Pour soi and En soi. Neither is it unlike Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's positions that offer no hope of reconciliation. The estranged condition of man is viewed by Tillich in terms of both self-loss and world-loss because of the disruption and distortion of the ontological elements. Self-loss occurs for Freud in the fragmentation of the self into its component parts of ego, superego, and id. World-loss occurs because the pleasure principle does not provide satisfactory meaning in life. Therefore, in both Tillich and Freud, an emphasis is made of the meaningless suffering of man in his estranged condition.[175] Tiebout claims that his analyses of Tillich's and Freud's view of sin

> have shown Freud's psychological analysis reinforces at many points Tillich's analysis of estrangement. Perhaps they have also shown how Freud is a corrective to Tillich. In his insight into the manifestation of *hubris*, Freud, it seems to me, is clearly more Christian than Tillich. Tillich, particularly in *The Courage to Be*, but also in his other writings, does not give an adequate account of the concrete workings of *hubris*. He recognizes *hubris* on the ontological level, but often seems unable adequately to describe its psychological and moral manifestations. When he descends from the ontological plane, Tillich seems to abandon Christian psychology for that of Karen Horney. Freud's discerning analysis of the egoism, pride, and arrogance that underlie the facade of humility and self-depreciation seems more in the stream of Christian psychology.[176]

One must agree with Tiebout's criticism, for Tillich does not represent at this point traditional Christianity. One must also agree, as has Tillich on several occasions, that Freud has a rather good grasp of the existential nature of man's sinful condition. Tiebout's criticism of Tillich resembles Niebuhr's at this point. Yet, both refuse to acknowledge that Tillich does not necessarily disagree with them and their criticism; he rather accepts their point and goes beyond them to grasp the deeper dimensions of the problem of estrangement. Tillich is more concerned with understanding both the internal sources and external manifestations and with deriving the deeper meanings of what it means to be estranged from one's essential being under existential conditions. He believes that man's alienation from himself, from others, and from God is not the result of pathological conditions but rather ontological disparity of his given being as a universal fact of existence. Tillich holds that "sin is a universal fact before it becomes an individual act; or more precisely, sin as an individual act actualizes the universal fact of estrangement."[177] Sin is the condition of freedom as well as destiny, two elements that are interwoven and whose unity is felt by anyone who experiences the ambiguity of life. Tillich is very different from Freud. He sees that "the doctrine of the universality of estrangement does not make man's consciousness of guilt unreal; but it does liberate him from the unrealistic assumption that in every moment he has undetermined freedom to decide in whatever way he chooses--for good or bad, for God or against him."[178] Influenced by depth psychology, Tillich has sought to overcome the moralism of traditional Christianity and the rigidity imposed from guilt, and to see not only the relative but also the absolute in both sin and grace.[179]

Erich Fromm views the existential condition of estrangement as alienation, the result of man's necessity to actualize himself. He maintains

> that man, the more he gains freedom in the sense of emerging from the original oneness with man and nature and the more he becomes an 'individual', has no choice but to unite himself with the world in the spontaneity of love and productive work or else to seek a kind of security by such ties with the world as destroy his freedom and the integrity of his individual self.[180]

This view of man's predicament is based on his claim that there are fixed and unchangeable factors in man's nature, namely, the necessity to satisfy his psychological drives and to avoid isolation and moral aloneness. Individuation is an extension and eventual severance of the "primary ties" that evolve a dialectic between the "growth of self-strength" and the "growing aloneness". Therefore, one either submits to self-growth in his "freedom from" institutional determinism or sublimates himself in his "freedom from" his individuation. Fromm describes this dialectic process of growing human freedom:

> On the one hand it is a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings. On the other hand this growing individuation means growing isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt concerning one's role in the universe, the meaning of one's life, and with all that a growing feeling of one's powerlessness and insignificance as an individual.[181]

Tillich and Fromm share the view that alienation is a common consequence of man's participation and possesses both a negative and a positive aspect.[182] Fromm holds a moralistic view of the Fall contending that man's alienation is the result of his willful, conscious decision for self-actualization.[183] He claims that alienation can be overcome by love, for "_love is union_ with somebody or something, outside oneself, _under the condition of retaining separateness and integrity of one's own self_."[184] It is a love that espouses full acceptance of a person and allows him to transcend his individualized existence while at the same time bears actively the power of love. It is a love that unites man with man. Tillich does not share Fromm's utopian view of estrangement. He sees life as fragmentary and ambiguous, a union of both the creative and destructive elements.[185] In the depth dimension Tillich observes a distinction in the suffering of loneliness that is absent from Fromm's thought: it is an expression of man's finitude and a manifestation of man's estrangement. The "sane society" cannot overcome the loneliness that results from finitude because finite loneliness is a result of the structure of finitude that cannot be changed. Further, under the conditions of estrangement, claims Tillich, loneliness becomes a "structure of destruction". Tillich maintains:

> The destructive character of existential insecurity and doubt is manifest in the way man tries to escape despair. He tries

> to make absolute a finite security or a finite certainty. The threat of a breakdown leads to the establishment of defenses, some of which are brutal, some fanatical, some dishonest, and all insufficient and destructive; for there is no security and certainty within finitude.[186]

Fromm's concept of love assumes that "union" between men is more than potentiality--it is a real possibility in a sane society. Tillich claims, however, that union is possible in existential loneliness even though subject to meaningless suffering when man is rejected by man. It is no more than potential in essential solitude because the reunion of existential man with essential man under finite conditions is possible only under the terms of grace.[187] A distinction between Tillich's and Fromm's positions can be made by a question about the degree to which the existential structures of destruction are universally human or historically conditioned. Tillich contends that the historical manifestations of the destructive structures are present because of the universal structure of finitude. The condition of estrangement is "a quality of the structure of existence; the way in which estrangement is predominantly manifest is a matter of history."[188] In other words, the structures of destruction in history are only possible because the structures of finitude are capable of being transformed into structures of estrangement. Tillich's analysis of the contemporary human predicament in a technological society is not unlike Fromm's analysis. Tillich notes "there are many sociological and existential analyses of man in industrial society which point to self-loss and world-loss, to mechanization and objectification, to loneliness and surrender to the collective, to the experience of emptiness and meaninglessness."[189] But then he diverges from Fromm to point out a deeper dimension of estrangement:

> These analyses are true as far as they go, but they are fallacious if in our period of history they derive the evil of man's predicament from the structure of industrial society. Such a derivation implies the belief that changes in the structure of our society would, as such, change man's existential predicament. *All utopianism has this character; its main mistake is in not distinguishing man's existential situation from its manifestation in different historical periods*. These are structures of distinction in all periods, and they provide many analogies with the particular structures of our period. *Man's estrangement from his essential being is the universal character of existence. It is inexhaustibly productive of particular evils in every period*.[190] (Italics mine.)

This is a distinction that is not emphasized in Hammond's comparative analysis of the estrangement in Tillich and Fromm. As noted earlier, Hammond believes that Tillich elevates an existential concept of estrangement to a theological idea by introducing the ontological essential perspective. This is perhaps *an evaluation in depth* which corrects both the radical and the utopian existential view of estrangement.

The condition of estrangement is measured by despair. It is more than a psychological or ethical problem for Tillich: "it is the final index of man's predicament; it is the boundary line beyond which man cannot go. In despair, not in death, man has come to the end of his possibilities."[191] It does not have a utopian hope because it is beyond the possibility of healing, as Kierkegaard claimed in Sickness unto Death and as Paul wrote in his Letters and Epistles. Neither is it a radical resignation to futility. Tillich claims that "despair is the state of inescapable conflict. It is conflict, on the one hand, between what one potentially is and therefore ought to be, and, on the other hand, what one actually is in the combination of freedom and destiny."[192] It is a condition in which man finds himself and in which he is unable to do anything about. He can only accept the element of grace that is able to make his ambiguous life unambiguous. He knows he is responsible for perpetrating his condition and that there is nothing he can do about it. Despair is the condition in which man most completely encounters estrangement. The depth dimension of the problem of estrangement is manifest in the concept of despair.

## c. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT ABOUT AMBIGUITY

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of ambiguity reveals the lucidity of man's awareness of the potential for both the greatness and the tragedy of his life that is possible in self-transcendence. Beneath the subject-object proclivity of existence, Tillich grasps the significance of man's yearning for the unambiguous life. Despite the anxiety that is aroused in his state of estrangement and that is manifest amidst the profanization of his existence, man is still able to encounter the holiness of his being, its essential greatness mixed ambiguously with essential tragedy. Man's cognizance of the dimension of the spirit in his life, the place in which the spirit encounters the Spirit and evokes ambiguous feelings, is possible because of the psychological dimensions of his being--the dimension of inner awareness. Life is ambiguous because the essential and the existential elements of being are united in the dimension of the spirit by psychological cognitive acts.

Tillich understands that the problem of ambiguity focuses upon man's awareness of the multidimensional aspects of his life and in particular upon the relationship between the dimension of the spirit and the psychological dimension. Furthermore, he claims ambiguity is not overcome until the psychological is dominated by the spiritual. The doctrine of belief that claims God added the "immortal soul" or "spirit" to the body of man at some point in the evolutionary process is rejected by Tillich. He understands the evolution of the spirit as a creative act in the individuation of man when the dimension of the spirit dominates the psychological dimension. The supranaturalistic view of man "disrupts the multidimensional unity of life, especially the unity of the psychological and the spirit, thus making the dynamics of the human personality completely incomprehensible."[193] Tillich has been influenced by the scientific understanding of man and especially by the holistic emphases of depth psychology and existential philosophy. That is why he firmly contends that the spirit "arises" out of a constellation of psychological factors, specifically that "every act of the spirit presupposes given psychological materials and, at the same time, constitutes a leap which is possible only for a totally centered self, that is to say, one that is free."[194] It is a leap characterized by a deliberate and decisive act to actualize the potentiality of being, in essence, an act of self-transcendence. The interrelationship of the spirit to psychological material can be illustrated in both cognitive and moral acts. Two rather long quotations will be cited from Tillich to illustrate the logic of his thought about the intricate multidimensional interrelationships between the dimensions of the psychological and the spirit and the processes by which they effect a united act of the whole person. Of the cognitive act, Tillich notes:

> Every thought aiming at knowledge is based on sense impressions and conscious and unconscious scientific traditions and experiences, and conscious and unconscious authorities, besides volitional and emotional elements which are always present. Without this material, thinking would have no content. But in order to transform this material into knowledge, something must be done to it; it must be split, reduced, increased, and corrected according to logical, and purged according to the methodological, criteria. *All this is done by the personal center which is not identical with any particular one of these elements.* The transcendence of the center over the psychological material makes the cognitive act possible, and such an act is a manifestation of spirit. *We said that the personal center is not identical with any one of the psychological contents, but neither is it another element added to them;* if it were this, it would be psychological material itself and not the bearer of the spirit. *Nor is the personal center strange to the psychological material. It is their psychological center, but transformed into the dimension of the spirit.* The psychological center, the subject of self-awareness, moves in the realm of higher animal life as a balanced whole, organically or spontaneously (but not mechanically) dependent on the total situation. *If the dimension of the spirit dominates the life process, the psychological center offers its own contents to the unity of the personal center.* This happens through deliberation and decision. In doing so it actualizes its own potentialities, but in actualizing its own potentialities, it transcends itself. This phenomenon can be experienced in every cognitive act.[195] (Italics mine.)

It is important to observe that the same multidimensional interrelationships of the psychological and the spirit are present also in the moral act. Tillich claims:

> Here, also, a large amount of material is present in the psychological center--drives, inclinations, decisions, more or less compulsory trends, moral experiences, ethical traditions and authorities, relations to other persons, social conditions. *But the moral act is not the diagonal in which all these vectors limit each other and converge; it is the centered self which actualizes itself on a personal self by distinguishing, separating, rejecting, preferring, connecting, and in doing so, transcending its elements.* The act, or more exactly the whole complex of acts, in which this happens has the character of freedom, not freedom in the bad sense of the indeterminancy of an act of the will, but freedom in the sense of a total reaction of a centered self which deliberates and decides. Such freedom is united with destiny in such a way that the psychological material which enters into the moral act represents the pole of destiny, while the deliberating and deciding self represents the pole of freedom, according to the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny.196 (Italics mine.)

It is quite obvious that Tillich refutes dualism and monism in the description of these two acts. In the case of dualism, Tillich does not attribute any distinctive separateness of the psychological or the spirit but rather stresses they are dimensions of a single being. Tillich has learned this from the psychological structure of the interrelationship of the conscious and the unconscious materials. In the case of monism, he does not allow one dimension to obscure the other because it is not in the

nature of either to incorporate the other.
observed this in the pathological symptoms that
when one or the other component of the psyche
not only dominate but also incorporate the other
power and desire. Tillich maintains that "the
multidimensional unity denies dualism as well as
logistic (or biologistic) monism."[191] The two
relate to each other in the potentiality of

The psychological center of man is
the dimension of the spirit for Tillich. This
similar to Jung's concept of the Self in many
functional analysis, Jung's Self is the result
"depotentated" psychic energy that has been
the Anima is raised to consciousness in the
process. This "mass" or "complex" of libido
off from the unconscious in this process does
itself to consciousness; it becomes an
nent of the psyche. Progoff interprets Jung in

> The psychic energy which formerly belonged
> the Anima comes to rest in a twilight zone
> where it performs a unique function: it
> as a bridge between conscious and
> divisions of the psyche. It becomes the
> of meeting where the opposites of the
> may be integrated into a unified
> It becomes the point on which the psyche
> balances itself and through which a
> equilibrium may henceforth be maintained.

The self as an independent component of the

It is important to observe that the same multidimensional interrelationships of the psychological and the spirit are present also in the moral act. Tillich claims:

> Here, also, a large amount of material is present in the psychological center--drives, inclinations, decisions, more or less compulsory trends, moral experiences, ethical traditions and authorities, relations to other persons, social conditions. *But the moral act is not the diagonal in which all these vectors limit each other and converge; it is the centered self which actualizes itself on a personal self by distinguishing, separating, rejecting, preferring, connecting, and in doing so, transcending its elements.* The act, or more exactly the whole complex of acts, in which this happens has the character of freedom, not freedom in the bad sense of the indeterminancy of an act of the will, but freedom in the sense of a total reaction of a centered self which deliberates and decides. Such freedom is united with destiny in such a way that the psychological material which enters into the moral act represents the pole of destiny, while the deliberating and deciding self represents the pole of freedom, according to the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny.196 (Italics mine.)

It is quite obvious that Tillich refutes dualism and monism in the description of these two acts. In the case of dualism, Tillich does not attribute any distinctive separateness of the psychological or the spirit but rather stresses they are dimensions of a single being. Tillich has learned this from the psychological structure of the interrelationship of the conscious and the unconscious materials. In the case of monism, he does not allow one dimension to obscure the other because it is not in the nature of either to incorporate the other. Tillich has observed this in the pathological symptoms that have occured when one or the other component of the psyche has tried to not only dominate but also incorporate the other under its power and desire. Tillich maintains that "the principle of multidimensional unity denies dualism as well as psychologistic (or biologistic) monism."[197] The two dimensions relate to each other in the potentiality of transcendence.

The psychological center of man is transformed into the dimension of the spirit for Tillich. This is very similar to Jung's concept of the Self in many ways. In a functional analysis, Jung's Self is the result of the "depotentated" psychic energy that has been released when the Anima is raised to consciousness in the individuation process. This "mass" or "complex" of libido that is split off from the unconscious in this process does not attach itself to consciousness; it becomes an independent component of the psyche. Progoff interprets Jung in saying:

> The psychic energy which formerly belonged to the Anima comes to rest in a twilight zone where it performs a unique function: it acts as a bridge between conscious and unconscious divisions of the psyche. It becomes the point of meeting where the opposites of the psyche may be integrated into a unified personality. It becomes the point on which the psyche balances itself and through which a constant equilibrium may henceforth be maintained.[198]

The self as an independent component of the psyche is like

Tillich's "personal center" that has no identity with any of the elements of the psychological dimensions. Tillich stresses that the Self "must not be misunderstood as an object, the existence of which could be discussed, or as a part of a living being, but rather as the point to which all contents of awareness are related, in so far as 'I' am aware of them."[199] In Jung the Self plays a "compensatory" role of relating the divergent elements of the psyche and equalizing any source of power one might have over the other. In this respect the Self is "our life's goal, for it is the completest expression of that fateful combinations we call individuality."[200] The task of the Self is one of "transformation of the personality through the merging and binding together of the noble and base elements, the conscious and the unconscious," or in psychological terms, a "Unifying Function of the psyche by which the conflict of opposites is transcended and the Self emerges as the centerpoint of a new harmony."[201] The term "unifying function" is sometimes translated as "transcendent function," Progoff notes. In Jung's later work the translation "transcendent" is more appropriate than "unifying", for the Self does not integrate the conscious and the unconscious; it rather transforms their energies in "compensatory" forms of expression. The Self enables the archetypal imagery to transcend consciousness and "to form a clear picture of what we are as a self."[202] As Dry observes, it is difficult to determine whether the Self is "unveiled" or "created" in Jung's thought.[203] But the terms generally point to the "unifying" and the "transcendent" functions, respectively. Tillich's view of the psychological dimension does not hold as distinctive a point of view as Jung's. He says "it is difficult to discuss the psychological realm and the functions of life within because of the fact that man ordinarily experiences the dimension of self-awareness in unity with the dimension of the spirit. The psychological and the personal self are united in him."[204] The Self in this sense is more "unifying" than "transcending". Only when Tillich begins to speak of the possibility of the unambiguous life does his concept of transcendence begin to differentiate the elements of the psychological dimension from the center or personal self. Neither Tillich nor Jung is particularly clear about the nature of the Self as function. The Self has organizational and directive or guiding qualities in relationship to the psyche, but there is no clarity of description as to what this basic relationship is that enables the self to relate to the psyche, nor is there clarity on how this relationship functions. It is clear, however, that the two men share the same ideas in the broadest sense of the term Self.

The term "transcendent" is particularly relevant to a conceptual analysis of the Self because it points out the indefinable and incomprehensible nature of the Self. As Jung observes, "the ego is the only content of the self that we do know. The individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and superordinate subject."[205] At best, the Self is known only in the symbolic imagery that is released from the unconscious and that is "representative" of the a priori form of the archetypal image of the Self.[206] Neither reveals the significance of the Self. Jung says:

> Intellectually the self is no more than a psychological concept, a construct that serves to express an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our power of comprehension. It might especially be called the "God within us". The beginnings of our whole psychic life seems to be inextricably rooted in this point, and all our highest and ultimate purposes seem to be striving toward it.[207]

This is most like Tillich's concept of "ultimate concern" which is the source of meaning in life that overcomes the ambiguities of the multidimensional nature of man's existential predicament. All of Jung's alchemical studies point towards this same conceptualization: the Self is "shrouded in 'metaphysical' darkness . . . it is a veritable *lapis invisibilitatis*."[208] This concept is very similar in content to Kant's *Ding an sich* and as such possesses a numinous quality. It has a conscious-transcending, *phoenix-like* quality. Yet the Self is the center of man, in the unconscious, in the "quid" which is unrecognizable.[209] Conceptually, however, Jung and Tillich share a common view of the Self and the psychological center in which the Self as the center of being is transformed into the dimension of the spirit and there dominates the life process. As Jung speaks about the Self as the "God within us" which transcends the conscious and the unconscious to give a teleological direction to the individuation of man, Tillich speaks about the psychological center which transcends the psychological elements that comprise it to give man a personal center in the dimension of the spirit. In both cases the center of the life process, in its transcendent position, is free of the elements that comprise it, yet the center is united with the destiny that is indigenous in its very being. In both cases there is a multidimensional unity which denies a dualistic or a monistic conceptualization. Jung's individualized Self is not unlike Tillich's unambiguous life. There is an immanent factor in each.

The central and deeper problems of ambiguity in life reside for Tillich in man's existential situation. He says that

> the act in which man actualizes his essential centeredness is the moral act. Morality is the function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being. Morality is the constitutive function of spirit. A moral act,

> therefore, is not an act in which some divine or human law is obeyed but an act in which life integrates itself in the dimension of spirit, and this means as personality within a community. Morality is the function of life in which the centered self constitutes itself as a person; it is the totality of those acts in which a potentially personal life process becomes an actual person.210

But it is precisely in this act that life becomes ambiguous, for man is free in the power of transcendence to respond to the essential structures of his existence. His libidinous motives in estrangement are concupiscent in nature, for he desires to actualize the full potentiality of his essential being. Theoretically, this is a possibility with only one exception: no one can destroy or assimilate the self of another person. This encounter with the unassimilative other self is what shapes one's self. But there is a problem at this point, for the self resists the concupiscent libidinous motives of man. He has encountered a resistance to his libidinal desires that restrain the sense of "oughtness" that emerges from his essential being. The structure of compulsion is present in all of the ontological polarities of the three functions of life in both dimensions of the psychological and the spirit. The unconscious motives of man strive for their expression over-against the restraining forces of consciousness, making life ambiguous. Life only begins to approach the unambiguous state when the self is able to transcend itself and become the Self that is able to integrate these alternate compulsions. Man must suffer the compromise between his essential and existential nature of being. It is a choice seemingly between pain and pleasure, life and death. This is the choice that Freud saw. Man was trapped in the ambiguities of these polar motives. And Tillich saw even more deeply a further ambiguity in each: i.e., pain in pleasure and pleasure in pain as in struggle and sex in the self-production of life.[211] Tillich claims that "the pain-pleasure principle is valid only in sick, uncentered, and therefore unfree and uncreative life."[212] He does agree with Freud's doctrine of Todestrieb because he believes man's self-awareness encounters this ambiguity of life, not because of the pain felt in living but rather because "it is the existential awareness of one's finitude which poses the question of whether the continuation of finite existence is worth the burden of it."[213] The death instinct makes unambiguous what tends to be universally ambiguous and reinforces man's self-affirmation of life. It is the condition of existential estrangement that provokes this ambiguous state of being.

Existential ambiguity can be depicted further in terms of man's striving for self-determination in order to overcome the ambiguity of identity and nonidentity. Tillich suggests:

> The determining subject can determine only in the power of what it essentially is. But under the conditions of existential estrangement, it is separated from what it essentially is. Therefore, self-determination into fulfilled humanity is impossible; nevertheless, it is necessary, because a self determined completely from outside would cease to be a self--it would become a thing. This is the "ambiguity of self-determination," the dignity and the despair of every responsible personality ("responsible" in the sense of responding to the "silent voice" of one's essential being.)[214]

This impossible but necessary task of self-creation is the central and most significant aspect of Carl Jung's life and work. Even the most cursory glance at his autobiography would indicate this central theme. A closer reading would reveal the struggle of Jung to make contact with the "silent voice" of his essential being. Jung reveals that "only what is interior has proved to have substance and a determining value," and these inner experiences "form the prima materia of my scientific work. They were the fiery magma out of which the stone that had to be worked was crystalized."[216] The most revealing search Jung made is seen in his admission that "my life is a story of the self-actualization of the unconscious."[217] This is evident in every aspect of his life and work, from his professional practice to his home in Bollingen, from his personal life to his public writing. It may not be too presumptuous to suggest that Jung's life and thought represent perhaps one of the most sensitive expressions of life dedicated to the actualization of the potentiality of being. This is not to say it was not ambiguous, for there was a constant flow of dialectical events in his life, even to the last moments. But there were many moments in which the prima materia of his inner life revealed the unambiguous and sustained self-affirmation in potential moments of self-destruction. The most central theme of his life's work, individuation, is the description of the evolutionary and evocative process of the self-actualization of the potentiality of being. He observed that "the years I was pursuing my inner images were the most important in my life--in them everything essential was decided."[218] Jung's life is illustrative of the dignity and the despair of every responsible personality" that Tillich discloses in his analysis of the ambiguity of self-determination. It is illustrative of what man can do when he breaks through the subject-object schema that has sustained the ambiguous structure of existence. Tillich stresses this point in observing:

> The most conspicuous example today is psychoanalytic practice and its ambiguities. One of the great achievements of psychoanalytic theory is its insights into the depersonalizing consequences of the phenomenon of transference, not only on the patient, but also on the analyst, and into the attempts to overcome this situation by methods finally removing the transference in the healing process.219

The ambiguity of communal participation, both cognitive and emotional, is, claims Tillich, "responsible for the inexhaustible creative-destructive situation in the relation of person to person."[220] This might also be so in the ego-Self relationship. The ambiguity of life is as deep as the existential estrangement from the essential potentiality of being. Tillich observes this in the classical conception of the hero and his seemingly inevitable tragedy:

> If one asks what the guilt of the tragic hero is, the answer must be that he perverts the function of self-transcendence by identifying himself with that to which self-transcendence is directed--the great itself. He does not resist self-transcendence, but he resists the demand to transcend his own greatness. He is caught by his own power of representing the self-transcendence of life.221

Life is ambiguous because man's estrangement from his essential being is exposed by his possibility of self-transcendence. In his finite freedom man refuses to accept the destiny that gives form to his dynamics, and he refuses to participate in life beyond his individualization. Tillich has gained this depth dimension of the problem of ambiguity not only in self-awareness but in the structures of existence so well defined by the rich resources and insights of depth psychology.

## C. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF MEANING

The depth dimension of Tillich's thought about the problem of meaning in history hinges on the Protestant principle which has coerced man to reflect upon his place in the historical dimension of his existential situation. The Protestant principle has enabled Tillich to grasp the historical consciousness of mankind as it is manifest in the events within the ontological categories of being. It has revealed to him the "vocational consciousness" of the history-bearing groups that provides both the aim toward which men strive and the sense of destiny they try to fulfill. In the psychological dimension man is aware of his existence "beside-each-other-ness" and his participation "after-each-other-ness." In the dimension of the spirit man is sensitive to a qualitative character of his participation in the historical dimension and the significance of his creative potential for his existence. When the dimension of the spirit dominates the psychological, man in his self-transcendence is concerned with the meaning of his existence. He senses the necessity and the contingency of the trends, structures, and the periods of history in which mankind has participated and the potentiality and possibility of the ambiguities in the polaric elements of the functions of life. Tillich observes that "life strives toward self-integration and may disintegrate in every history-creating act" because "life transcends itself and may fall into profanity when it runs toward the ultimately new and transcendent."[222] The historical consciousness of mankind, because of its existential estrangement, is subject to the ambiguities of existence and, in turn, the anxiety which they provoke, all because of man's inability to cognitively grasp the essential meaning of his human existence.

The Protestant principle opens up the deeper dimensions of historical consciousness for Tillich through the concepts of theonomy, *kairos*, and the demonic. In theonomy he has grasped the ultimate meaning of existence that is manifest in all the finite forms of thought and action. Much of Tillich's work has been dedicated to a theonomous interpretation of culture. It has been based on the principle that "religion as ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself. In abbreviation: religion is the substance of culture, and culture is the form of religion."[223] John Dillenberger makes this fundamental assumption clear.

> It is important that we not misunderstand what Tillich meant by religion. It is not religion in general, nor the concrete religion of mankind. It refers rather to *the dimension of depth or ultimacy which informs the heart of a culture*. Religion is ultimate concern; that is, it is that which is the ultimate meaning in the culture. It is the abstract translation of Luther's dictum that where one's heart

> is, there is one's God, or the biblical phrase. "For where your treasure is, there will be your heart also" (Matt. 6:21).224 (Italics mine.)

He also stresses the importance for understanding that "religion is the substance of culture, for it stands for that meaning which forms and gives structure to the culture," and that "culture is therefore not an end in itself, but the expression of the dynamics of meaning and apprehension."[225] Tillich was concerned about this theonomous position because he believed history was now at the end of an autonomous period that had existed since the Enlightenment. It seemed to him that man could no longer live out of himself nor could he find meaning in life from the absolute forms of heterodoxies. The fulfillment of human dignity and creativity is dependent upon a theonomy where, in Dillenberger's words,

> the *theos* or ultimate religious meaning is freely and naturally accepted and gives spontaneous and creative forms to the culture. It is where the self is seen under God without arbitrariness or imposed authority. But it is also where the self does not live out of itself, but out of the transcendent source of meaning.226

A theonomy was necessary to overcome the dehumanization of man that was taking place in contemporary society. Tillich maintains that "the Protestant principle as derived from the doctrine of justification through faith rejects heteronomy . . . as well as a self-complacent autonomy. . . .

It demands a self-transcending autonomy, or theonomy."[227] The problem of meaning points to the need for a theonomous message that can integrate the ambiguous awareness of the existential predicament.

The *kairos* was a significant theme in Tillich's philosophical theology because it gave form to the dynamic idea he had discovered in his theonomous perspective of the Protestant principle. The *kairos* provided a means of grasping the depth dimension of the historical situation in the various *heirophanous* events that occured in the periodizations of history. Tillich believes that the Protestant principle demands a methodology for interpreting history in which "the critical transcendence of the divine over against conservatism and utopianism is strongly expressed and in which, at the same time, the creative omnipresence of the divine in the course of history is concretely indicated."[228] In this way historical absolutism as well as progressive utopianism is cast into a dynamic historical consciousness. It is a way of thinking about "a consciousness of history whose roots reach down into the depth of the unconditional, whose conceptions are created from the primordal concerns of the human spirit, and whose ethos is an inescapable responsibility for the present movement in history."[229] The *kairos* provides this depth dimension of the meaning of history by touching the depth of the *unconditional quality* which is experienced in reality. The unconditional, as quality and not being, is not identified with any given reality, for that reality would be nothing more than an idol. Here Barth and Tillich agree that no finite reality can ever be absolute. Everything is a "Yes" and a "No" in the unconditional because history experiences a permanent crisis of judgment and separation. But from a dialectical type of historical criticism, a relative approach including the theological, logical, and sociological forms may derive a positive valuation of any period in history. The dialectical interpretation enables Tillich to grasp the meaning or eternal significance of each, independently or in relation to all other periods.[230] The ambiguity of this approach demands the surrender of the conditioned to the unconditional. Tillich says:

> The relation of the conditioned to the unconditional, in individual as well as in social life, is either an openness of the conditioned to the dynamic presence of the unconditional or a seclusion of the conditioned within itself. The finite life is either turned toward the infinite or turned away from it towards itself. *Where there is an acceptance of the eternal manifesting itself in a special moment of history, in a kairos,* there is openness to the unconditional.[231] (Italics mine.)

It is this possibility of openness to the unconditional that provides a depth dimension to the meaning of history, even in its dialectical and ambiguous forms. In the openness to the unconditional, man is able to grasp the meaning of the presence of the unconditional that permeates and guides culture through the mythical forms in religion. Tillich claims that

> religion is the life-blood, the inner power, the ultimate meaning of all life. The "sacred" or the "holy" inflames, imbues, inspires, all reality and all aspects of existence. There is no profane nature or history, no profane ego, and no profane world. All history is sacred history, everything that happens bears a mythical character; nature and history are not separated.[232]

Man is capable of grasping the meaning of history to the degree that he can interpret the theonomous forms of his existence as they are manifest in myth and cult. The meaning of history is lost to the heteronomous and the autonomous perspective, for preclusive forms rule out the manifestation of the unconditional. This is especially true of the autonomous position. But as Tillich notes, in several references to periods in the history of Christianity, there are *kairoi* in which "the eternal breaks into the temporal, shaking and transforming it and creating a crisis in the depth of human existence."[233] Tillich procedes to stress that

> *the consciousness of the kairos is dependent on one's being inwardly grasped by the fate and destiny of the time*. It can be found in the passionate longing of the masses; it can become clarified and take form in small circles of conscious intellectual and

> spiritual concern; it can gain power in the prophetic word; but it cannot be demonstrated and forced; it is deed and freedom, as it is also fate and grace.234 (Italics mine.)

Meaning in life is dependent upon man's awareness of the encounter with the unconditional in the *kairoi* which manifest the theonomous consciousness that is present in the existential situation of his life.

The third decisive concept for determining the depth dimension of the problem of meaning in history is "the demonic." Since the Enlightenement, demonic has been relegated to the realm of superstitution and thereby disregarded, or it has been characterized in its traditional form depicting the "structures of evil." Depth psychology, however, has pointed out the underlying destructive mechanisms in the unconscious that effect both personal as well as social thought and action on the conscious level of life, and theology has sensed the need for understanding this influence. The meaning of history is dependent upon the depth dimension that the demonic brings to it. Tillich cites that

> C. G. Jung has called the history of Protestantism a history of continuous "iconoclasm" ("the destruction of pictures," that is, of religious symbols) and, consequently, the separation of our consciousness from the universally human "archetypes" that are present in the subconscious of everybody. He is right. Protestants often confuse essential symbols with

> accidental signs. They often are unaware of the numinous powers inherent in genuine symbols, words, acts, persons, things. They have replaced the great wealth of symbols appearing in the Christian tradition by rational concepts, moral laws, and subjective emotions.[235]

If the meaning of the symbols of the unconditional is lost to man in the depths of his unconscious, and isolated there by his defensive mechanisms out of fear for what they might reveal to him about his arbitrarily formed conscious decisions about life, then it is clear that the problem of meaning in history is characterized by iconoclastic principles of false hope in the face of reality. Man can function only briefly on the basis of a superficial analysis of history that holds up autonomously and heteronomously determined values. Tillich has learned from depth psychology that the demonic cannot be repressed very long before it explodes into consciousness with its disruptive demands for recognition. He admits that "the rediscovery of the unconscious in medical psychology and the insight into the unconscious drives of the mass psyche gave me the key to this problem of the Protestant cultus."[236] The unconscious revealed the demonic and its influence upon man in his search for the meaning in history.

## 1. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT ABOUT MEANING

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of meaning is evident in his analysis of the demonic forces. This analysis illuminates the unconscious and shows demonry to be "the form-destroying eruption of the creative basis of things.[237] The concept of the demonic gives form to the creative-destructive forces that lie in the depths of the human psyche and that seek expression in human personality and social mores. Tillich claims "the demonic comes to fulfillment in personality, and personality is the most prominent object of demonic destruction, for personality is the bearer of form in its totality and unconditional character."[238] The demonic seeks to cleave the personality and separate the ambiguous forms in order to gain control over man. The demonic appears as the hero who has gained creative expression for the libidinous energies that have been repressed. Tillich maintains that "the possessed state and the state of grace correspond; the states of being demoniacally and divinely overcome, inspired, and broken through, are correlatives."[239] The creative forces of both break out of their autonomous, isolated confines of the unconscious into consciousness carrying with them new materials that form the dialectical and ambiguous meaning of life in the historical context. The ecstatic nature of these new materials is not comprehensible because they emerge in symbolic form. Demonry is as different from grace as it is similar. In the state of grace these forces are united with the unconditional; in the grasp of the demonic they are bound to the conditioned state of being. Tillich distinguishes between grace and demonry noting that

> grace has a fulfilling and form-creating effect on the bearer of the form, while demonry has the consequence of destroying the personality through robbing it of being and emptying it of meaning. Divine ecstasy brings about an elevation of the being, of creative and formative power; the demonic ecstasy brings about weakening of being, disintegration and decay. Demonic inspiration does indeed reveal more than rational sobriety; it reveals the divine, but as a reality which it fears, which it cannot love, with which it cannot unite. The relationship of divine and demonic ecstasy is the explanation of why in religious history the state of grace could so often change into a possessed state and why the moralistic attitude in religion denies both alike.240

The demonic has not always been credited with the possibility of revealing the divine as it breaks into the center of one's personality; rather, it has been understood as a form of an attack upon the divine. The real interest of the demonic is to divide, to separate the sacred from the profane, to set them at war with each other, and in that way consume them according to its own intent. This purpose has not always been clear because of the dualistic perspective that has put the demonic and the divine in opposite and antagonistic camps. The demonic rules not by oppression but by division so that consciousness is driven to absolute forms for security. Consciousness then loses touch with problem of meaning is evident in his analysis of the demonic forces. This analysis illuminates the unconscious and shows demonry to be "the form-destroying eruption of the creative basis of things."[237] The concept of the demonic gives form to the creative-destructive forces that lie in the depths of the human psyche and that seek expression in human personality and social mores. Tillich claims "the demonic comes to fulfillment in personality, and personality is the most prominent object of demonic destruction, for personality is the bearer of form in its totality and unconditional character."[238] The demonic seeks to cleave the personality and separate the ambiguous forms in order to gain control over man. The demonic appears as the hero who has gained creative expression for the libidinous energies that have been repressed. Tillich maintains that "the possessed state and the state of grace correspond; the states of being demonically and divinely overcome, inspired, and broken through, are correlatives."[239] The creative forces of both break out of their autonomous, isolated confines of the unconscious into consciousness carrying with them new materials that form the dialectical and ambiguous meaning of life in the historical context. The ecstatic nature of these new materials is not comprehensible because they emerge in symbolic form. Demonry is as different from grace as it is similar. In the state of grace these forces are united with the unconditional; in the grasp of the demonic they are bound to the conditioned state of being. Tillich distinguishes between grace and demonry noting that

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> This is only one certainty, that the demonic is overcome in eternity, that in eternity the demonic is depth of the divine and in unity with divine clarity. Only in view of the eternal may one speak of overcoming the demonic, not in the view of any time, a past or future. But that we can regard the eternal in this way, that we need not grant the demon the same right as the divine and therewith the higher, the only right, that we need not, in the face of the world, grant the ultimate victory to the negation, to the abyss, to meaninglessness--that and that alone is the salvation in finite time, which again and again becomes reality; that is the fundamental destruction of demonic dominance over the world.242

Demonry is overcome only by divinity, possession is overcome only by grace, and this overcoming is possible only in the reunion of the demonic forces in the courage to be, in the affirming of them as a part of essential being. Tillich observes that "in depth psychology there is frequently more awareness of the meaning of grace and, consequently, more effective 'care of souls' than in the ministry of the church."[243] Depth psychology has not agreed that life is governed by "pure consciousness," as has the church and, for the most part, secular culture as a whole since the Enlightenment. The resources and insights of depth psychology have amply demonstrated for Tillich that the unconscious has an uncanny influence upon man's rational existence. He holds:

> Unconscious psychic forces continuously break into our conscious center and direct it just

> when we believe ourselves to be completely free. The dark ground of prepersonal being, which contains elements of the universal process of life as well as the life-process of the individual, is effective in every moment of our conscious existence. Whether it is repressed or not, it is real and powerful, and its manifestations show the limits of personal freedom. One of these manifestations is the stage that is called "possession," in which the personal center is "split" (the original sense of "schizophrenia") or, more exactly, the consciousness is conquered by a "destructive structure" originating in the "dark ground" of the personality--the unconscious.244

Tillich points out that the unconscious powers of the demonic which can invade and conquer the personal center are overcome by elevating the creative power of the ground of being, which also has demonic forces as a part of its nature, through grace, into a meaningful experience in life and history.

Tillich does not believe that a conscious autonomy can be created that will exclude the demonic from conscious interference and overcome its influence as Freud proposed in his psychoanalytic process. The unconscious cannot be overpowered by consciousness, nor can it be directed along consciously predetermined lines. The unconscious powers will not be repressed because the repression process only increases their forces. The Freudian process establishes only a new and false center, which partially and for the present subdues the unconscious that is divorced from the divine, the creative resources of the unconditional residing in the very depths of one's being. Man must not fear all that issues forth from his unconscious just because it is not rational. He must be cognizant of the conscience-callings of the depth of his being that acquaint him with the call to actualize himself, to take upon himself the reality of his unconscious as well as his consciousness. Man must in good conscience realize, as Heidegger does, that "the call to conscience has the character of the demand that man in his finitude actualize his genuine potentialities, and this means an appeal to become guilty."[245] In its "mode of silence" says Tillich, "the good, transmoral conscience consists in the acceptance of the bad, moral conscience."[246] Man must incorporate all of the potentialities of his being into his personal center if he is to maintain his touch with the creativity of the psychic forces and the dimension of the spirit that is known through them. The idea of the transmoral conscience is Tillich's central claim to overcoming the demonic and for grasping the meaning of history. If this idea were to be found faulty, claims Tillich,

> religion as well as analytic psychology would have to be dismissed also; for in both of them the moral conscience is transcendent--in religion by the acceptance of the divine grace which breaks through the realm of law and creates a joyous conscience; in depth psychology by the acceptance of one's own conflicts when looking at them and suffering under their ugliness without an attempt to

> suppress them and to hide them from one's self. Indeed, it is impossible _not_ to transcend the moral conscience because it is impossible to unite a _sensitive_ and a _good_ conscience.247

Man must not be afraid to acknowledge, to encounter, and to incorporate that which seems to represent the evil aspects of his being. In his transcendent powers he will be able to unite these "dark forces" with the depth of his ground of being and through their creative powers achieve a sense of unity with himself and find meaning in history. The problem of meaning in history comes with the individuation of man, with the acceptance of the divisive forces of the unconscious as they play upon consciousness in the whole of man's existence. This is why the theonomous interpretation of the _kairoi_ that are manifest by the demonic provides an understanding to the problem of meaning in history and, therefore, a partial answer for Tillich.

Tillich's analysis of the problem of meaning, in life and in history, has emphasized the importance of understanding the manifestation of the unconditional in the depth dimension of human experience. He maintains that "historical interpretation is self-reflection on the part of one who is acting historically about the meaning, the purpose, and the presuppositions of historical action."[248] The problem of meaning, then, is basically "_self_-interpretation," a process of perceiving the spiritual presuppositions that undergird life.[249] A Christian interpretation of history follows the same principle: that the one interpreting the meaning of history is a Christian. This is the presupposition that accounts for Tillich's theonomous-oriented theology that gives considerable respect to the kairoi and "the demonic" in which man encounters the outer and the inner forces upon his life. The derivation of meaning from the depth dimension of life in this predicament is problematical. Freud believed that meaning in life and history was the product of the rational process of a "stabilized personality;" that is, meaning was achieved when an equilibrium had been accomplished between cathexis and anti-cathexis. This is a condition in which, as Calvin Hall notes,

> the psychic energy has found more or less permanent and constant ways of expending itself in performing psychological work. The precise nature of this work is determined by the structural and dynamical characteristics of the id, ego, and superego, by the interaction between them, and by the developmental history of the id, ego, and superego.[250]

It is a conquest of ambivalent, autonomous forces of the libido in which the id, counter-resisted by the superego, finds, in the secondary process, an acceptable ego-form by which pleasure can be derived in personal and social cathexis. Freud attributed, in his later works, a considerable importance to "ego energy," a neutral force that had compromising powers over the erotic and thanatotic impulses and that transformed them into an acceptable cathexis. Freud contended that it was this new motive power of the ego-libido which gave man his desirable meaning and acceptable function in life.[251] He says of this new theory, "We have thereby conceded to the ego the ability to exact so far-reaching an influence upon the processes taking place in the id, and have now to learn to understand the way in which this surprising manifestation of power becomes possible to the ego."[252] Freud never found this answer but his repetition-compulsion theory sufficed to explain the dialectical actions of the ego that ambiguously sought to nullify its repressive control on the one hand and to give secondary expression to the libido on the other hand. But this means that Freud did acquiesce to the influence of social conditioning and conceived of the psychoanalytic purpose as being of a "moral" nature in which the unconscious libido must not be allowed expression but must rather be compromised according to the values laid down by conscience-oriented social forms.[253] Dynamics was subject to form in Freud's thought. This is also true of Tillich's analysis of man's problem of meaning in his existential situation. The dynamic-form polarity is distorted and eventually destroyed when man accepts autonomous, and especially heteronomous, values. Meaning is available to man, in Tillich's opinion, only when the theonomy cuts into and reunites the divisions and ambiguities of life. The id in Freud is similar to the satanic in Tillich: both play the role of distorting meaning. In both cases they represent an absolute contradiction to man. They are negative elements of the psyche. Freud devoted his lifetime to the discovery of principles that would repress the energies of the id, at best compromise the cathexis of the id in some acceptable manner. Tillich claims that religious socialism was the first to rediscover from ancient Jewish, Persian, and Greek sources the mythological and ontological depth of the demonic character of the psyche. No longer was the demonic power a general term used, as Freud used it, in a negative, satanic form, as if the demon had objective being, but rather as

> that destructive, blind, chaotic element which is implied in all powerful creating movements and drives them toward final dissolution. While the word "demonic" has this positive and creative connotation, the word "satanic" points to a purely negative principle. The satanic can only be understood as absolute contradiction, while the demonic participates in the divine creative power. Therefore the satanic cannot exist in itself; it needs the positive of which it is contradiction; it has reality only in the reality of the demonic powers which control existence generally, and human existence especially.[254]

Freud did not grasp this understanding of the multidimensional nature of the demonic in its id-form because he tended to objectify the negative forces in the psyche so that they might be rationally cathected therapeutically. Tillich allowed the demonic to remain subjective and nondescript, except for its symbolic manifestations, and viewed it as an essential component of being. In this way the creative forces could be utilized to grasp the depth dimension in the meaning of history.

Tillich's view of the positive-negative character of the demonic is not unlike that of Jung. Both have grasped the Heraclitic _eantiodromic_ law in their analysis of life as well as history. The ambiguity of existence is always the reflection of the _eantiodromia_ of the ontological polarities of being. Neither Tillich nor Jung has objectified the demonic as Freud; but both have held it to be an integral part of essential being, suggesting that therapy demands acceptance and inclusion of the demonic rather than rejection and exclusion. They have sought to utilize the creative powers of the demonic forces of the unconscious in their analysis of the human predicament because both are acquainted with the historical etymology of the word demonic and its ideological contents. Jung suggests that the concept of the demonic has long shared a place in the concept of a universal magical power called God, soul, spirit, fertility, power, etc.[255] The _eantiodromic_ principle contributes to a holistic view of the psyche and to a positive view of the unconscious relationship to consciousness. It allows the psyche an optimum contribution to man's meaning in life and history. The archetypal images of the unconscious give structure to the legacy of ancestral life and, combined by the Self, quite spontaneously evoke new sources of meaning for man in his existential situation. These new sources, however, can be "possessive," especially when they cannot be controlled by the ego, and tend to distort any meaningful experiences. Jung claims that "the overpowering of the ego by unconscious contents and the consequent identification with a preconscious wholeness, possesses a prodigious psychic virulence, or power of contagion, and is capable of the most destructive results."[256] But this is a risk that man encounters in his search for the depth dimension of the problem of meaning in his life. The dialectic, though often ambiguous, is the primary process for deriving the truth of any given situation. The Self, for both Tillich and Jung, is the integrative power that holds the conscious and the unconscious psyche in an interdependent relationship and utilizes the positive-negative forces in a meaning-producing correlation. The Self holds an "Archimedean" position in relationship to the psyche, a position of self-transcendence that allows it to utilize the psychic forces for potential truth and meaning for man. Jung has grasped the same problem of meaning, especially for the Protestant, that Tillich understands in his psychological understanding of the effects of the Protestant principle:

> The Protestant is left to God alone. For him there is no confession, no absolution, no possibility of an expiatory opus divinum of any kind. He has to digest his sins by himself. . . . But, for this very reason, the Protestant has a unique chance to make himself conscious of sin to a degree that is hardly possible for a Catholic mentality, as confession and absolutism are always at hand to ease excess of tension. The Protestant, however, is left to his tensions, which can go on sharpening his conscience. Conscience, and particularly a bad conscience, can be a gift from heaven, a veritable grace if used in the interests of a higher self-criticism. . . . The sting of a bad conscience even spurs you on to discover things that were unconscious before, and in this way you will be able to cross the threshhold of the unconscious and take cognizance of those impersonal forces which make you an unconscious instrument of the wholesale murderer in man. If a Protestant survives the complete loss of his church and still remains a Protestant, that is to say a man who is defenseless against God and no longer shielded by walls and communities, he has a unique spiritual opportunity for immediate religious experience.[257]

The Protestant is unique in his independent stance in history and suffers the great and the tragic as he explores the depth dimension of his being expecting to find meaning in his life and history from the pleromatic condition. This is precisely the identical situation Job found himself in before Yahweh.

The resources and insights of depth psychology have enhanced the depth dimension of Tillich's thought about the problem of meaning in history, about the influence of the creative forces of the unconscious upon consciousness, and about the integrative powers of the psyche for organizing the ambiguous elements of existence into some meaningful form. Tillich has, like Jung, valued the natural forces or impulses that man often calls the "will of God" as absolutes that must be recognized and dealt with as potential sources for meaning in life and history. Freud has contributed much to understanding the satanic element that destroys man's power in his existential situation. Jung has avoided objectifying the satanic; he has included it as one of the elements of the creative potentials of the demonic in its subjective form in the unconscious. Tillich's thought has paralleled both Freud and Jung in his concern with the analysis of the whole man, on the premise that the meaning and purpose of history is present never in any part of man or society but only in the whole of either one. The depth dimension of the problem of meaning in history is reached in the theonomous interpretation of the *kairoi* and the unconscious manifestations of the psyche.

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# CHAPTER V

# SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The thesis of this dissertation has asserted that depth psychology is decisive and indispensable for Paul Tillich's analysis of the human situation. The basis for this assertion is explicitly evident in Tillich's own admission of the significant contributions of depth psychology to his thought and to theology in general and is implicitly evident in his utilization of the resources and insights of depth psychological materials in his existential analysis of man's finite condition. The problem of this dissertation has been to examine his conceptualization of depth psychology and his utilization of it in determining the basic questions of man's ultimate concerns that arise from the human predicament. Tillich has understood and utilized depth psychology both denotatively and connotatively. Denotatively, he has understood depth psychology as a psychological, as distinguished from the physiological, study of human behavior concerned with the dynamic, as opposed to the static, activity of the psyche that occurs in the unconscious, rather than the conscious, dimension of human psychical phenomena. Connotatively, Tillich has understood depth psychology as characterized by the rich resources and critical insights mankind has gleaned about the unconscious dimension of the psyche through art, drama, literature, history, science, sociology, psychology, and especially existential philosophy. He has frequently implied that depth psychology and existentialism are in reality one thing. Tillich has utilized depth psychology particularly as an *ancillāris* to the ontological principle in his correlative methodology for relating theological answers to existential questions. Essentially, *depth psychology* has provided Tillich with a *depth dimension* for his existential analysis of the category of existence.

## A. THE METHOD OF CORRELATION IN TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

The system of Paul Tillich's theology is dependent upon a methodology for correlating the interdependent categories of philosophical and theological thought about the human situation and the Christian message. The method of correlation is a "theological assertion" based on the object of theology, man's ultimate concern, and the object of ultimate concern, the ground of being. The philosophical question of man's ultimate concern, derived from an existential analysis of the human situation, and the theological answer of divine self-revelation, interpreted from the traditions of the Christian faith, are correlated on the principle of analogia entis. The analogy of being provides the common basis for the philosophical analysis of the structure of being and the theological analysis of the meaning of being in Tillich's systematic theology. Tillich contends that the questions and answers are interdependent because both occur within man's religious experience; within the "theological circle" in which theology formulates the existential questions implied in the human situation and also formulates the theological answers implied in the divine self-manifestation as they are determined by the existential questions. The method of correlation is an Anknüpfsungspunkt for questions and answers, for situation and message, and for the divine-human relationship from which a meaning of religious life might be obtained.

Tillich contends that the method of correlation overcomes the inadequacies of traditional supranaturalistic, naturalistic or humanistic, and dualistic methodologies by a "self-transcending" or "ecstatic" naturalism in which natural theology is resolved into the analysis of existence, and supranatural theology is resolved into the answers given to the questions derived from existential analysis. The structure of Tillich's systematic theology is determined by his methodology so that the ambiguous questions of reason, being, existence, life, and history are answered by revelation, God, Christ, Spirit, and the Kingdom of God. Each is held in correlation with the other, independently analyzing its own respective existential and essential categories, dependently demanding the understanding which the other can provide in the independent analysis, and interdependently correlating the existential questions with the theological answers for a meaningful religious faith. Such a proposition rests upon the rational character of theology, upon "ecstatic reason," reason that is grasped, overpowered, invaded, shaken by man's ultimate concern, and guided by semantic, logical, and methodological principles providing a consistency of cognitive assertions. It is further dependent upon an ontological assumption that epistemologically, man as a microcosmos can perceive the *logos*, the rational structure of the universe, through which the subject can know the object, and the human can know the divine, by analogy.

The category of existence has been connotatively demonstrated by the philosophical questions derived from the analysis of the human predicament under existential conditions. In the depth of reason man experiences a conflict between autonomous and heteronomous reason and quests for theonomy; between absolutism and relativism and quests for the concrete-absolute; and between formalism and irrationalism and quests for the union of form and mystery. The quest of reason is for the answer of revelation. In self-awareness man senses the conflict between his essential and existential states of being created by finite freedom and is torn between the polaric ontological elements of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. Threatened by non-being, in terms of the ontological categories of being, man quests for God who can overcome his anxiety. Through self-transcendence man recognizes his estrangement from his essential state of "dreaming innocence" and experiences the anxiety provoked by his "Fall", a universal quality of finite being. Experiencing the double threat of losing himself by either actualizing or failing to actualize himself, man quests for the "New Being" who brings meaning to the ambiguity of existence. In the realm of the spirit man perceives the multidimensional unity of life and encounters the ambiguities of his existence in functions of the life process. In the self-unity and self-alteration functions, self-integration is threatened with disintegration; self-creation is threatened by destruction; and self-transcendence is threatened by profanization; and man quests for the Spirit to draw him beyond the ambiguities of life. Through subjective "historical consciousness" man grasps the distinctive nature of human potentialities, but being frustrated by the ambiguities of his reason, being, existence, and life, he despairs of meaning in his inablity to actualize his aims beyond limited terms. He quests for the universal meaning of being of the Kingdom of God as it is manifest in Spiritual Presence and Eternal Life.

The category of essence has been connotatively demonstrated by the theological answers interpreted from the revelatory events recorded by the Christian faith. These answers, if they are to be relevant, must evolve from the theologian's participation in the human predicament. The existential question of reason for the theological answer of revelation is a rational quest for ecstatic reason that transcends the subject-object structure of finite reason. Ecstatic reason enables man to receive revelation, the manifestation of what concerns man ultimately, in the transparent depth dimension of reason. The ground of being as manifest in the logos is grasped by an "infinite passion" and unites existential with essential knowing. Man, threatened by non-being in his existential condition, quests for the theological answer of God who is the source of being. In the depth of reason, where man's logos is in relation with the divine logos, man is aware of God's directing creativity which is the source of his "ontological courage" to affirm his creatureliness in the threat of non-being.

The New Being is the theological answer to the existential question of man's estrangement from his essential being and from God as Being-itself. The New Being restores man to his essential unity with the ground of his being by representing the *imago dei* that is indigenous to man despite his estranged condition. In the realm of the spirit man quests for theological answers of the "Spiritual Presence" to reunite the ambiguities of his multidimensional life. As the spirit is grasped by the Spirit in the ecstatic movements of "faith" and "love" in community, it is raised to the transcendent unity of the unambiguous life. Frustrated from a lack of *telos* and meaning, man's historical self-consciousness quests after a purpose and fulfillment of the limited ends in the theological answers provided in the *kairoi* that reveal the ultimate and unambiguous meaning of the Kingdom of God. The ambiguities of history are essentialized by the ground of being manifest in Jesus as the Christ, the one who is able to grant eternal life.

The structure of Tillich's system has been correlated by the principle of *analogia entis*. This scholastic principle assumes that an ontological unity exists between self and world, between divine and human in the universal *logos*. By analogy of being, on the basis of the common *logos*, Tillich maintains that revelation is known by man through the grasping and shaping function of the cognitive process. By the same analogy, man can know God because God is present in man's awareness of his finitude, according to the "ontological argument." Christ is revealed to man in the New Being who participates fully in man's existential estrangement in the Cross. The ambiguities of life are overcome by the Spirit who grasps the spirit through the creative powers of the Spiritual Presence that reunites the existential element in finite life with the essential element in divine life. The immanent and transcendent qualities by which Christ appears in the center of history reveal the meaning of the _kairos_ in the _kairoi_ of human existence. Analogously, the _telos_ of the revelatory events are interpreted by the self-consciousness of man and the "vocational" consciousness of the community which affirms the events of man's finite existence.

There are two basic criticisms of Tillich's method of correlation. The Protestant criticism originates from a kerygmatic posture held by Barth and focuses upon Tillich's "principle of immanent dynamism." Barth contends that Tillich's questions and answers ought not proceed from the human to the divine, but rather just the opposite, because the theological answers are essentially superior to the philosophical questions. Cobb distinguishes Tillich's methodology as an "answering theology," distinct from either the kerygmatic or apologetic approaches. He does contend, however, as does Herberg, that Tillich's systematic theology is more representative of German Idealistic philosophy than reflective of the traditional theological content of the Christian faith. In this respect both Barth and Cobb point out the strong philosophical emphasis that Tillich gives to his theology. McKelway raises a similar criticism of Tillich's use of the ontological "common denominator" that distorts the fundamental revelational process of Jesus Christ. Hamilton believes that Tillich's correlative methodology has fallen into a "synthesis" trap not unlike nineteenth century liberalism that subjugated the authenticity of the Word to a priori principles. Tillich's "Christian philosophical theology" is detached from the *kerygma* because of "theology-as-methodological-knowledge" assumptions. The same anthropocentric criticism is expressed by George Thomas who questions if the "converted" Christian philosopher can rightly determine the authentic message of the Christian faith. The basic Protestant criticism is from a kerygmatic posture. It claims Tillich has subjugated the authority of the theological answers to the existential questions, thereby distorting the validity of the Christian faith. But do these criticisms adequately reflect Tillich's emphasis upon the interdependence of the questions and answers implied in his "theological circle"? Have his critics fully appreciated the implications of learning theory for his "answering theology"? Is there a serious recognition of his inclusion of historical research and of depth sociological and psychological phenomena that influence his methodology? Have the Protestant critics been sufficiently cognizant of the critical role of philosophy in the theological process?

The Roman Catholic criticism of Tillich's method of correlation centers upon Tillich's concept and use of analogy and the traditional Protestant-Roman Catholic differences with regard to subjectivity against objectivity, autonomy against authority, and symbol against analogy. Weigel contends that the phenomenological influence on Tillich's ontology causes Tillich to emphasize symbolism rather than concretism, thus distorting his understanding and utilization of analogy, especially analogy in a Thomistic sense. Tillich does separate the essential from the existential as if they were independent entities rather than two aspects of one entity. Tillich defends this position and stresses how important a distinction between "sign" and "symbol" has been in this conceptualization and in his relationship to Thomistic thought. McLean is critical of Tillich's neglect of reality as the basis for a rational and objective knowledge of God and his inclination to describe the divine-human relationship rather than God by his use of attributive analogy. O'Connor points out Tillich's resistance to proportional analogy and strongly suggests that his "anti-authoritarianism" is the source for the preference for the symbol and attributive analogy and the respective freedom and autonomy they grant to him. Tillich's response to both McLean and O'Connor points out his obedience to the law of reason that demands his loyalty to theonomy as opposed to the heteronomy of naturalism that objectifies authority autonomously determined by man under the conditions of human finitude. Tavard believes that Tillich's theology is representative of the existential category only, since Tillich denounces supranaturalism. This criticism, therefore, is a "loaded argument." McLean agrees with Tavard, claiming that Tillich's ontological posture limits his conceptualization of the divine. However, neither seems to appreciate Tillich's concept of the universal logos as the common point of the divine-human relationship. Basically, the Roman Catholic criticism of Tillich resists his use of attributive analogy, his basic postulate of the universal logos, and his emphasis upon the symbol in favor of using proportional analogy, the naturalistic conception of reality, and the concretism of the sign.

## 1. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S METHOD OF CORRELATION

The depth dimension of Tillich's method of correlation is evident in the ancillary role that depth psychological insights and resources, both denotatively and connotatively, have played in his utilization of the ontological principle for correlating the question and answer, the situation and message, and the human and the divine relationship. In opposition to the more traditional approaches to theology--the kerygmatic posture of supranaturalism, the apologetic posture of naturalism or humanism, and the synthetic posture of dualism--Tillich revitalized the correlative approach of analogy. He had learned from depth psychology the multidimensional nature of life, the fact that life was an essential-existential mixture and, therefore, ambiguous. Any approach to theology, he reasoned, ought to be cognizant of this phenomenon and respect the dialectical nature of man's understanding of his religious experiences. Tillich's use of the method of correlation reflected this depth psychological insight by delineating the independent, dependent, and interdependent relationships between the essential and existential categories in his systematic approach to theology. He demonstrated this in his conceptualization of each of the philosophical questions and theological answers under the four levels of ontological concepts--structure, characteristics, elements, and categories--pointing out the polaric conflicts in the existential analysis of the human situation and the resultant quests for theological answers to these existential questions.

The depth sociological and psychological insights that undergird learning theory were reflected in the ontological methodology and illuminated the necessity for the interdependent relationship of the question and the answer. Tillich contended it was imperative that a methodology reflect the mutual influence of the question-answer relationship. The existential question, in expressing the problem of the human predicament, is formed by the theological answer and the total system. The theological answer, the substance of the revelatory experience, is independent of the question, but the form of the answer is not independent of the form of the existential question. In this way the question and answer, each independently derived, are dependent upon the influence of the form on each other to produce a relevant and meaningful interpretation of religious experience. The theological answers can never be created by man; that is, their content cannot be created, although they can be received in a meaningful way in this interdependent relationship of question and answer. This is the essence of Tillich's "theological circle" or ellipse that protects the theologian from an arrogance that is possible from either a kerygmatic or an apologetic approach to theology.

The insights and materials of depth psychology have influenced Tillich's use of analogy in his correlative methodology. Tillich's analogy has not been made on reality, as has Thomas Aquinas', nor on faith, as has Karl Barth's, but on being, the essential nature of existential man. He has driven to the very depths of man's being, to the center of his existence, and has philosophically analyzed the structure of his being and theologically analyzed the meaning of being. Correlatively, he has been informed from both perspectives. The critical importance of personality development, in terms of the conscious and the unconscious aspects of the psyche, has been juxtaposed with the activity of the New Being in the realm of the spirit where the grace of God encounters man. Man's being in the depth dimension where he, in self-transcendence, encounters himself and the world, encounters the ambiguity of his essential-existential states in estrangement, and encounters the most crucial threat of non-being. It is this depth dimension of man's being where man's ultimate concern is formed. It is here where everything important is encountered and dealt with in some way.

The depth dimension, by which man perceives the universal logos and thereby analogously knows of the ground of being, reflects the influence of depth psychology on Tillich's thought. The ontological analysis of the structures of being manifest in the universal logos yields an awareness of the ground of being, being-itself. Man can encounter it and be grasped by it; he can know it and act toward it. Man in his depth of reason can ecstatically affirm his ultimate concern despite his existential condition. The transparency of the depth of reason to the ground of being reveals the irrelevancy of technical reason and provides the decisive insights of the unconsicous for cognitive thought. The depth of reason, in its ontological essence, enables man to grasp and shape the reality he encounters and analogously relate it to the content of revelation. This is not unlike the man's grasping and shaping of the unconscious symbols in terms of his conscious experience.

It is evident that Tillich's ontology in his method of correlation has not only been denotatively influenced by depth psychology and therapeutic processes, but has been connotatively influenced as well by the depth psychological materials in existential philosophy and literature. These influences have not been appropriated structurally or substantively independent of the ontological principle but have been utilized under the correlative principles operative in his methodological approach to the interpretation of man's religious experience.

## B. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

Tillich's first acquaintance with depth psychology occurred about 1920 as Freud's psychoanalytic movement began to make its impact upon the world. He had been looking for an alternative meaning to the traditional definition of the term "demonic." From that time forth[4] depth psychological insights and materials became imperative for the depth dimension in the ontological presuppositions of his thought. Depth psychology was especially critical to his theology because of the importance he gave to "experience" as the medium of religious knowledge.

A contemporary definition of depth psychology has a distinctive bench mark in the Enlightenment. Prior to that time psychology, under the influence of medicine, philosophy, and theology, was concerned with the body, mind, and soul, respectively. Following the Enlightenment the emphasis shifted to a philosophy of consciousness as a result of religious humanism, reductive naturalism, secular liberalism, and scientism. A rationalistic orientation to life prevailed. Beginning with Freud's rediscovery of the dynamic and powerful force of the unconscious in his work on hysteria, depth psychology has continued to develop theories about the interdependence of conscious and unconscious elements of the human psyche.

The term depth psychology was first used by Eugene Bleuler at the turn of the twentieth century to designate a new development in medical psychology. Generally, he referred to a study of the non-conscious levels of personality and specifically to the "unconscious repressed" and its effect upon human behavior. Progoff cites the recognition of the "reality" of the psychic processes and their subjection to law and scientific principles of understanding as Freud's main contribution to the early stages of depth psychology. To the negative conceptualization of the unconscious which Freud derived from his existential analysis of man, Jung added a more positive and holistic view of the psyche which he evolved from an essential analysis of man. The most significant contribution of Jung's thought to depth psychology was his discovery of the teleological principle that guided the unfoldment of the psyche. Following this presupposition Progoff has contended that the psyche procedes along psychologic principles to a spiritual end that is fulfilled in man's existence. In the continuing development of depth psychology through the cultural emphasis of the neo-Freudian to the more philosophic concerns of the existential analysts, the influence of the unconscious has received greater recognition. Depth psychology has distinguished itself in its concern for the psychological analysis of the dynamic activity of the unconscious in its interdependent relationship with consciousness. It has concerned itself primarily with the depth dimension of the psyche that reveals the creative nature of man.

Depth psychological insights and materials are of crucial importance in all of the significant writings of Tillich, especially for his existential analysis of the human predicament. Tillich has involved himself not only in the literary expressions of depth psychology but also with the movement and many of its representatives, in university seminars, and even in personal friendships with analysts. Hiltner notes that Tillich was exploring the creative revelations of the psychoanalytic movement when most other theologians were condemning it. Leibrecht contends that existentialism and depth psychology were indispensable to Tillich both in their protest against the philosophies of consciousness that were ideologically in opposition to his experiencial position as well as in their detailed description of man's existential predicament and estrangement. Peter Homans observes that Tillich, more so than any other theologian, allows his thought to be influenced by depth psychology, especially in his "rediscovery" of the spiritual depths of Western culture.

Tillich has admitted that an elaboration of a Christian doctrine of man is impossible without the vast materials developed by depth psychology.

The influence of depth psychology upon Tillich can be measured in part by his influence upon it and upon pastoral psychology. He has received wide recognition in his "active participation" among professional and pastoral psychologists. His ingenious procedure of thought for generalizing upon the particular enabled him to grasp an overarching panoramic perspective of the field that yielded many dynamic principles for the professional's practice. His empathy for their tasks inspired many to continue their search for an understanding of the complexities of human finitude. Rollo May has observed that many professionals came to hear him, to read his books as well, because of a yearning for a meaning in life, for a capacity to care, and for a "belief-ful realism" that he offered in terms of his ultimate concern. Most of all, Tillich could point out to them "the meaningfulness of the demonic." The analysts found a new conceptualization of existential anxiety that allowed them to accept the anxious patient in a new relationship and to deal therapeutically with his guilt and despair.

Tillich's doctrine of forgiveness, greatly influenced by depth psychology, has provided a depth dimension for the therapeutic problem of reconciliation in the concept of acceptance. He has been able to correlate the polarities of freedom and destiny, the paradoxical elements of reconciliation, Williams claims, by his concept of the New Being who unites man with his source and power of being, and whose grace accepts man in his estranged condition. Fletcher contends that the ultimacy of love, agapē, is the key to Tillich's concept of "transmoral conscience;" it undergirds the situational ethic that provides depth psychology with a new dimension for understanding the complexities of interpersonal relationships and for the determination of the ethical foundations of support for the integrity of man's decisions about his life. Browning maintains that Tillich has misunderstood the psychotherapeutic principle by which he rejects the theistic concept of God and the legal modality of the sin-salvation syndrome. In Browning's opinion, God must be a being if man is to be accepted, for the experience of acceptance requires the presence of another who is accepting. The awareness of the source and power of being is not equivalent, he believes, to being accepted by Being-itself. This same argument is true for sin and salvation. Kenneth Mitchell observes a similar problem in terms of the analyst's and pastor's role in the therapeutic process and pleads for some guidelines by which the source of man's acceptance might be mediated by them. Hiltner defends Tillich's role of providing basic principles rather than professional procedures which must be uniquely devised by the analyst or the pastor himself.

Wayne Oates has summarized Tillich's major contributions to pastoral psychology under five rubrics. First, Tillich's method of correlation has made possible again the use of psychological method in theology. Second, his methodology has provided the means for translating the power of the gospel into twentieth century thought--the psychological idiom--and opened up a new conversation with contemporary psychologists. Third, he has paved the way for an existential approach to pastoral psychology by his distinction between ontological and pathological anxiety. Fourth, his conceptualization of the demonic has enabled the pastoral counselor to analyze the idolatrous elements in the religious experience of disturbed people. Fifth, Tillich has provided a theological *raison d'etre* in his representation of the "unconditional acceptance of the God of grace and hope" to those who are estranged.

The relationship of depth psychology to theology, in Tillich's opinion, has been based on the interdependent relationship of philosophy and theology in their analysis of *Dasein*. Their interdependence, based on *logos* of being, is correlated on the principle of *analogia entis*.

Existentialism and depth psychology, for Tillich, are in reality one thing, for they have been connected and mutually influenced by each other from the very beginning in the most radical and profound ways. Both have stood in opposition to the philosophies of consciousness and have sought to go beyond them to the deeper dimension of the unconscious psyche. Their common perspective has been man's existential predicament from which they sought to grasp the nature of human finitude. Existentialism's history reflects a movement as early as the thirteenth century which has fought for the integrity of the unconscious irrational will. Existentialism has done battle with traditional theological dogma, with Cartesian philosophy, Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, and perhaps most significantly with Hegelian synthesism. Schelling led the early movement and influenced the thought of Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Nietzsche who formed many of the guidelines for depth psychological inquiries. This early movement has evolved in the last twenty-five years, involving and influencing almost every discipline of thought in the Western world. Existentialism has been most discerning about the nature of man and has yielded to theology and psychology a critical analysis of man's estrangement and the ambiguities of life as well as providing a matrix for their distinct analysis of the human situation.

The evolvement of depth psychology has followed a similar protest movement. First it protested the rigid position held by theology, philosophy, and medicine and sought to evolve an understanding of the unconscious psyche and to free it from the bonds of mystical and physiological thought. Freud's study of hysteria, following the leads of Brücke, Meynart, and Charcot, revealed the interdependent phenomena of the psyche giving considerable importance to the powers of the "unconscious repressed." From this point depth psychology has moved in numerous ways to delineate the existential nature of man, and in places, even the essential nature of man as well. A sacred and charismatic quality was attributed to the unconscious dimension of the psyche in the pre-historical period of depth psychology. In the transitional period of psychoanalytic thought, neurology began to deliver the unconscious from these bonds. Freud was able to derive generally the structural, dynamic, and economic modes of conceptualizing the unconscious and its dynamic forces. But, according to Fine, Freud never escaped the influence of the Newtonian deterministic system and the Darwinian evolutionary principles. In the developmental period of the history of depth psychology, the thought of Adler, Jung, and Rank initiated a broader and deeper dimension of the unconscious by their philosophical and social concerns. Cultural elements were added to the psychoanalytic emphasis by the neo-Freudians, namely, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, Schultzhencke, French, Rado, Kerdiner, and Schachtel. The philosophical interests in depth psychology, based primarily upon the thought of Husserl and Heidegger who employed a hermeneutic of "the ontological structure of human essence" and the "ontic structure of human existence," have been largely phenomenological. Jung's thought has provided the central core for this phenomenological emphasis. Binswanger, Boss, Caruso, and Diam have diverged along existential ontological lines to involve a psycho-physical-historical parallelism. The thought of Buber, Scheler, Lowith, and Trüb have undergirded von Weizsächer's and Henry Ey's personal emphasis in the depth psychological movement.

Both existentialism and depth psychology were united in this century in a common concern for the existential integrity of the total person. Existentialism has provided, according to Ruitenbeek, the structural means for depth psychology's interpretation of the clinical phenomena of the deeper dimensions of man's existence. Depth psychology, with the help of existential analysis, has been able to unite the dialectical and ambiguous essential-existential states of being on the basis of Heidegger's conceptualization of Dasein. Binswanger and Hora, in utilizing Heidegger's ontology, have evolved an holistic framework for a scientific and ontological analysis of the human situation. This has been the primary source for Tillich's "unambiguous life" that is possible when the subject-object cleavage has been overcome. Basically, Tillich claims that existentialism has served as the philosophical matrix for depth psychology and thereby enables the theologian to grasp the existential conditions of finitude from a perspective of the essential nature of man. The ambiguity of goodness could be seen as well as the ambiguity of evil in the life of man. Existentialism has enabled psychotherapy to hold a depth dimension that it could not achieve alone. The thought and influence of Freud's existential analysis and Jung's essential analysis of human existence are prevalent in Tillich's thought. Equally so are the insights of the broad spectrum of existentialism. Tillich has emphasized the independence of Freud and Jung and existential insights and their distinct contributions as well as their interdependence and the depth dimension that results from the unity of their points of view.

Tillich brings to the existential concerns of depth psychology the contrasting essential perspective of theology in his correlative methodology. He views existentialism as an element within the larger framework of essentialism. Existentialism describes only the human situation that is the result of the universal fall of man as it appears in the thought of Jaspers, Heidegger, Camus, Sartre, and even in the kerygmatic theology of Karl Barth. Depth psychology, for Tillich, must incorporate the essential view of man, also, and subject itself to the polaric views of essentialism represented by theology. Three fundamental propositions about human nature are held by theology: *esse qua esse bonum*, the universal fall, and a potential transcendence beyond existential estrangement. In Tillich's opinion, Freud did not distinguish between man's existential and essential nature. His analysis was of the self-estranged man even though a teleological principle governed his therapeutic rational. Adler, Jung, and Rank, in their essential analysis of man miss the existential depths that Freud knew about. Fromm's thought about the "autonomous non-authoritative personality" and the "sane society" are excellent examples of the essential emphasis upon the nature of man. Contemporary analyses of anxiety and guilt, in Tillich's opinion, failed to see the essential-existential perspective that points out that anxiety, doubt and guilt are the result, not of pathological conditions, but rather of the existential structure of human existence. Existentialism and depth psychology form the philosophical category of Tillich's thought that represents the existential questions of the human situation; and they are correlated with his theological category that provides the answers to these questions under the guidance of the latter on the basis of analogia entis in the logos of existence.

Tillich has pointed out four significant contributions that depth psychology and existentialism have made to theological thought and to his own systematic theology. The first was the rediscovery of depth psychological materials in secular and religious literature, in the arts and sciences, history and philosophy, and sociology and psychology. The depth dimension of man's existential predicament revealed by these various disciplines were confirmed and methodically organized by depth psychology. The second major contribution illuminated the concept of sin by pointing out it was a state of being characterized by a tragic estrangement, a separation from one's essential being, that resulted from the universal fall of man. Sin is not an act but a condition, an existential condition of man estranged from his essential being. The third gift of depth psychology to theology was its understanding of the demonic forces of the unconscious that determine conscious decisions, that limit man's freedom of choice, often coercing man in ways he does not desire to go consciously. A source of understanding of the disruption, conflict, despair, meaninglessness, and even self-destruction, was now available to theological thought. The telos of the unconscious could be recognized and accepted and utilized creatively in the determination of man's life. The fourth contribution was the rediscovery of the meaning of grace that allowed Christian theology to overcome its moralistic posture. The concept of acceptance has evolved from the depth dimension of the doctrine of forgiveness, justification, and *agapē*. In God's grace, man has recognized the possibility of an integral and authentic life, and in love the courage to pursue it. All of these deeper dimensions of Christian theology have been rediscovered by depth psychology in its analysis of the unconscious dimensions of the psyche.

Tillich has also indicated the depth psychological influences on specific doctrines in terms of pastoral psychology. The first of these was the rediscovery of the meaning of the doctrine of man in Augustinian and Reformation thought that opposed the legalistic and moralistic concepts. The doctrine of God has been reformulated in terms of man's depth psychological understanding of himself and his existence; and a self-giving nearness as opposed to the traditional demanding and remote characterization has been attributed to Him. The doctrine of divine acceptance that had fallen prey to rigidity, aridity, and moral legalism was reevaluated in terms of the new concept of God that emphasized his grace. The symbols that gave structure to man's cognitive grasp of the Christian message had been literalized until depth psychology pointed out the importance of man's participation in, rather than the use of, symbols. When the symbol was conceptualized as a sign, it became meaningless, for the truth of the mythical symbol was represented as actualized in history and therefore found to be irrelevant. The deeper dimension of the symbol that reveals a *telos* indigenous to mankind was revived by depth psychology in its analysis of the "collective unconscious" and its archetypal forms. The doctrine of salvation provides the decisive test of the influence of depth psychology on theology. But depth psychological insights countered the view of salvation as a cosmic event with an emphasis upon the individual and his destiny from the unconscious dimension of the psyche. The subjective element was given preference over the objective and enabled man to see more clearly the nature of his ambiguous condition of existence. The doctrine of the Spirit was reconceptualized in terms of a concreteness that encountered the spirit in the realm of the spirit in existential man. In this way salvation was achieved by the Spirit grasping the spirit and raising it beyond itself and healing it through the creation of faith and love.

The importance of depth psychology to Tillich's thought is evident in his methodology that accepts the authenticity of depth psychology's contribution to the analysis of the existential situation and demands an integrity in the interpretation of the Christian message as revealed in the doctrines about the revelatory events. This is not unlike the therapeutic experience man participates in while seeking his individuation. The question that arises from the existential analysis of the human situation shapes the form of the substance of the theological answer and makes it relevant to man's ultimate concern.

## 1. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

The depth dimension of Tillich's theology is evident in the extensive utilization of the insights and materials of existentialism and depth psychology that have provided the means by which he has overcome the philosophies of consciousness that have dominated theology since the Enlightenment. With these depth resources Tillich has respected the holistic view of the psyche that emphasized the positive and creative influence of the dynamic forces of the unconscious upon consciousness and commandeered this perspective methodologically to grasp the depth dimension of the human predicament. The depth psychological insights have been the critical sources for his formulation of the ultimate concern in the depth of man's being.

Tillich's understanding of depth psychology has evolved from his "participation" in the depth psychological movement through the analyst's thought and practice and through personal and professional relationships with them. His primary concern has been with the theoretical and with the implications of depth psychology's understanding of the unconscious motivations of human behavior. The conflicts that analysts have encountered in their practice, anxiety, for example, have been the stimuli for a deeper theoretical analysis of the ontological nature of being that revealed the practical distinction between ontological and pathological anxiety. In this way Tillich has also been concerned with the practical for it has driven him beyond the traditional theoretical positions to the depth dimension of the human predicament in its existential mode. In the dialectic of the analyst's theory and practice Tillich has derived an understanding of the unconscious nature of man and his resultant behavior that has provided the depth dimension of his existential analysis.

The impact of depth psychology on Paul Tillich's theology is evident, by his own admission, in four significant contributions depth psychology has made to theological thought. It needs to be emphasized that these contributions are not new content but rather rediscoveries of the depth dimension that has been lost especially since the Enlightenment. The first is the depth dimension in Tillich's thought that was derived from the rediscovery of the depth psychological materials concerning the soul in the religious literature of the history of mankind. Man has always sought to explain the divine presence that manifests itself to man in the depth of his being. Tillich was vitally interested, as is evident by the vast array of illustrative materials, in the broad spectrum of man's artistic and aesthetic creations that reveal man's concept of the divine presence within his unconscious. He took special interest in those "artists" who grappled with the expression of the meaning in life that evolved from the depth dimension of their experience. Tillich sought to grasp the ultimate questions of man's encounter with himself and his world, for this would determine the relevance and meaning of the theological answers of the Christian faith to them. The second is the depth dimension in Tillich's thought about sin as evolved from both depth psychological theory and practice. Sin as a state of being had been rediscovered from sin as unconventional acts. Sin was to be seen as a universal condition of man resulting from his transition from his essential to his existential state of being. In sin man was estranged from his essential being and from the depth of the ground of his being. His separation was due to the structure of finitude and not from any act that he might have committed or ommitted. The third is the depth dimension in Tillich's thought concerning the demonic. His concern about the demonic led him to his first acquaintance with the depth psychological movement, therein to rediscover the demonic structures of the unconscious psyche that determine man's conscious will and his decisions. Tillich has found ample evidence in the depth analysis of the unconscious psychic forces for disputing the philosophies of consciousness and their hope for man's rational powers. Man was to be understood in terms of his totality of being that affected the decisive quality of his life. This depth dimension of the psyche revealed the *telos* that resided in the depths of man's being and consciously perceived in the depth of reason. The depth dimension of the demonic uncovered both the negative and the positive nature of the libido indicating it belonged to man's created goodness as well as to man's existential condition in which it became distorted and ambiguous. The *fourth* is the depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the nature of grace. Depth psychology rediscovered the importance of acceptance in the therapeutic process. It pointed up the nature of the bad moral conscience that man had derived from his judgmental conception of a theistic God. If man were to subject his vital impulses to moral law and social conventions he would always possess a bad moral conscience. However, if man were to recognize he was not the judge of himself, but that it is God who judges him, then he could believe that the grace of God can accept him and free him from guilt. The grace of God enables man to be accepted for who he is under the conditions of his existence. He transcends the moralism that has bound him and is free to be, in love, agapē. He has been accepted, forgiven, and justified in his existence by the ground of being.

The significant contributions have also influenced the practical formulations of Tillich's doctrinal conceptualizations. His existential analysis of the human situation has formed the content of the theological answers. The depth psychological insights into the human predicament have penetrated the symbolic depths of the traditional Christian revelatory events and exposed the meaning that has been lost to cultural distortion. They have enabled Tillich to ask the existential questions that probe the existential nature of man who encountered the revelatory events and sought to express their meaning in terms of his own finite condition. This implies both an anthropological as well as an ontological analysis of the form that conveys the content of the Christian message.

The depth dimension in Tillich's theology is occasioned by the insights and materials of depth psychology which he has employed, both denotatively and connotatively, in his correlative methodology for his "answering theology."

Because the existential question guides the formulation of the theological answer in response to the question, the existential analysis of the human situation is a critical element of Tillich's methodology. This is why depth psychology is decisive and indispensable to Tillich's theology.

## C. DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY IN TILLICH'S ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN SITUATION

Depth psychology has been the *source*, the *medium*, and the *norm* for Tillich's existential analysis of the human predicament. It has provided for a phenomenological analysis of the human psyche that reveals the ultimate concerns of man. It has provided a methodology for correlating the ultimate questions of man with the ultimate answers of God by the principle of *analogia entis*. It has provided a profound conceptualization of the nature of man by which the phenomenological analysis and the methodological correlation can relevantly interpret the question and answer, the situation and message, and the divine-human relationship.

Basic and central problems occur as ultimate questions in Tillich's analysis of the human situation that establish the quest for theological answers of the Christian message. The problems of cognition, anxiety, estrangement, ambiguity, and meaning occur in the concepts of reason, being, existence, life, and history, respectively. Tillich's analysis of each of these problems reflects a depth dimension of thought that he derived from the insights and materials of depth psychology.

The problem of cognition occurs in both the essential and the existential states of ontological reason. It is a problem of determining the nature of the universal logos structure of reality in the depth of reason in essential reason. The problem arises in existential reason because the structure and depth of reason are estranged, causing reason to become opaque. Tillich has sought to derive the depth dimension of the cognitive problems from absolutes. Being is the absolute in the logos structure of reality. Being-itself is the absolute content of the symbolic manifestation of myth and cult. Essences are the absolutes that man cognitively grasps in his encounter with being and Being-itself. Cognition of these absolutes is dependent upon their transcendent powers as well as on man's transcendent power in the depth of reason for transforming them into cognitive forms. Basically, the problem of cognition is one of grasping and shaping the absolutes of human knowledge from the stream of relativities in human existence through the depth of reason, when reason is transparent to its depth and united with its structure. When the grasping and shaping functions of reason are estranged under finite conditions, existential reason must quest for revelation to be informed of the essential meaning of the symbolic contents of myth and cult and be reunited with essential reason.

The possibility of deriving a cognitive understanding and meaning of man requires, in Tillich's opinion, an amalgamation of the detached, analytical, objectification of controlling knowledge and the subjective, receiving knowledge gained by union with and participation in being. Independently, objective reason is safe but not ultimately significant and subjective reason is ultimately significant but provides no certainty. The problem of cognition demands the risk of participation in the depth of reason where the ground of being is transparent to man in the rational structure of reality. The understanding and meaning of man lies in the "depths" of his being and is accessible, claims Tillich, in the "depths of suffering" which is the only door to the depth of truth. It is suffering, for man must dwell among the chthonic depths if he is to grasp the depth of truth and being. Even deeper still in the ultimate depth of the divine ground is the liberating word in all its power that reunites man with the ground of being. This is the trek into the depths of being that the saints, prophets, reformers, and great creators of all times have taken despite the danger involved. As Tillich claims, the depth of reason is the road to the depth of truth, hope, and joy; it leads through despair and doubt and cynicism to the ground of hope and the dynamic source of all creative decision, Being-itself. It can be a tragic decision, for it involves demonic possession with all of its fury, wrath, and vengeance. But it can also be a decision for greatness if one reaches the creative sources of the depth of his being and Being-itself.

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of cognition was derived from the insights of depth psychology. He explicitly acknowledges its decisive and indispensable importance to his existential analysis of the human situation. Depth psychology is of critical importance for finding one's way into the depth of being; but it cannot, according to Tillich, guide man into the deepest ground of being, to the depth of life itself. The significance of depth psychology for theology has been its illumination of the effects of the unconscious upon consciousness, and its delineation of the creative and destructive impact of the unconscious upon the cognitive process. The latter has been most important, because of the dialectical nature of "wisdom" and the ambiguous condition of human existence to man in his search for meaning. According to Adam, Tillich views depth reality as infinite power and dynamics; a reality that confronts the infinite and inexhaustible ground of all being and meaning. The grasping of this wisdom is possible, claims Tillich, in the passion that Kierkegaard describes as the moment of unity of the infinite and the finite which transcends man's existential condition. Otherwise, actual reason is thwarted and frustrated by finitude. Pure theory cannot derive the truth, for in the demand for distance and objectivity it falls into intellectual asceticism. Tillich maintains that only in an attitude of participation, when man stands within reality, is it possible for him to recognize the subjective, irrational elements of the unconscious psyche and to creatively utilize the dynamic forces in the cognitive process.

The depth dimension of the unconscious in Tillich's thought is similar to the views of Jung and Freud. The essential conceptualization of the unconscious in Jung and Tillich emphasizes objectively the biological, teleological, dynamic process and subjectively the psychic, numinous, integrating, cognitive process which jointly offer potentially the individuation of a Self that is cognitively capable of deriving meaning from the psyche. The existential conceptualization of the unconscious in Freud and Tillich is concerned with the indestructible forces of the id that seek cathexis primarily in terms of the pleasure principle and secondarily in terms of the reality principle. The original impulse of the id, under the rationalizing influence of the ego in the secondary process, is distorted so that the object perceived is abstracted as a distinct object from its subjective nature. The classic example of this distortive rationalization is obvious in a person's explanation of his actions carried out under post-hypnotic suggestions. From an essential point of view the problem of cognition is the determination and acceptance of the teleological nature of the psyche. From the existential viewpoint it is a rationalization of subjective knowing into objective knowing. The meaning of being is distorted from both postures, for subjective truth does not lend itself to objective cognition.

The depth of reason in Tillich's thought is analogous to Polanyi's tacit knowing. Both contend the potentiality for knowing subjectively or tacitly does not invalidate knowledge but rather enhances the possibility of grasping the depth contents of the psyche that are manifest in symbolic form without distorting them through objectification. Eliade's heirophanous concept of the sacred manifesting itself in the profane is also indicative of Tillich's concept of how the ground of being, transparent to man in the depth of reason, is transmuted by transcendence into man's cognition of Being-itself. Polanyi, Eliade, and Tillich all share Gestalt psychology's insight into the participant's role in tacit knowing, especially his comprehension by "indwelling" in the symbolic manifestations of truth.

Tillich points out the faith dimension of the cognitive process and the role that the Self plays as it transcends both the objective and the subjective dimensions of knowing. The Self is the center of one's self-relatedness by which the totality of man's existence is united. The cognitive grasp of the depth of one's being in the Self precedes reason, then, because it has transcended the structures of reason and points to truth itself, to that which is infinitely and ultimately real. This "phenomenological intuition" which penetrates the depth of reason to the ground of being is similar to Progoff's claim that the real is transparent to man in symbolic form and is experienced without an intellectual understanding of it. Cognition is possible without the objectification of the symbol, for both Tillich and Progoff, because the symbol bears a meaning that can be experienced in its unique form through participation in its meaning. Man's search for wisdom involves an experience of awe in an encounter with the holy that illuminates the depths of man's being and imparts a courage to accept the gift of meaning revealed to him. As Unhjem has noted, Tillich is aware of the demonic forces of doubt that assail the cognitive process under existential conditions and inhibit the capacity for grasping truth. Doubt thrives in despair and guilt, for the search for truth is subjected to the conservative powers of the ego that seeks security for its existence. Tillich has learned from depth psychology that truth exceeds man's cognitive grasp but that it can be experienced in both the negative and positive encounters with the depth of one's being and with others whenever love frees them to accept the gift of meaning they provide. The problem of cognition is overcome when love unites the existential with the essential state of being.

The problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity all share common ontological elements that frame the polaric structure of being and categorical forms by which the mind grasps and shapes reality in the concepts of being, existence, and life, respectively. There is a commonality, also, in their existential analysis, for anxiety is provoked by the ambiguity man experiences in his estrangement. But the problems have distinctive distortions that must be dealt with independently.

*The ontological analysis of the problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity* reveals the microcosmic nature of man and his awareness of the problems through his powers of transcendence in terms of the universal *logos* of being and reason. The polarity of the ontological elements that constitute the structure of being represents, on the one hand, the self-relatedness of being, and on the other hand, the belongingness of being. The polaric elements of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny are all interdependent. An emphasis upon either pole is self-destructive. Man is anxious about his being because of the dialectical nature of these elements. His personhood is determined by his participation in community which alters his self-identity, requiring him to reestablish a new identity. His vitality is always curtailed by his intentionality that requires his dynamic and creative expressions to give way to meaningful forms. His arbitrariness is likewise restricted by the determining elements of his existence that shape his freedom. Man's existence is characterized by estrangement because of the independence of each polaric element that represents his essential and existential states of being. Man's life is ambiguous because of the interdependence of these polaric elements. And because of his microcosmic nature his existence is dependent upon his response to both in a multidimensional mode of being.

The problem of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity become more obvious in the categories of finitude. The category of time imposes the possibility of an end to the dynamic interdependent processes of the polaric elements. Anxiety occurs in the threat of non-being; estrangement is always a reality because the elements are polaric; and ambiguity is the result of man's transcendent powers that reveal the presence of both polaric elements in his microcosmic nature. The category of space heightens anxiety by man's sense of pilgrimage, provokes estrangement by man's awareness of the distance from his essential being, and evokes ambiguity in man's cognizance of the duality of his essential-existential state of being. The categories of causality and substance have the quality of Geworfenheit that makes the problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity more real to man. Not only is man faced with an awareness of the cause of his problem but also with the reality of its presence. In man's essential being the polaric ontological elements and categories are recognized as problems of anxiety, estrangement, and ambiguity because the power of man's self-transcendence reveals them in his microcosmic nature of being.

The problem of anxiety occurs under existential conditions in man's awareness of his finitude which emphasizes the possibility of non-being. The threat of non-being is latent in the structure of being and man cannot escape its omnipresence. Anxiety is to be distinguished from fear because it has no object; its object is non-being or no-thing-ness, and, therefore, cannot be overcome as fear is overcome but rather affirmed and accepted by man as a part of his essential being. The eschatological nature of anxiety imposes a meaning on the present and drives man to that which is beyond non-being, to Being-itself. In this way non-being is taken into essential being. In this way Tillich's thought is a corrective for the negative existential analysis derived from Kierkegaard and Heidegger. In Martin's opinion, Tillich's emphasis on the essential structure of being overcomes the despair that is typical in existential thought.

Tillich has demonstrated the problem of anxiety in the ontological categories and elements. The categorical structures evoke anxiety because they provide man with the means for grasping and shaping the reality of his existence. Time makes man aware of his finitude, and space unites being with non-being in the ontological structures of being. Causality provokes anxiety when man does not possess "aseity." In a state of contingency having no necessity in himself, man is a prey to non-being. He is also anxious about losing the substance of his being, the meaning of his existence, and his identity in the losing of his existence in death. As man experiences these categorical forms of human finitude, he is anxious, for there is no permanence promised for his existence. Existence is always in process, and change tends to destroy points of contact from which man derives the source of power and meaning for his being. Essentially, the polaric elements of being are unified, but existentially, they are estranged and man is caught between them. To choose one or the other is self-destruction. To choose both is anxiety-producing because either one points out that man has not actualized his potentiality for being. Any attempt at self-actualization produces anxiety. If one chooses the individualization of himself the result is loneliness, for he is separated from himself, others, and the world. If he chooses participation in community he transforms his self-identity into group identity and thereby loses his sense of personal being in conformity to community. To choose both leads man to a frantic oscillation between them, provides him no contact with either one and leaves him with no identity, personal or communal. The same pattern is true in the dynamic-form situation. If man chooses his dynamic and vital energies without respect for a meaningful form, his choice results in formless chaos. If man chooses his static intentionality, all of his vitality and creativity is directed only to the possibility of action. The choice of either one is as despairing as the choice of both. In the freedom-destiny polarity man also experiences anxiety and frustration by being trapped between two dialectical poles of meaning for his existence. In freedom man seeks to utilize his dynamics and be creative with his life, to individualize his vitality, and to "make something of himself." He is anxious that his creativity may take him beyond any meaningful structure of the reality of his experience. Yet, to choose his destiny means to sacrifice his creativity to some form, intention, identity, and decision that has been made for him. Man is anxious because he tries to preserve his freedom by defying his destiny and tries to save his destiny by denying his freedom. In both elements and categories man is in danger of losing himself in the ontological structure of his being. Tillich stresses that this threat to being need not be a necessity, however, for in courage man can affirm and accept this anxiety into his essential being where the elements are united and the categories are no longer threats to man's self-understanding.

Tillich distinguishes three types of ontological anxiety in which non-being threatens man in his existential situation. It threatens man's ontic self-affirmation relatively in terms of fate and absolutely in terms of death. The contingency of man's existence is viewed against the relative threat of fate which lurks within every human experience and against the absolute threat of death that awaits man in every moment of his living. It threatens man's spiritual self-affirmation relatively in terms of emptiness and absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. When man can no longer participate creatively in the life process nor gain meaning from the transformation of his experiences, a sense of meaninglessness comes over him, producing anxiety. Man has become estranged from his essential being. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation relatively in terms of guilt and absolutely in terms of condemnation. As man fails to actualize his potentiality of being, to utilize his powers of deliberation, decision, and responsibility, according to his destiny he experiences guilt and despair. Unable to accept his inability to perfect his essential being, he condemns himself both for attempting self-actualization and for failing self-actualization. Man cannot escape the anxiety provoked by these ambiguous forms of life. To choose one or the other, or both, is to lose one's being. Man has no choice but to affirm and accept these existential conditions into his essential being.

_The problem of estrangement_ exposes man's separation from his essential nature because he has chosen to actualize his potentiality for being, to stand out from his essential being, to exist. Existence for Tillich is total estrangement and affects every dimension of man's being under finite conditions. The context for man's estrangement from his essential nature is not a cultural phenomenon, but rather finite freedom. The transition from essence to existence is the result of man's decision and destiny. In "dreaming innocence" where man realizes his freedom to actualize himself or preserve his created goodness, man exercises his power of finite freedom and decides for self-actualization. The result is estrangement. In awareness of his destiny man chooses to preserve his created goodness, his "dreaming innocence." The result is estrangement. Man is trapped between self-actualization and self-preservation. He chooses actualization and existence and estrangement.

All three traditional concepts of sin indicate man's awareness of his dual nature: his essential oughtness and his existential isness. In unbelief, man recognizes his estrangement from God in his denial of God in the center of his being. In *hubris*, man denies his finitude and establishes himself as the center of his being and the world. In concupiscence, man attempts to make himself universal in his potentiality. In each case man recognizes his finite condition as estranged from his infinite potential and his drive for the actualization of his potentiality of being.

Hammond is critical of Tillich's thought. He claims Tillich has gone beyond existential thought and elevated the philosophical concept of estrangement into a theological concept. He further notes that Tillich distinguishes the "radical" and the "utopian" existentialists as different from himself, claiming that for the radical, estrangement is total and irreconcilable and for the utopian, temporary and overcome by social and psychological processes. Tillich accepts neither view and contends that sin is not the result of human nature or cultural lag but rather the result of man's choice of self-actualization in finite freedom. Estrangement, then, is an ontological result of human finitude. In this respect Hammond's insight is acknowledged. But the [illegible] of Tillich's thought appears to justify [illegible]nd philosophical limitations. Tilli[illegible]nt as self-loss, the disintegratio[illegible]n as well as the world in which [illegible] his centeredness he loses meanin[illegible] from his essential being.

In freedom man is estranged from his destiny. Every willful act under the control of hubris and concupiscence separates man even further from his destiny and deprives man of a sense of contingency and ultimacy in his choices. Man becomes arbitrary and subject to environmental forces upon him; and all that seemed to be free has become subject to internal compulsions and external causes. Man loses his centeredness in estrangement and becomes impotent. Existence becomes fantasy when man's dynamics is separated from form. Existence becomes chaos when man's individualization is separated from participation. Existence becomes alienation when man's freedom is separated from his destiny.

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In freedom man is estranged from his destiny. Every willful act under the control of *hubris* and concupiscence separates man even further from his destiny and deprives man of a sense of contingency and ultimacy in his choices. Man becomes arbitrary and subject to environmental forces upon him; and all that seemed to be free has become subject to internal compulsions and external causes. Man loses his centeredness in estrangement and becomes impotent. Existence becomes fantasy when man's dynamics is separated from form. Existence becomes chaos when man's individualization is separated from participation. Existence becomes alienation when man's freedom is separated from his destiny.

Existence is total estrangement in all dimensions of man. Under existential conditions man is out off from the ultimate dimension of his life and subject to doubt and despair. His hope is the New Being who will unite him with his essential being.

The problem of ambiguity occurs because man, in the dimension of the spirit, is aware of both his potentiality and his actuality. He is unable to reunite the essential-existential estrangement of his being and must live with the multidimensional nature of his existence. His search for self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence is dependent upon the polarity of the ontological elements under the principles of centeredness, growth, and sublimity, respectively. Existential conditions drive man to actualize one of the polar elements and to encounter possible disintegration, destruction, and profanization. In self-integration man risks the ambiguous situation of individualization and participation in which he is driven to establish his unique centeredness as well as driven to participate as a centered self in community where he gathers vitality from the other centers outside himself. He is forced to choose between the reality of his personal centeredness for the possibility of a larger center of being gained in the relationship with others. Usually, man chooses himself as he is rather than risk the loss of his identity to be what he ought to be. And therefore, life is ambiguous. In self-creation man risks the ambiguous situation provoked by dynamics and form. His choice to utilize his vitality means that he moves toward self-destruction. But the choice for form is also destructive for there is no growth possible. Every new creation implies the death of the old elements that comprised man's existence. Self-creation is ambiguous, for growth implies destruction. In self-transcendence the sublimity of man is threatened by the awareness of man's estrangement from his essential being and the tragic condition of his existential existence. Man's awareness of the greatness of his essential being is shocked by the threat of the smallness of his existential being. He fears the sacredness will be profanized. He avoids greatness so as to avoid tragedy. But he senses the ambiguity of his condition when he realizes that to avoid tragedy is to be incapable of greatness. The demonic element suggests that he conserve his sacredness; but this is idolatry and, in the end, profanization. In his finite freedom man aspires to greatness, to overcome his condition by intentionality; but this too becomes profane. In every case man is aware of his ambiguous situation between the polar elements that promise actualization of his being as well as destruction of his being unless they can be reunited by the Spirit.

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of anxiety emphasizes man's self-awareness of his finiteness and the limitations of his being. It distinguishes anxiety from fear as being ontological rather than psychological and as being independent of any causal object other than the threat of non-being or finitude. Basic anxiety is not alterable by therapy, for the structure of finitude is unalterable. Rollo May and Tillich, in their distinction between existential and pathological anxiety, indicate that man's attempt to actualize his potentiality of being in his finite freedom makes him aware of his destiny and, in turn, his ontological anxiety. Pathological anxiety occurs as symptoms of the existential anxiety that are not unlike characteristics of fear which respond to the therapeutic processes. All too often, in Tillich's opinion, analysts fail to recognize the ontological nature of basic anxiety and deny its existence. When they do, they seek the cooperation of philosophers and theologians for a doctrine of man to be able to grasp the depth dimension of the nature of anxiety in its existential condition.

Tillich's depth analysis of anxiety follows the existential thought of Heidegger and Kierkegaard. From Heidegger's thought Tillich has found the concept of Dasein helpful for understanding man in the context of the structures of existence. He utilizes Heidegger's concept of anxiety as a basic "state-of-mind" that results from man's having been thrown into the world without any means of determining his Being-one's-self. Man is anxious about his Being-in-the-world because it is meaningless to him. King emphasizes this point by noting the dreadsome quality of man's total insignificance of being nowhere and nothing without Being as Heidegger's main concept of the source of anxiety. For Heidegger anxiety is both *sichängsten* and *sich abangstet*, anxiety itself as well as anxiety as a "state-of-mind," due to Being-in-the-world. Tillich and Heidegger both agree that *Dasein* is the source of anxiety about the authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, for *sichängsten* and *sich abangstet* coincide in *Dasein*. If man were to fear his *Dasein*, he would fall away in the opposite direction toward his existential existence. As man prevails in hope for the actualization of his being he experiences anxiety. Heidegger holds out no hope for affirming and accepting one's estrangement from his essential being as does Tillich who has learned of the possibility of ontological courage from Scheler and Schelling. Tillich does not accept Heidegger's *Being-toward-death* or Kierkegaard's *sickness-unto-death*. The depth dimension enables Tillich to grasp the possibility of *Dasein* in terms of meaning derived from the *logos* of being. This is the source for Tillich's denial of the moral aspect of anxiety held by Kierkegaard and Freud who maintain anxiety results from the universal "possibility of freedom." Whether it be experienced internally as with Kierkegaard and Freud, or externally as with Fromm and Horney, anxiety makes the individual impotent to choose self-actualization or to deny it because of his ambiguous existential situation. Loder observes that Kierkegaard's dread and Freud's doubt are both forms of ambivalence that evoke anxiety. Tillich agrees with both Heidegger and Kierkegaard, Martin points out, that anxiety, in the sense of man's awareness of his finitude and the threat of non-being, is the most basic constituent of man's psychic being.

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of estrangement reveals the nature of the transition from the essential to the existential state of being. It points to man's self-actualization in his finite freedom and the resultant tragic-universal character of his existence. Tillich stresses that the concept of original sin ought to be more respectful of the deeper dimensions of the tragic and moral elements of the universal destiny of man and of the moral elements of his responsible decisions. Man's freedom must be seen in terms of his destiny; and his conscious decisions must be seen in terms of the determining power of the unconscious psyche. Man's estrangement is not the result of an accidental fall from his essential being, but rather the result of his decision to actualize himself in the power of finite freedom. This decision for self-actualization is made by man in the depths of his being, fully aware of his responsibility for actualization, yet aware of his guilt for deciding against actualization. Reinhold Niebuhr does not accept Tillich's ontological analysis of man's estrangement and claims that man chooses and experiences his self-actualization on a level above ontological fate. But Tillich retorts that man's existential state of being is a "leap" and not a "structural necessity," as Niebuhr claims it is, because existence is not derived from essence. Essence Tillich contends, loses its created goodness as it is existentially actualized. The personal character of estrangement in Niebuhr's thought is evident in Tillich's thought which stresses man's personal responsibility for his estrangement as the result of his ontological nature in finite freedom.

The problem of estrangement is understood by Tillich in terms of concupiscence and is illustrated by his citations of Kierkegaard's analysis of the demonic aspects of Nero's use of unlimited power, Don Juan's despair in his erotic strivings, Faust's search for knowledge, Freud's concept of the libido, and Nietzsche's will to power. All of them contribute to an understanding of man's predicament but fail to grasp the essential-existential dialectic because they analyze only man's existential condition. Freud, for example, fails to see the essential nature of the libido that seeks reunion with another. Nietzsche's view of will to power does not represent the ontological nature of man's desire for self-affirmation. Tiebout claims, however, that there is a similarity between Freud's neuroses and Tillich's estrangement, and between Freud's "primary narcissism" and Tillich's "dreaming innocence," pointing out a common viewpoint that "sin presupposes itself." Tillich contends there is a possibility of reunion of the self with the infinite, whereas Freud holds a stoic attitude of detachment and resignation unlike Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's position which offers no hope of reconciliation. Estrangement for Tillich is viewed as both self-loss and world-loss in an ontological sense. Freud claims self-loss is due to the fragmentation of the self and world-loss is due to the pleasure principle that fails to achieve a satisfying meaning in life. Basically, Tillich accepts these views of Freud, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger but goes beyond them to the deeper dimensions that are revealed by the ontological analysis that relates essential-existential being. Estrangement is not a cultural or pathological condition; it is an ontological disparity of being under existential conditions of freedom and destiny. Fromm's view of estrangement as a necessity for human existence reflects a moralistic view that fails to grasp the limitations of man's finite condition. He contends that human existence can be altered on the basis of the uniting power of love that will overcome man's loneliness in a sane society. Tillich does not agree that union between men is a real possibility as Fromm claims because man is not estranged due to his failure to love--he is estranged because estrangement is a quality of the structure of existence. It is true that the contemporary human predicament reflects the dehumanization of man due to technology, but only in part, for man's estrangement reflects in a depth dimension the universal character of existence.

The depth dimension of Tillich's thought about the problem of ambiguity is evident in his awareness of man's ability to encounter the holiness of his being, the essential greatness that is ambiguously mixed with essential tragedy, in the profanization of his existence. Man is cognizant of this dimension of the spirit in his life, a dimension of being that is dependent upon the psychological dimension that facilitates his awareness of the numinous in his depth of being. The evolution of the spirit in man is not, in Tillich's opinion, a theistic additive to man's being, but rather a creative act in the individuation of man in which the dimension of the spirit dominates the psychological dimension. This point of view reflects the holistic emphases of depth psychology and of existential philosophy upon both a cognitive and a moral act by which the psychological center of being is transformed into an independent, self-orienting personal center of man's being. In this way Tillich has overcome the problems encountered by dualism and monism. This depth understanding of man's "personal center" is analogous to Jung's concept of the Self that results from the individuation process. Jung speaks of the orienting function of Tillich's "personal center" as a "unifying" or "transcendent" function in which the psychological energies are not so much integrated as they are held in a "compensatory" relationship by the transforming powers of the Self. Tillich tends to favor the "union" of the dimensions of the spirit and the psychological dimension in his concept of the transcendent function of the personal center. Jung respects the unique independence of the dialectical forces of the psyche and stresses the transforming function of the Self in a compensatory mutual-informing context. Both Tillich and Jung point out the indefinite and incomprehensible nature of the Self, yet claim it has the potentiality for expressing, interpreting, and transforming the symbolic essence of the depth dimension into comprehensible and cognitive form for conscious perception and understanding. This provides for the possibility of man's cognizance of his "ultimate concern" that penetrates consciousness and reveals itself. Jung's phenomenological experiences recognize this numinous, conscious-transcending, phoenix-like quality of the depth of being to manifest a meaning in life. There is perhaps little difference in Tillich's psychological center that transcends the psychological elements that comprise it giving man a personal center in the dimension of the spirit and Jung's Self that is the "God within us" which imparts a teleological dimension in the individuation of man. In each case the Self or personal center is independent in its transforming or transcending position of the elements that comprise it, yet remains united with the destiny that is indigenous in its very being.

A more central and deeper problem is one of existential ambiguity created because morality is the constitutive function of the spirit in Tillich's thought. A moral act is one in which life integrates itself into the dimension of the spirit and an act in which the centered self constitutes itself as a person. The libidinous motives of man in estrangement are concupiscent and drive man to actualize the full potentiality of his essential being. But man also is motivated in his ambiguous awareness to resist these libidinous desires for he is cognizant of the tragedy that awaits greatness. This is the source of his ambiguity. Tillich claims that man only begins to approach an unambiguous state of being when the Self achieves its transcending position and is able to subject the psychological realm to the direction of the dimension of the spirit. Man must suffer the compromise of his essential-existential state of being. Tillich rejects Freud's pleasure-pain principle as valid for the pathological; he accepts, however, the eschatological motivation that Freud's concept of _Todestrieb_ provides for man's self-affirmation. Tillich's view for overcoming the ambiguity of life is very similar to the life-orienting, self-creating principles that governed the unfolding of Jung's life. Jung lived out his life according to the "silent voice" of his essential being that manifested itself as the _prima materia_ of his life in thought as well as in action. These sources have served Jung's unfoldment of life as the ultimate concern has directed Tillich's life. They have made the unambiguous a cognizant potentiality for overcoming the ambiguity of life present in the existential situation.

_The problem of meaning_ in history is evoked by the Protestant principle that has coerced man to reflect upon his existential predicament in terms of the "vocational consciousness" of the history-bearing groups that formulate both an aim of life and the destiny man seeks to fulfill. In the dimension of the spirit man is sensitive to the qualificative character of his participation in the historical dimension and the significance of his creative potential for his existence. He also senses the necessity and contingencies of the trends, structures, and the periods of history and the effects that the ontological elements have had upon man and community in each of these aspects. The problem of meaning is crucial in Tillich's thought because life strives towards self-integration despite the possibility of self-disintegration in every history-creating act. Man must endure the existential ambiguities in search of essential meaning of his finitude.

The Protestant principle opens up the deeper dimensions of historical consciousness for Tillich in the concepts of theonomy, kairos, and the demonic. In theonomy Tillich grasps the ultimate meaning of existence because religion is the substance of culture that provides the depth dimension or ultimate meaning of history for man in comprehensible cultural forms. Culture in this theonomous perspective is the expression of the telos that represents the theos known in the logos and in the place where the Self is seen under God without arbitrariness or imposed authority. It is where man grasps the transcendent meaning of history. The kairos is significant to Tillich because it provides the means by which man can grasp the depth dimension of history in heirophanous events that have occured in the profanization of history. The kairos represents the dynamic activity of the ground of being, the "unconditional quality" that is experienced by man in reality. This is not the occasion in which man interprets a meaning from history but rather one in which he receives a meaning for his human existence in being grasped by the fate and destiny of his time. The demonic is a crucial concept for Tillich because it possesses unusual power, both negatively and positively, for releasing the meaning of history in the depth dimension of the unconscious psyche. The demonic watches over the meaningful symbols lost to man in the depths of his unconscious, ready to reveal as well as to hide their eternal verities. It is the central factor in Tillich's thought for deriving the depth dimension of the meaning of history and man's place in it.

The depth dimension in Tillich's thought about the problem of meaning focuses upon the demonic, the form it gives to the creative-destructive forces that reside in the human psyche, and the effect it has on man's personality and social mores. The demonic achieves its fullness in personality where it seeks creative expressive as the hero of the libidinous energies that have been repressed. As the demonic erupts into conscious expression it carries forth dialectical and ambiguous materials in symbolic form that are incomprehensible to man in his existential condition. As grace reveals the unconditional so, too, can demonry as it breaks into the center of man's personality where it usually seeks to divide the sacred from the profane, to set them in conflict, and to possess them after its own intent. Estranged from the depth resources, consciousness is driven to absolute forms of security on the horizontal dimension of life. These superficial forms, however, are inadequate to inform man of the meaning of history and provide relevant guides to his life. The degree to which man distrusts the demonic and separates himself from its creative and powerful resources, is the degree to which he also distrusts the ground of being that is manifest in the depth of his being. He fears he will be destroyed by the unconditional as by the demonic and resists the journey into the darkness of the unconscious depths where the creative sources of life also reside. Man is aware, from the witnesses of the ages, that the creative depths of being hold the potentiality of being which is available to the courageous who are able to grasp and transform the demonic powers into a positive meaning for life. It is this fact that has impressed Tillich most in the later years of his life. The profanization of the divine overcomes the demonic as reality is given expression and meaning. The powers of the demonic are conquered as man is able to elevate the creative power of the ground of being, and meaning is derived from these dynamic and vital resources of the psyche.

Tillich does not believe that the unconscious forces can be subdued by a conscious autonomy as Freud has claimed in his psychoanalytic theory. All resistance of the unconscious powers tends only to increase them so that they burst out at some time in irrational forms that cannot be comprehended by man. Tillich has learned from Heidegger that the "call to conscience" is the demand upon man to actualize his genuine potentialities. It is in a "mode of silence," Tillich believes, that man hears the call, responds to it with courage, and risks his personal center to the creativity of the psychic forces and the meaning born by them. Man must not fear to acknowledge what seems to be the dark and evil forces in the depth of his being, for his transcendent power will unite them with the ground of being and, in turn, achieve a sense of unity within himself and find a meaning in history. With the process of individuation comes the awareness of the telos manifest in the kairoi of existence, for historical interpretation is self-reflection and man perceives the spiritual presuppositions that undergird life. This is the basic principle that supports Tillich's theonomous interpretation of culture. It has structural precedence in Freud's concept of the "ego-energy" that comprises erotic and thanatotic forces into acceptable cathexes in the secondary process. It also appears in Jung's concept of the Heraclitic eantiodromic law that compensates the antagonizing forces of the psyche into a holistic unfolding of the Self. Tillich, as well as Jung and Freud, understands the importance for holding the creative-destructive forces of the psyche in an interdependent relationship using their positive-negative aspects in a meaning-producing correlation. The Protestant principle has made it clear that man must suffer the tragic and the great in the depth dimension of his being if he is to exact a meaning in history and life from the pleromatic condition of his existence.

## 1. THE DEPTH DIMENSION IN TILLICH'S EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN SITUATION

The depth dimension in Tillich's existential analysis of the human situation reflects the influence of depth psychology on his ontology. Ontologically Tillich has penetrated the essential-existential structure of being through the analytical insights of depth psychology. The ultimate concerns of man have been revealed by the phenomenological analysis of the human psyche. The wealth of resources and materials about the nature of man has been correlated by depth psychology's methodology. The depth psychological analysis of the human predicament has been a normative factor for validating the ontological conceptualization of man's finite condition. Basically, depth psychology has provided a profound holistic conceptualization of the nature of man from both a theoretical and a practical point of view.

The most important single contribution to the depth dimension of Tillich's thought about the human situation has been depth psychology's understanding of the dynamic and creative functions of the unconscious psyche and its determinative influence upon consciousness. It has shown Tillich the way to approach the rich and vital resources of the unconscious which he could follow with his own philosophical and theological resources. It has pointed out the dangers of demonry as well as the potentiality of being in the grace of the ground of Being that is transparent to man in the depths of his reason. Depth psychology has reinforced Tillich's persistent search for and affirmation of the ultimate concerns as legitimate movements of the Self for providing meaning and purpose and direction to man's life. Tillich has been able to comprehend the ambiguities of the multidimensional aspects of life, the existential estrangement of man from his essential being, and the ontological anxiety that is evoked by the transcendent awareness of his finitude on the basis of depth psychology's analysis of the interdependent relationship of the unconscious with the conscious psyche.

Depth psychology has been decisive and indispensable for Tillich's analysis of the human situation. He has both implicitly and explicitly admitted the significant contributions of depth psychology to his thought. Depth psychology has indeed been the source of his fruitful analysis of the human predicament, the medium by which he could correlate the critical insights and rich resources of man's knowledge about his finite conditions, and the norm for guiding his ontological conceptualization about the existential-essential states of human existence. The theology of Paul Tillich gives due respect and honor to depth psychology for its significant contributions to theology.

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